TOWARD AN INTERPRETATION OF HEGEL'S PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES

by

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ABSTRACT

The basis for a new interpretation of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (PhG) is developed from an intensive examination of the Preface, the Introduction, and the first four chapters of the text. The central thesis is that the PhG is not only a brilliant *tour de force* but also coherent, intelligible, and philosophically revolutionary for the reader who comes to grasp Hegel's phenomenological method and systematically works through the text in terms of this method (rather than that, say, of the *Enzyklopädie*). Hegel's use of the terms "wir," "für uns," and "unser" are seen to be aids for such a reading of the text because these terms refer to the reader of the PhG.

The object in Hegel's phenomenological method is knowledge as it appears. This method is *descriptive* in two senses: (1) the question of the existence of its object (i.e., the knowing subject described) is suspended and (2) the describing subject suspends his judgment, thereby allowing the described subject to (a) select its own object, (b) judge its object on the basis of its own criterion, and (c) transform its object together with itself through its own acts of judgment. The knowing subject is accordingly described *as* a process (i.e., (a)–(c)) and this process is describable in so far as its moments manifest themselves as appearances (i.e., as language, labor or work). Moreover, it is this described process rather than Hegel's method which shows itself to be 'dialectical.' The object so described is found to be self-interpreting, self-constituting and self-transforming. As the reader discovers in Chapter IV of the PhG, the object which lends itself to such a description is *Geist*. But this discovery is only possible for the reader who has not merely understood Hegel's phenomenological 'program' but has also come to terms with those epistemological preconceptions which systematically outrule the possibility of comprehending phenomenological descriptions in Hegel's sense of the term. The first three chapters of the PhG are shown to provide a way out of the paradoxes of epistemology in that they force the reader to work through them.

The major transition of the work is found at the end of Chapter III, where the reader sees that all consciousness-of is at bottom self-consciousness, and at the beginning of Chapter IV, where immediate self-consciousness reveals itself to be desire. Desire is defined as the process through which the described subject reduces all of its objects to a negative unity with itself. The development from desire to Spirit, Hegel's phenomenological anthropogeny, is found in his description of two desiring subjects encountering one another as objects. Owing to the manifest nature of desire, this encounter becomes a struggle to death, and a relationship of Lordship and Servitude is seen to result when one of the adversaries allows its life to be conserved by the other, thus recognizing the other as the living presence of death. The phenomenologically observable middle terms for the subsequent development of structures of recognition (i.e., shapes of Spirit) are, first, nature and, later, language.

The closing pages of this dissertation constitute an essay in imaginative generalization showing how the foregoing analysis of Hegel's phenomenological method and his concept of recognition suggest a new interpretation of Chapters VI and VII of the PhG and an appraisal of modern history peculiar to the Hegel of Jena.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter **Page**

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

If the history of western philosophy may be summed up as a series of footnotes to Plato, perhaps its most recent phase may be epitomized as a postscript to Hegel. But however true such vast generalizations might be, it is impossible to doubt that the influence of both thinkers has been prodigious. They have shaped the course of human events, not merely in the world of academe but perhaps even more profoundly in the texture of values which constitutes our civilization. The works of Plato and Hegel must therefore be recognized as singularly important sources for those who seek to grasp the problem of man within a philosophic vision which is both comprehensive and timely.

Like Plato's *Republic*, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the most comprehensive expression of a great philosopher. Both works may be read and enjoyed for the sheer artistic excellence of numerous passages; and both likewise present structural complexities and technical difficulties which challenge the reader whose concern is systematic as well as literary. In the case of the second work, however, it has been especially tempting to assign a large measure of its philosophical difficulty to the willful obscurity of its author.

The present study does not pretend to suggest that Hegel's greatest work will ever possess for its readers that native grace and charm which has immortalized Plato's *Republic*. But it does propose a way toward overcoming some of the fundamental problems inhibiting both intelligibility and enjoyment for the reader of the *Phenomenology*. Beginning with the assumption that the work can only be understood in terms of its unique phenomenological method, this essay will first attempt to show as precisely as possible the radically new departure which Hegel has made from the classical mode of conceiving philosophical issues and presenting them to a reader. It will then proceed to give a fresh interpretation of the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology* illustrating how these may be experienced as a way of overcoming the preconceptions which every philosophical reader of our age consciously or unconsciously brings to bear in his study of a philosophical text. With this preparatory work accomplished it will be possible to begin an interpretation of Hegel's most important insight, his description of man as Spirit.

There is probably no term in the *Phenomenology* more likely to put the contemporary reader on his guard than "Spirit." Although "phenomenology" has in recent years attained a certain respectability even in Anglo-American philosophical discussions, "Spirit" still seems to suggest all of the most unscientific features of theological speculation and German Idealist metaphysics. It might therefore be tempting to focus on Hegel's positive contribution to what we today call phenomenology and thus draw attention away from those terms which most readily call to mind the well known image of Hegel as the esoteric philosopher *par excellence*. But such an interpretation would be difficult to sustain, not merely because *Geist* appears prominently in the title and throughout the text, but more importantly because *Geist* is precisely the generic term for the kind of phenomenon which the *Phenomenology* describes.

It will not be possible to give a full interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of man in this essay but an attempt will be made to show that Hegel's phenomenological method reveals a comprehensive image of the human spirit and a conception of human history which, despite ambiguities of the text, offers an insight into historical meaning quite different from the relativistic and paradoxical views characteristic of our post-Christian epoch.

CHAPTER TWO

HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

A. The Problem of Interpretation.

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* provides for the student of philosophy a unique feast. In its method or form of exposition it is without precedent[1] in the history of philosophy; and as a unified vision of human experience as a whole it finds no rival, even in the subsequent encyclopedic writings and lectures of Hegel himself. In this chapter an effort will be made to grasp the revolutionary significance of Hegel's phenomenological method.

Perhaps the most serious obstacle to an understanding of this method has been set up by Hegel himself. With the exception of non-academic writers such as Goethe, Marx, and Bruno Bauer, the term "Hegelian" was throughout the 19th century almost universally associated with the speculative system of Hegel's Heidelberg and Berlin periods. This system generally was seen to divide itself neatly into three parts: (1) Logic or the ontology of the Absolute Idea (i.e., God) before the creation of the world, (2) the Philosophy of Nature or the metaphysic of God's self-externalization in the material world and (3) the Philosophy of Spirit or the history of God's return to himself (i.e., to the state described by Aristotle as self-thinking thought, νόησις νοήσεως) through the development of human history, especially in art, religion, and philosophy.[2]

The present study does not propose to challenge the significance of this monumental achievement. It seeks merely to avoid an uncritical identification of the *Phenomenology* and its method with a part of Hegel's mature system.[3] This mode of interpretation is, of course, not without precedent. Ever since the publication of Dilthey's *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels* in 1905 there has been a growing awareness of the independent significance of Hegel's pre-Nuremberg writings and, especially through Kroner, Hartmann, Hyppolite, Kojève, and van der Meulen,[4] of the *Phenomenology* in particular.

But in view of the fact that none of these writings have appeared in English, it is perhaps not surprising that the Anglo-Saxon world has tended to sustain a distinctly nineteenth century conception of Hegel. Moreover, and this is no doubt of paramount importance, the only available English translation of the *Phenomenology*, that of Baillie, is avowedly[5] based on the model of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*. As Baillie rightly acknowledges,[6] "a translation of a work of such originality and profound insight into the operations of the human spirit—a profundity which is often dark as well as deep—must necessarily be in large measure an interpretation of the thought as well as a rendering of the language of the text." His translation has accordingly tended to sacrifice precision for fluency in those sections of the text which, presumably, appeared to him "dark" or failed to corroborate his interpretation. This interpretative tendency is particularly evident in his rendering of the sections on Morality and Religion as well as his free translation of such terms as *Entäusserung* and his generous additions of 'we' where *wir* does not appear in the original.

Since the present study is primarily concerned with the method of Hegel's *Phenomenology* rather than with that of his later writings, the analysis will be based on the original German text.[7] Many fruitful comparisons could, no doubt, be made between the method of the *Phenomenology* and that of

Hegel's mature system, but such a study falls outside the scope of this project. The aim of this chapter will be the laying of a foundation for an interpretation of Hegel's phenomenological anthropology and his phenomenology of the community.

B. The Non-Dialectical Character of Hegel's Phenomenological Method.

There is probably no aspect of 'Hegelianism' (and Marxism as well) which has attracted more attention and occasioned more confusion than the so-called 'dialectical method.' Every university student has doubtless heard at least one lecture on this 'secret' of Hegelianism, whether in terms of the notorious triad: thesis-antithesis-synthesis, or in some more sophisticated terminology. This is particularly noteworthy, not only because, as will be shown, it misrepresents Hegel, but because Hegel was probably the *first* philosopher whose thought was radically and self-consciously non-dialectical.

Although scores of commentators, from Trendelenburg to Findlay, have denied that Hegel employed a consistently dialectical method (claiming on the contrary that his thought only attains its apparent dynamic through surreptitious appeals to experience), Ivan Iljin was, so far as I am aware, the first to develop the insight that "Hegel, in his philosophical method, was no dialectician."[8] Iljin's argument, persuasive though it is, does not focus particularly on the *Phenomenology*, but deals rather with Hegel's authorship as a whole. Perhaps the most influential, albeit indirect work opening the way for an appreciation of Hegel's non-dialectical phenomenology is Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.[9] This influence is seen most dramatically in Kojève's lectures.[10]

What, then, is Hegel's phenomenological method if it is not dialectical? In so far as it can be characterized in a word, it is *descriptive*. The study of science, in Hegel's sense, requires that the student, through a tremendous effort of restraint, give himself completely over to the phenomena. This, I take it, is what Hegel means by the famous phrase "die Anstrengung des Begriffs" (PhG 48). The true philosopher must strenuously avoid the temptation of interrupting the flow of the content described by the introjection of interpretive models; he must rather give up this instinctively felt prerogative or 'freedom' "und statt das willkürlich bewegende Prinzip des Inhalts zu sein, diese Freiheit in ihn zu versenken, ihn durch seine eigne Natur, d.h. durch das Selbst als das seinige, sich bewegen zu lassen und diese Bewegung zu betrachten"* (PhG 48).

But if the phenomenological method must not interfere with the movement of the subject matter, it must also abstain from a purely negative attitude vis-à-vis all content, e.g., the stance of the disengaged analyst who removes all life from the content, going straight after its truth value by a more or less elaborate and systematic employment of the formal criterion of tautologyhood. This methodological device, which is of unquestionable value in the mathematical sciences, is totally inadequate in the field of philosophy. The total affirmations or total negations evinced by a two-valued logic of tautological truths versus non-tautological falsehoods *eo ipso* exclude from consideration the

* "and instead of being the arbitrarily moving principle of the content, to submerge this freedom *in* the content and let the content be moved through its own nature, i.e., through the self as the self of the content, and to observe this movement."

characteristics of negation inherent *in* the subject matter itself. And it is precisely this internal negative movement which the Hegelian phenomenological method seeks to describe.

If, then, this method rejects the central criterion of formal or mathematical logic, it would seem fitting to inquire what sort of standard Hegel proposes to put in its stead. His answer to this question, which constitutes the theme of the brief but all-important Introduction to the *Phenomenology*, is also the clearest indication of his radical departure from the previous history of western philosophy. He acknowledges (PhG 70) that if the *Phenomenology* were to be regarded as an exposition in which science is *related* to knowledge as it appears, or as an inquiry into the nature of human understanding or reason, then it would indeed, after the manner of a Locke or a Kant, require some sort of fundamental presupposition which could serve as a criterion. But instead of adapting himself to this classical philosophical orientation, Hegel, to borrow a phrase from Kierkegaard, has found a way of "going beyond Socrates"—and Kant as well.[11] Unlike that of any previous philosophy, Hegel's phenomenological method takes the "paradox of learning" of Plato's *Meno* (Steph., 80d) in complete seriousness: "Aber hier, wo die Wissenschaft erst auftritt, hat weder sie selbst, noch was es sei, sich als das Wesen oder als das Ansich gerechtfertigt …"* (PhG 70).

The argument of the Introduction divides itself at this point into three exceedingly compact and organically inseparable moments. The *first* concerns the abstract distinction between knowledge and truth on which all previous epistemological theories have turned. This distinction is based upon the observation that consciousness itself "… *unterscheidet* nämlich etwas von sich, worauf es sich zugleich *bezieht*"† (PhG 70). The *determinate* aspect of this interrelationship, the something which is said to be *for* consciousness, the "being-for-another," is called knowledge. But, on further consideration, we also notice the side of that which is determined, viz., the *determinable*. Or, to employ the expression of Brentano, consciousness is always consciousness *of*. This aspect of "being-in-itself," whether regarded as a material thing, an abstract entity, a thing-in-itself, or by whatever expression, has tended to be associated in philosophical theory with *truth*, and philosophers have accordingly sought to establish criteria for determining the truth of knowledge.

It is particularly important to notice that Hegel (and, on this point, also Husserl and the 'phenomenological movement') does not join in this time-honored enterprise. From the viewpoint of the PhG, the question of the truth *of* knowledge is not a matter of direct concern; it is, in the modern idiom, 'bracketed.' The only object with which the PhG is concerned is knowledge as it appears, already organized in the form of a 'science' involving some systematic distinction between knowledge and truth.[12] If, on the contrary, we[13] were to concern ourselves with the truth *of* knowledge, i.e., of what knowledge is in itself, then we should have to provide some criterion whereby that truth could be determined. But it is clear that the truth thus attained, if indeed any such knowledge could be acquired, would not be the truth of knowledge, its being-in-itself; it could at most be *our* knowledge of it or its being-for-us. Moreover, as Hegel observes (PhG 71), the criterion would be *our* criterion

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* "But here, where science first appears, neither science itself nor whatever might be taken as its essence has justified itself *as* essence or as something inherently real."

† "… *distinguishes* from itself something to which it at the same time *relates* itself."

and that for which our criterion was to serve as a determinate "hätte ihn nicht notwendig anzuerkennen."*

The first moment of Hegel's methodological exposition therefore serves as a preliminary elucidation of what is implied by undertaking a phenomenological description of knowledge as it appears (PhG 66). Since the object of our inquiry is knowing, any distinction on our part between subject and object would be a playing with mere abstractions. *Our* object is at once and inseparably both the object-knowing subject and the object known-by-the-subject. Thus our object, consciousness or spirit, contains this subject-object distinction within itself and requires no further distinction by us.

The second moment of Hegel's argument is equally far-reaching and revolutionary though its philosophical significance can be no more than adumbrated here. It directly concerns the *Begriff*[14] but it also involves a radically new insight into the perennial problem of time and eternity. Just as the object of knowledge is seen to fall *within* the object of *our* inquiry, Hegel also makes the unprecedented move of regarding the *Begriff* as something completely within the temporal process of the consciousness or spirit under investigation.[15] Thus the *Begriff* is not regarded as identical with timeless eternity, as in the Parmenidean tradition, or, after the manner of Plato or Whitehead, as an eternal object which "participates" or "ingresses" in the temporal realm of human experience or of "actual occasions." It is also to be distinguished from the Aristotelian and Nietzschean interpretation of the *Begriff* as something which, although falling within time, e.g., as a "natural kind," nevertheless undergoes a cyclical process of eternal recurrence within time itself. For Hegel the *Begriff is* time, or "Die *Zeit* ist der *Begriff* selbst, der *da ist*"† (PhG 558).[16]

Since the *Begriff* is seen to be within the knowing process of human consciousness or spirit, it follows that "Das Bewußtsein gibt seinen Maßstab an ihm selbst, und die Untersuchung wird dadurch eine Vergleichung seiner mit sich selbst sein"‡ (PhG 71). To understand how this comparison takes place we must observe that just as consciousness or spirit was seen to be at once both "subjective" and "objective," this same duality holds true for the *Begriff*: consciousness itself distinguishes between (a) the *Begriff qua* knowledge or thought and (b) the *Begriff qua* object, being, or in-itself. Hence there is within consciousness not only something which is taken to be *for it*; consciousness also assumes that that which is for it, is in-itself or has an independent status as well. Accordingly, we see that the *Begriff* has two moments. If we take the *Begriff qua* knowledge, then the criterion for this *Begriff qua* knowledge will be its object or what is said to exist in-itself. The comparison, in this instance, will consist in seeing whether the *Begriff* corresponds to the object, i.e., what consciousness regards as the criterion of truth. But, on the other hand, if we take the *Begriff* to be the object as it is essentially or in-itself, then the *Begriff* itself will be the criterion for the *Begriff qua* known, i.e., the *Begriff qua* object of knowledge. Here the comparison consists in seeing whether the *Begriff qua* known or *qua* object corresponds to the *Begriff* itself.[17]

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* "would not necessarily have to recognize it."

† "*Time* is the *Begriff* itself which *exists*."

‡ "Consciousness in itself provides its own criterion, and thereby the investigation becomes consciousness' comparison of its self with its self."

Although both aspects of the *Begriff* must no doubt be taken into account in any adequate description of the knowing process—and an emphasis on one or the other has traditionally served as the touchstone for a realist or idealist epistemology—Hegel's descriptive method seems, in this second moment of its explication, to be in danger of losing its purely descriptive character in virtue of the necessity of *our* determining which aspect of the *Begriff* is to serve as criterion.

His answer to this problem is as simple as it is—when the reader has followed the presentation through the section called "Consciousness"—convincing. He observes, namely, that both of these processes are the same. The criterion is selected by consciousness itself and, since both moments of the process fall within our object, i.e., knowledge as it appears, any selection of criteria on *our* part would be superfluous.[18] Needless to say, the adoption of such a purely *passive* and descriptive stance vis-à-vis *our* object does require a great deal of restraint; it is not the traditional way of 'doing' philosophy.

The third moment in the development of Hegel's phenomenological method is based on the observation that consciousness not only selects its own criterion but is also the *comparison* of its knowledge with its own criterion. This is based on the fact that consciousness is "einerseits Bewußtsein des Gegenstandes, anderseits Bewußtsein seiner selbst; Bewußtsein dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, und Bewußtsein seines Wissens davon"* (PhG 72). Consciousness is therefore both consciousness *of* something, and consciousness of its self. (This second aspect of consciousness must not be simply identified with that section of the PhG explicitly called "Self-Consciousness." As a moment of human knowing, self-consciousness is a factor, however much explicitly emphasized, throughout the entire course of experience from "Sense Certainty" to "Absolute Knowledge."[19]) And in view of this characteristic feature of consciousness, it is at the same time conscious of its criterion for truth and conscious of its knowledge of the truth in question. And since both the criterion and the knowledge are for the same consciousness, their comparison is a fundamental feature in the movement of consciousness itself.

It is indeed true that consciousness' criterion for truth is only a criterion in so far as it is known by consciousness, i.e., as it is *for* consciousness and not as it is in itself. And this observation has driven many less descriptive philosophers to some form of scepticism, for the presumptive criterion does not really seem to be what it 'ought' to be (viz., something independent of knowledge) and hence seems incapable of serving as a standard for knowledge. But for Hegel, whose attention is steadfastly focussed on knowledge as it appears, all such talk about 'capacities' and 'intentions' is beside the point. The crucial point is that consciousness, in all the forms of its appearance, *does* draw a distinction between its criterion, or what the object *is* in itself, and its knowledge, or the being of the object *for* consciousness (PhG 72). And if, in the course of the comparison, consciousness should find that its criterion and its knowledge do not correspond, it will, on the basis of its own assumptions, have to change its knowledge in order to make it correspond to its criterion and hence 'true.'

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* "on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of its self; consciousness of that, which to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth."

But it also follows from these same assumptions that a change in consciousness' knowledge *eo ipso* involves a change in its criterion, for the criterion was based upon the object and, indeed, upon the object *qua* known. Hence with a change in the knowledge for the sake of truth, the criterion for truth is itself changed. Consciousness thus discovers that the process in which it placed its knowledge in *doubt* (Zweifel), all the while certain that it held a firm criterion for what the object of its knowledge was in-itself, turns out to be a movement in which it loses its own truth; the "path of doubt" is transformed into a "highway of despair" (Verzweiflung) (PhG 67). Moreover, this despair is not something more or less arbitrarily imposed on consciousness from without; it is immanent in the very movement of consciousness itself. Thus, in Baillie's poignant translation, consciousness "suffers this violence at its own hands."[20]

The positive aspect of this third moment of Hegel's method is that the process of examining knowledge, which of necessity involves a criterion, is actually (and equally necessarily) an examination of the criterion as well. And with the emergence of a new criterion, consciousness is confronted by an object which is for it new and now true. At this point in the exposition, one is, of course, compelled to ask, "Whence this new object?" or, more sceptically, "Isn't Hegel here attempting to justify that sleight-of-hand trick for which his dialectical method is so notorious?"

If this 'new object' is indeed the product of Hegel's 'dialectical method,' the traditional charge against him is completely justified. But Hegel's 'method,' if indeed it can properly be called a method in the usual sense of the term, is radically *un*dialectical. It is the experience of consciousness itself which is dialectical and Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a viable philosophical enterprise precisely to the extent that it merely *describes* this dialectical process. The "new object" therefore must not be introduced by the philosopher or the true scientist; it must arise out of the course of the experience described—and not merely *qua* described, but through itself.

Experience itself is therefore described as dialectical to the extent that it generates new objects for itself. But the "new object" seems to be no more than a reflection on the part of consciousness, and a reflection which is not based on anything objective, but merely on its knowledge of its first object. The term 'reflection,' however, is misleading; it tends to suggest something which takes place more or less immediately. But experience is a *process*, it is something which takes time; and the process of experience is precisely constituted by the alteration of its first object, and therewith its first criterion. The alteration, in turn, must be seen as a negation of the *appearance* of the first object within consciousness' experience. Thus the negating process of alteration is not an immediate, empty, or absolute negation; the appearance which is negated has content and the alteration is a *determinate* negation (PhG 68) which, *qua result* of the negated appearance, also has a *content*.

Thus the "new object" is not simply the product of an immediate reflection; it is constituted by the process of negating the first object; "er ist die über ihn gemachte Erfahrung"* (PhG 73). But Hegel's concept of determinate negation can only be grasped through a careful analysis of (a) the role

* "it is the experience which has been made concerning the first object."

of appearance in experience and (b) why "we" must describe the experience of consciousness as a phenomenon. This analysis will be the task of the next two sections.

C. Experience as a Phenomenon.

C-1. *Appearance, Action and Description.*

Hegel's concept of experience is both more restrictive and at the same time far more inclusive than what is usually understood by the word. And the intelligibility of the entire PhG hinges upon a firm grasp of what phenomenal experience, knowing as it appears, consists in. In the first place, phenomenal experience is more restrictive than other philosophical interpretations of experience because experience, to be described as a phenomenon, must *appear*. Thus mere intentions, capacities, dispositions, meanings, etc., do not, as such, constitute experience. In so far as such 'mental entities' are recognized as the real content of experience, the attempt at phenomenological description is condemned to acknowledge the validity of Prufrock's claim: "That is not it at all, that is not what I meant, at all"; or the equally enigmatic 'meaning' which is presumably expressed in the assertion: "The present King of France is bald."

For Hegel, on the contrary, genuine experience *is* a self-revealing process and philosophy is not conceived as a systematic analysis of a presumed relationship between meanings and assertions. Experience is constituted by an *act*: something which is actually said or done. Experience is therefore revealed in language and work and what is so revealed can be *described*: it is an *act*, "und es kann von ihr *gesagt* werden, was *sie ist*"* (PhG 236). In the act, the 'inexpressible meaning' is simply abolished, i.e., it is expressed.

But if this restriction of experience to that which can be described appears to be a narrowing of what philosophers have usually understood by the term, the wealth of human experience[21] actually described in the PhG is the most eloquent demonstration that Hegel's method is far more 'empirical' than that of the philosophers who call themselves 'empiricists.'[22]

The kinds of phenomenal experience described in the PhG are basically two: (1) the acts of individual men considered in abstraction from their social and historical "world," and (2) the acts of a community or a "world" in the course of its historical development (PhG 315). This emphasis on the forms of experience in terms of the nature of the acting subject suggests[23] a systematic division of the PhG into two parts. The first, covering the sections on "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness," and "Reason," constitutes the anthropological part. It is a phenomenological description of man *qua* individual, or "natural consciousness," in the various shapes (Gestalten) of his theoretical (i.e., in language) and practical (i.e., through labor and work) struggle for truth. The second, spanning the sections from "Spirit" through "Religion" to "Absolute Knowledge," concerns the sequence of shapes assumed by man in his life with other men. Although (as we shall have further occasion to notice) Hegel himself is not entirely consistent in his account of the historical relations between 'Spirit' and 'Religion' (compare PhG 476 with 557), it is clear that the entire second half of the PhG deals with the development of associated humanity (in the shape of a *Gemeinschaft* or a *Gesellschaft*) and that it is

* "and it can be *said* of it, what *it is*."

only this part which can be spoken of as historical in the proper sense of the term. "Alle bisherigen Gestalten des Bewußtseins sind Abstraktionen desselben," i.e., of historical or *daseiender* Spirit; "Dies Isolieren solcher Momente hat ihn selbst zur *Voraussetzung* und zum *Bestehen* …"* (PhG 314).

C-2. *A Metacritical Digression.*

It is particularly important in this connection to avoid two popular but misleading interpretations of the structure of the PhG. Both of these views are supported by evidence external to the work itself. The first is based on the structure suggested by the table of contents, in terms of which the PhG is divided into *three prima facie* incompatible parts: "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness," and "Reason" (Lasson proposed the title "Das absolute Subjekt" and Baillie "Free Concrete Mind" for this problematical third part). Although this manner of viewing the PhG has the merit of preserving a semblance of that triadicity for which Hegel's later writings are so noted, I am unaware of any thus oriented study which has succeeded in illuminating the internal structure of the PhG itself. It is of course possible to conclude, with Findlay, that there is no fundamentally inherent structure, beyond a certain "queer aesthetic appropriateness"[24] of Hegel's transitions. But the more popular gambit has been to acknowledge the inappropriateness or inadequacy, especially of the third triad, and then explain it away in terms of such philosophically irrelevant biographical data as Hegel's pressing financial situation in 1806, his impatient quest for prestige, or his unsympathetic publisher.

In this connection it is necessary to consider one specific fact revealed by Theodor Haering in his much discussed speech before the third Hegelkongress in 1933. Whatever one might think of Haering's radical hypotheses on the shifting of Hegel's 'intention' during the course of his writing the PhG (these are subjected to a sober review by Hoffmeister in his editor's introduction to the PhG, pp. XXVIIIff.), it is of singular importance to note Haering's discovery[25] that the triadic division of the PhG *as a whole* was not introduced by Hegel himself. During the printing of the first part of the manuscript Hegel did insert the headings (A) Consciousness (B) Self-Consciousness and (C) Reason. But Hegel did not continue this division under Latin capital *letters* in the second part of his manuscript; he only carried out the five-fold Roman *numeral* division of the first part, viz.: I. Sense Certainty, the This, and Meaning, II. Perception, the Thing, and Deception, III. Force and Understanding, Appearance and Supersensible World, IV. the Truth of Self-Certainty, and V. Certainty and Truth of Reason. Following this same *numerical* scheme, the second part was divided by Hegel into VI. Spirit, VII. Religion, and VIII. Absolute Knowledge. With no continuation of the Latin *letter* division at hand, Hegel's publisher, Goebhardt, adopted the expedient of arranging the table of contents as follows:

(A) Consciousness
(B) Self-Consciousness
(C) (AA) Reason
(BB) Spirit
(CC) Religion
(DD) Absolute Knowledge

* "All of the previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from historical or existing Spirit. . . . This (abstractive) isolating of such moments *presupposes* Spirit and *requires* Spirit for its *subsistence*."

Thus the mystifying tetrad of double Latin capitals, which together appear to constitute the third member of an overarching triad, is seen to be a product of what Hegel in a letter of February 20, 1807 to his friend Niethammer called "diese Druckerei."[26]

The second 'systematic' interpretation is not so widespread, but it is equally misleading and external to the text. It consists, again, in dividing the PhG into three parts; but this time the triad is directly based upon the *Encyclopedia*. The first, "Subjective" part, is said to include "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason"; the second, "Objective" part is taken to be "Spirit," and the third, "Absolute" part is viewed as "Religion" and "Absolute Knowledge." This interpretation has found particular favor among Marxists, e.g., Lukács and Bloch.[27] They have tended to rest their claims on Marx's presentation of the PhG's table of contents in his "Paris Manuscripts" of 1844. This sort of argument from authority, as George Kline[28] and Jan van der Meulen[29] observe, is clearly illicit; it is, however, even more astonishing in view of the fact, unmentioned by either Lukács and Bloch, or Kline and van der Meulen, that Marx's version of the table of contents does not divide the PhG into three, but rather *four* parts.[30] But since Marx himself does not, either in these manuscripts or elsewhere, explicitly develop this tetradic division, we may conclude our review of the 'Marxist' triadic division with this remark.

There have been, of course, numerous other hypotheses concerning the structure of the PhG or the number of times Hegel starts afresh his presentation of human history in the PhG. In this study, however, we shall not be primarily concerned with either of these intriguing questions. The focus will rather be upon the description of phenomenal experience as it appears in the PhG; and, as we have seen, Hegel himself describes the appearance of human experience in two major forms: (1) The experience of man *qua* individual and (2) the experience of man *qua* associated. It is perhaps interesting to notice that experience in both of these forms passes successively through stages in which "Consciousness," "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason" are prevalent; "Religion," for example, is explicitly referred to as "das Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes" (PhG 473). Thus our analysis of Hegel's description of experience will have implications for a study of the PhG's structure, but the structure itself will not be the central issue.[31]

C-3. *The Negativity of Action in Phenomenal Experience.*

We have seen that the absolutely essential precondition for a phenomenological description of experience is the actual *appearance* of experience itself. The term "appearance" has, however, two distinct usages in the PhG, and Hegel's phenomenological method is bound to seem either exotic or capricious if these two usages are not distinguished. The first of these concerns the appearance *of* experience; the second concerns appearance *in* experience. A great deal of what is unique, and consequently 'unfamiliar' about Hegel's method is based on his insight into and his consistent awareness of this twofold character of appearance throughout most of the PhG. The appearance *of* experience is the condition necessary for the possibility of a phenomenological description; it is the basic (or direct) presupposition of the PhG as a philosophical work. This presupposition must also be shared by the reader, i.e., the philosophical "we" of the PhG. We shall discuss this problem of the

metaphenomenal appearance *of* experience and the philosophical "we" in section D below. Here attention will be directed to the problem of appearance as it is revealed *within* experience.

The experiencing subject, either as an individual or a community, tacitly or explicitly presupposes a distinction between appearance and reality, between his knowledge and his criterion. Appearance as such is taken to be something involving time; reality is felt to be something which is at least in principle timeless or somehow eternal. But as long as this sense of the unchangeable remains a mere feeling, there is no experience in the proper sense of the word. Human experience must involve action, it must involve an expression of the inwardly felt reality—which as such is no reality. This is what Hegel means by an *act*: it is the revelation of 'reality' through the process of letting it appear. Action, in turn, has two basic forms: language and work.

Both forms of action entail an objectification of what is otherwise merely 'meant,' 'intended' or 'presumed' to be. Consequently the subject who actively expresses himself in the world of appearance puts himself at the same time under the *risk* that his sense of reality will be altered or perverted (PhG 237). The risk, however, is inevitable for the experiencing subject; the only seeming alternative is a solipsism of the present moment. But this is only theoretically conceivable as a 'philosophical' stance which one tacitly 'intends' or 'means' to assume. As Hegel demonstrates in his opening chapter on "Sense Certainty," it is impossible for this solipsism to say what it 'means' because any saying involves language and language is a form of expression or objectification. And *qua* objectified, such a 'meaning' is patently contradicted: the solipsist's "here and now," once it has been written down, becomes a 'there and then.' In its actual appearance, in language, 'meaning' must mix with time; and by this process its semblance of atemporal reality is simply negated.

But a negation of meaning-solipsism in no way entails a negation of that sense of eternal reality for which the language of sense certainty is merely the most immediate expression. The entire course of human experience, both individual and collective, can be viewed as a series of progressively less immediate or more mediated expressions of this quest for certainty and truth in the form of something which will not, like Chronos, be devoured by Zeus. This, indeed, is Hegel's viewpoint in the PhG.

To sustain a sense of security with respect to the real which is felt to be eternally invariant, the commonest device is to rest one's claim on that which has already appeared and is presumed to be 'well known.' Any query, for example about Hegel's Philosophy, can be promptly answered: "Oh, we know all about that!" The question is then regarded as conclusively settled. But the security of familiarity, though more popular, is no more viable than that of 'meaning' certainty. "Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es *bekannt* ist, nicht erkannt"[*] (PhG 28).

The 'well known' generates no sense of what Aristotle called θαυμάζω because it seems to be a self-enclosed system of truth rotating upon its own axis. But this semblance of eternal veracity is, within the ambit of human experience itself, inevitably the prey of an irrepressible human power. "Die

[*] "That which is 'well known' is really 'unknown' and just for the reason that it is '*well known*.'"

Tätigkeit des Scheidens ist die Kraft und Arbeit des *Verstandes*, der verwundersamsten und größten, oder vielmehr der absoluten Macht"* (PhG 29).

Hegel's panegyric on the Understanding is, *prima facie*, a puzzle, as long as he is viewed in his familiar image as the philosopher of Constructive Reason, standing in firm opposition to the philosophers of the Understanding. In this context, however, the term 'Understanding' has far wider ranging significance than in the restrictively philosophical usage of a Locke or a Kant. For Hegel, *Verstand* is the peculiarly *human* power of breaking away from the circle of the immediate and the familiar; of actually deciding, making a project, and bringing it to the light of day. From the standpoint of the circle of familiar and unbroken calm, the decision or project of *Verstand* has the status of a mere accident; but this 'accident' is through human activity given an independent existence of its own, an objective and phenomenal existence which as such negates the hitherto prevailing calm. The peaceful status of familiarity is thus transformed into a bacchanalian revel (cf. PhG 39); the calm of mere life is shattered by *Verstand*, "die ungeheure Macht des Negativen"† (PhG 29).

The power of human *Verstand* is, however, not exhausted by the act which brings about the negation of mere life; "Der Tod, wenn wir jene Unwirklichkeit so nennen wollen, ist das Furchtbarste, und das Tote festzuhalten, das, was die größte Kraft erfordert. . . . Aber nicht das Leben, das sich vor dem Tode scheut und von der Verwüstung rein bewahrt, sondern das ihn erträgt und in ihm sich erhält, ist das Leben des Geistes"‡ (PhG 29).

That which appears within the life of human experience is therefore the result of a human activity which spells the death of what was hitherto held fast as immovable truth. But this experience of the death of truth is cast into the abyss of scepticism if it is regarded as a merely external phenomenon. The human spirit does not experience the death of its old truths merely passively. Human experience is that movement which actively affirms its self-identity throughout its self-externalization (PhG 528), and it is only this power when "er dem Negativen ins Angesicht schaut, bei ihm verweilt"§ (PhG 30).

Human *Verstand* thus regards phenomenal existence as a quality or a determinateness which endures, a determinate simplicity which maintains its self-identity in time. In other words, that which appears in human experience is at the same time known, and as knowledge it takes the form of a determinate thought (PhG 46). It is, as Hegel observes, by virtue of this twofold characteristic of human experience—involving, as we saw above, both the object-knowing subject and the object known-by-the-subject—that Anaxagoras was able to grasp the totality of phenomenal existence (*Dasein*) as νοῦς. By parity of reasoning (implicit or explicit), the determinate *kinds* of phenomenal existence are taken by human *Verstand* to be temporally immutable, either in the reflective form of an

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* "The activity of breaking away is the force and labor of *Understanding*, the most astonishing and greatest, or, better, the absolute power."

† "the terrible power of the negative."

‡ "Death, as we may call that unreality, is the most terrifying of all things, and to hold fast to what is dead, that is what demands the greatest of all powers. . . . But the life of spirit is not one that avoids death and keeps itself pure in the face of destruction; it is one that bears death and in death maintains itself."

§ "it faces up to the negative, and dwells with it."

eternal idea, a supersensible law, or simply as an established fact. That which is made to appear, either through speech or productive activity, is determined as a kind and is thereby known in the form of a simple thought; as such, it is thought to subsist, to have subsistence, or to be a substance. In virtue of the self-identical character of a thought, the phenomenally existent thus appears within human experience as something fixed and permanent.

"Aber diese Sichselbstgleichheit ist ebenso Negativität; dadurch geht jenes feste Dasein in seine Auflösung über. Die Bestimmtheit scheint zuerst es nur dadurch zu sein, daß sie sich auf *Andres* bezieht, und ihre Bewegung scheint ihr durch eine fremde Gewalt angetan zu werden; aber daß sie ihr Anderssein selbst an ihr hat und Selbstbewegung ist, dies ist eben in jener *Einfachheit* des Denkens selbst enthalten; denn diese ist der sich selbst bewegende und unterscheidende Gedanke, und die eigene Innerlichkeit, der reine *Begriff*. So ist also die *Verständigkeit* ein Werden, und als dies Werden ist sie die *Vernünftigkeit*"* (PhG 46-7).

The nature of appearance within experience may therefore be described as a movement constituted by three moments: (a) Actual appearance, as opposed to the mere idea of appearance, presupposes that the subject has made a definite *decision* or formulated a project. The act of deciding or projecting is only real, however, when it is carried out, when the subject commits himself, not merely to a meaning, an intention or a plan, but to his objectification in the phenomenal form of speech (e.g., a theory), a deed (praxis), or a work (production). In short, appearance requires an act, and the act only appears when it is objectified. "Die Gegenständlichkeit verändert nicht die Tat selbst, sondern zeigt nur, *was* sie ist, d.h. ob sie *ist*, oder ob sie *nichts ist*"† (PhG 237).

(b) That which actually appears, insofar as the subject does not disown it with an attitude of olympian indifference, destroys the transparent simplicity and natural confidence of what Descartes called *le bon sens*. The presumptively eternal truths of abstract concepts are, in appearance, subjected to the test of time. Hegel describes this destructive, negative character of actual appearance as a *death* experienced by the active subject (cf. e.g., PhG 69). The term is, of course, to be understood in a specifically phenomenological sense. But it is in this context peculiarly appropriate, for, like natural human death, it denotes the *end* of something which is felt to be endless; it dramatizes the finitude and temporality of something which longs for infinitude and eternal life, whether it be an abstract thought or a human soul. But the uniqueness of consciousness within the world of nature is its demonstrated capacity of enduring its own death, of holding fast to that objectification which marks the death of its pure thoughts and abstract intentions. And appearance is not really experienced unless the subject does so grasp the fluid form assumed by its abstract ideas, thus transfigured through their death by the act.

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* "But this selfsameness is just as much negativity; hence that fixed existence passes over into the process of its own dissolution. The determinateness at first seems to be a fixed existence only in virtue of its relation to *another*, and its movement seems to be imposed upon it by an alien force; but its having its own otherness within itself and its being a self-movement—these are implied in the very *simplicity* of thought itself. For this is the self-moving and distinguishing thought, the inherent inwardness, the pure *Begriff*. Thus the *intelligibility of understanding* is a becoming, and as this becoming, it is *rationality*."

† "Objectivity does not alter the act itself; it only shows *what* it is, i.e., whether it *is* or whether it *is nothing*."

(c) The experience of actual appearance is therefore a process, a movement, and it may be called dialectical to the extent that the acting and experiencing subject carries out, so to speak, a dialogue with the objective phenomenon. The 'interlocutors' are (in the case of individual spirit) therefore consciousness and its object; subject and substance. At the outset, consciousness seems to be engaged in an empty monologue, a mere reflection upon abstract thoughts. The monologue does provide a certain sense of satisfaction since the thoughts are felt to be at once both an intimate possession of consciousness as well as eternally true. But this peaceful calm, this godlike αὐτάρχεια, veils an illusion; consciousness continually exhibits itself as a consciousness *of*, an interaction with existing objects. Thus the monologue of pure thought, withdrawn from the violent world of actual objects, shows itself to be a pure thoughtlessness, and the ennui of endless abstractness drives it to seek concreteness through the experience of phenomenal existence (cf. PhG 69).[32] The dialogue thus begins, at whatever stage of consciousness' development, with the objectifying act, whose midwife is the inexhaustible drive for concreteness.

The central issue of the dialogue is the appearance of a difference between the project and the actual product, e.g., between the subjective thought and the objective speech. In the early or 'Socratic' dialogues of Plato, for example, it becomes dramatically clear that the individual subjects tend to lose confidence in the thoughts which they had initially expressed with a sense of certainty. If they fail to hold fast to their own words in the course of the discussion, if they at any point deny the identity between their thoughts and the actual appearance of these thoughts in *spoken* form, protesting that their meaning has been perverted by the clever Socrates, then the explicit development of the dialogue comes to a seemingly inconclusive halt. But not without some tacit recognition of sameness between what was thought and what has been said. And it is this acknowledgement of identity in apparent difference that Hegel calls "das Negative überhaupt" (PhG 32). Not merely the abstract, tautological identity of self-reflexive thought, and not merely the indifferent inequality of unrelated objects, but the commitment to identity within a moving, temporal context (e.g., a dialogue) of expressive, phenomenal action—this is the process whereby seemingly pure and eternal concepts and ideas become real and living *Begriffe* (cf. PhG 31).

We may therefore conclude our preliminary examination of the nature of appearance within experience with the observation that (a) appearance brought about by decisive action, and (b) a relentless grasping of one's own death in an objectified form, constitute a unified temporal process whose result is (c) an experience which *is* an existing *Begriff* itself. We must add, of course, that the experiencing subject does not himself recognize the *Begriff* as a *Begriff*. For the subject, the *Begriff*, once constituted through experience, is regarded as a fact. And as a known fact it is concept, law or idea. Thus the process of letting appear must begin once again; but this beginning of appearance within experience is not the same as its antecedent. The experiencing subject has changed; he has become a new subject through his objective activity. Perhaps he himself does not explicitly know this, but "we" do—and not because we have some special access to the inner recesses of his consciousness akin to that of the 'omniscient narrator,' which was once such a popular novelistic device.

The PhG is not a novel of that sort; in method of presentation as well as subject matter it is far more comparable to a dramatic work.[33] Like a drama, it is an expression in language; but unlike

'ordinary language' and the language of pre-Hegelian philosophers, it is purely descriptive. The course of the dramatic development is only describable because it has appeared: because there have been actual appearances within experiences and because these appearances are susceptible of being discussed and have been discussed. Under these circumstances the development of human activity and the continual dialogue about human activity can be *comprehended* by those who have a sure guide and who are able to learn at the outset[34] that "Was die *Zeit* betrifft, … so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst"* (PhG 38). The guide in question is the PhG; we shall now turn to the problem of its readers.

D. "We," or the Problem of Reading the *Phenomenology*.

D-1. *Intelligibility and the Critical Problem of Phenomenological Description.*

Wilhelm Windelband, writing at the end of the nineteenth century, suggested that the age or the intellectual community which could read the PhG with comprehension and enjoyment had died away. The remark has been frequently quoted and, more recently, challenged. Through the publication of Hegel's *Theologische Jugendschriften* (ed. Nohl, 1907) and, even more significantly, the *Jenenser Realphilosophie* (ed. Hoffmeister, 1931 and 1932), together with several Hegel studies based on these texts (e.g., A. Koyré's essay "Hegel à Iéna," 1934, Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution*, 1941, and Lukács' *Der junge Hegel*, 1948), a new image of Hegel has been born and the possibility for something approaching intelligibility in reading the PhG has, no doubt, been attained. Reading the PhG has once again become a dramatic experience, as it clearly was for Goethe. But the drama which it presents nevertheless remains in many ways quite unlike that of the traditional theater. Although the philosophically cultivated reader can, for the most part, identify himself with the protagonists, the various shapes of natural consciousness, in the tragic course of this "voyage of discovery," the difficulty of sustaining that identity is far greater than, say, in the case of *Faust*.

The most obvious source of additional difficulty stems, of course, from the external literary form of the PhG; it is at most a very peculiar kind of *Lesedrama*. But the character development itself is systematically interrupted by what may be described—in the felicitous phrase of Brecht—as a *Verfremdungseffekt* (estrangement-effect).[35] Every reader of the PhG has doubtless puzzled over the significance of the "*wir*" and the "*für uns*" which periodically come into view and break up the flow of experience described. In the Preface, before the actual drama gets underway, it is of course clear that the "we" is to be taken in the sense that it more or less conventionally has in any philosophical work: i.e., we philosophers who are following the argument in question.

The Introduction may be viewed as a transition from the ordinary philosophical usage of an editorial we to the problematical usage of the work itself. Here Hegel comes closest to giving an explicit account of how the term 'we' is to be understood in the sequel. Yet even at this juncture the reader is forced to ask himself: "Who are 'we'?"

The problem seems to become critical at two points in particular. The first (at PhG 71) concerns the determination of what shall serve as a criterion within experience: object or *Begriff*. Hegel

* "As to *time*, … it is the existing *Begriff* itself."

at first seems to suggest that "we" make the selection. But as the previous discussion has shown (cf. *supra*, p. 5), he provides an answer which, in principle, preserves the purely descriptive character of his method. The second difficulty (at PhG 74) is, unfortunately, not so easily answered.

We have already seen the general relationship of consciousness to its object, the twofold character of the *Begriff*, and how in the course of experience consciousness brings about both an examination of its criterion and emergence of a new object. All of this is intelligible as a process which takes place within experience. We have also seen that experience itself involves, by its very nature, action and appearance. Hence the process of experience is not constituted by any hidden or 'inner' meanings or intentions; i.e., it is in principle describable. The problem which now emerges is that what is *for* consciousness a new object is *for us* a new attitude towards objectivity, a new shape or *Gestalt* of consciousness. In other words, whereas consciousness itself merely seems to be related to a new object appearing *within* experience, from *our* point of view, i.e., the description of the appearance *of* experience, consciousness, i.e., the active protagonist, has itself changed.

"Diese Betrachtung der Sache ist unsere Zutat, wodurch sich die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewußtseins zum wissenschaftlichen Gange erhebt, und welche nicht für das Bewußtsein ist, das wir betrachten"* (PhG 74). On the one hand, therefore, "we" seem to be merely describing what the active experience of consciousness presents for phenomenological description; on the other hand, however, "our" observation is also seen to be an act ("unsere Zutat") which plays a constitutive role in the drama as a whole. Moreover, as Hegel adds, without "our contribution," the drama of human experience could only have a sceptical conclusion, or rather no conclusion at all.

In view of these considerations, the descriptive character of the whole PhG seems to become paradoxical, if not impossible. For if our observation is regarded as totally determined by the subject matter, the development of appearance within experience, then "we" may indeed observe the coming to be and passing away of various objects of experience, but the upshot would be no more than a chronicle tracing a formless flow of phenomenal content.[36] In so far as the description concerned historical phenomena, our viewpoint would be that of a sceptical relativism or historicism. This indeed has been a popular characterization of what Hegel's mature philosophy of history—minus the Absolute Idea—implies. And when we consider the radical temporalizing of the *Begriff* in the PhG, together with the conspicuous absence of any Absolute Idea, the phenomenological method of this work seems to entail a distinctly relativistic orientation for the "we."

If, on the other hand, our description of the sequence of objects experienced is raised to the level of a scientific series simply in virtue of the fact that it is "we" who do the describing, that the description is "unsere Zutat," then "we" seem to be nothing short of the Absolute itself. Either our description would be carried out *sub specie aeternitatis*, or "our" addition would have the significance of the positing of a Fichtean metaphysician, or both.

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* "This way of looking at the matter is our contribution, whereby the sequence of consciousness' experiences is raised to the level of a scientific whole which does not exist for the consciousness we observe."

Hegel's phenomenological method, for all its cogency in the treatment of appearance *in* experience, thus seems to be impaled on a crushing dilemma with respect to the no less important and complementary question of the appearance *of* experience. Between the Scylla of relativism and the Charybdis of constructive metaphysics there seems to be no safe passage. In view of the absolutely critical nature of this problem, it will be well to consider at this point what Hegel scholars have had to say about "we" in the PhG.

D-2. *Interpretations of the 'Philosophical We' in the Hegel Literature.*

As one might expect, Hegel's use of the term 'we' in the PhG has been recognized by most of his commentators as, in one way or another, in need of an explanation.[37] The explanations usually provided are, however, remarkably laconic. It will therefore be feasible to expedite our brief (and by no means exhaustive) survey of these explanations by presenting and commenting on a selection of relevant quotations from the literature. In many cases, the passages cited will be coextensive with the total direct discussion of the problem in the work cited:

> Herbert MARCUSE: The reader who is to understand the various parts of the work must already dwell in the 'element of philosophy.' The 'We' that appears so often denotes not everyday men but philosophers.[38]

> Georg LUKÁCS: Die eigenartige Darstellungsweise besteht darin, daß dem Leser der Zusammenhang der objektiven und subjektiven Kategorien, den die jeweilige individuelle 'Gestalt des Bewußtseins' nicht zu erblicken vermag, stets klargemacht wird. . . . Der Dualismus ist nur für die 'Gestalten des Bewußtseins' da, nicht für den Philosophen, darum auch nicht für den Leser. Wenn Hegel … [Lukács makes reference to PhG 267] davon spricht, daß die entscheidenden Zusammenhänge zwischen Objektivität und Subjektivität für die 'Gestalten des Bewußtseins' undurchsichtig, aber *für uns* verständlich sind, so meint er damit den philosophischen Leser, der diesen Entwicklungsweg der menschlichen Gattung von einer höheren Warte aus betrachtet.[39]

> Henri NIEL: La conscience engagée dans l'expérience est douloureusement surprise par cette transformation [of its 'inner' into its 'outer' and vice versa]. Mais nous, qui réfléchissons après coup sur ce processus, nous y reconnaissons l'expression du mouvement de médiation avec soi.[40]

> Sir James BAILLIE: This expression refers to the distinction already made in the Introduction [to the PhG], between the point of view of the *Phenomenology* and that of the actual consciousness whose procedure is being analysed in the *Phenomenology*. That is 'for us' which we (i.e., the philosophical 'we') are aware of by way of anticipation, but which has not yet been evolved objectively and explicitly; it is intelligible, but not yet intellectually realized. That is 'in itself' (*an sich*), which is implicit, inherent, or potential, and hence not yet explicitly developed. The terms 'for us' and 'in itself' are thus strictly alternative: the former looks at the matter from the point of view of the philosophical subject, the latter from the point of view of the object discussed by the philosopher. The implicit nature of the object can only be 'for us' who are thinking about the object: and what *we* have in mind can only be *implicitly* true of the object. The alternative disappears when the explicit nature of the object is what 'we' explicitly take the object to be.[41]

Jan van der MEULEN: (quoting from the *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 201) 'Aber dies Bewußtseiende, und das, dessen es sich bewußt ist, ist nur für einen Dritten diese Einheit des Bewußtseins, nicht für sie selbst.' Hier finden wir schon die für die Darstellung der PhG grundlegende Differenz von 'für es' und 'an sich' oder 'für uns' (die wir das Bewußtsein zum Gegenstande haben) ausgesprochen. . . . Wir, für die nur diese Bewegung des Entstehens ist, sind die vom Standpunkt der reinen Wissenschaft aus das Bewußtsein in seiner Entwicklung Betrachtenden und Begreifenden.[42]

Nicolai HARTMANN: Mit dem 'Wir' ist das mitfolgende philosophische Begreifen gemeint. Und darin liegt die Möglichkeit der Philosophie, im Verfolgen jenes Entstehens auch seine Notwendigkeit zu begreifen. Denn sie ist es, wodurch 'dieser Weg zur Wissenschaft selbst schon eine Wissenschaft ist,' eine Wissenschaft von der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins.[43]

Jean HYPPOLITE: C'est pourquoi la nécessité de l'expérience que fait la conscience se présente sous une double lumière, ou plutôt il y a deux nécessités, celle de la négation de l'objet effectuée par la conscience elle-même dans son expérience, dans l'épreuve de son savoir, celle de l'apparition de l'objet nouveau qui se façonne à travers l'expérience antérieure. (On pourrait nommer cette nécessité *rétrospective*). Cette deuxième nécessité n'appartient qu'au philosophe qui repense le développement phénoménologique; il y a là un moment de l'en-soi ou du 'pour nous' qui ne se trouve pas dans la conscience … (La *Phénoménologie* est *théorie de la connaissance* et *philosophie spéculative* en même temps; mais elle n'est philosophie spéculative que pour nous. . . . C'est dire que la *Phénoménologie* de Hegel est en même temps *description* de la conscience phénoménale et *compréhension* de cette conscience par le philosophe) … (La succession des 'expériences' de la conscience n'est donc contingente que pour la conscience phénoménale. Pour nous, qui recueillons ces expériences, nous découvrons en même temps la nécessité de la progression, qui va de l'une à l'autre. Ce que démontre la *Phénoménologie*, c'est l'immanence de toute l'expérience à la conscience. Il faut d'ailleurs reconnaître que cette nécessité (synthétique) n'est pas toujours facile à saisir, et le passage paraît parfois arbitraire au lecteur moderne. Ce passage pose d'ailleurs le problème des rapports de l'histoire et de la *Phénoménologie*.)[44]

Richard KRONER: Daher laufen in der Phänomenologie zwei Bewegungsreihen nebeneinander her: die des beobachteten Gegenstandes, der von Erfahrung zu Erfahrung wandernden 'Seele' und die des Beobachters, der dieses Wandern vom Standpunkte des Wegendes aus als Selbstverwirklichung des Absoluten begreift. Jeder Schritt, den das 'natürliche' Bewußtsein vorwärts tut, ergibt sich daher als ein doppelt notwendiger; oder *die Notwendigkeit jedes Schrittes tritt in doppelte Beleuchtung*. Einmal wird das Bewußtsein auf Grund seiner Erfahrung selbst gedrängt, … Zweitens aber wird die Notwendigkeit dieser ersten Selbstbewegung in das Licht des absoluten Wissens gestellt und von dem Ziele her, auf das sie sich richtet, und das in Wahrheit das wandernde Ich zu sich hinzieht, als Notwendigkeit eingesehen.[45]

John FINDLAY: … the full inevitability of the process … will be evident only to the phenomenological observer, or in the phenomenological retrospect. (In a meta-language, we should say, one can say things about a given language which that language is unable to say of itself.)[46]

Martin HEIDEGGER: Wer sind die 'wir'? Sie sind diejenigen, die in der Umkehrung des natürlichen Bewußtseins dieses zwar in seinem Mienen belassen, aber zugleich und eigens auf das Erscheinen des Erscheinenden sehen. Dieses Sehen, das eigens dem Erscheinen zusieht,

> ist das Zusehen, als welches die Skepsis sich vollzieht, die auf die Absolutheit des Absoluten vorgesehen und ihrer sich im vorhinein versehen hat. Was im sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus zum Scheinen kommt, zeigt sich 'für uns,' d.h. für diejenigen, die, auf die Seiendheit des Seienden denkend, mit dem Sein schon versehen sind. . . . Die Zutat ist selbst das Gewollte der Absolutheit des Absoluten. . . . Die Zutat bringt zum Vorschein, daß und wie wir im Zusehen der Absolutheit des Absoluten zugeartet sind.[47]

The passages here assembled provide an instructive spectrum of possibilities for envisaging the 'philosophical we' but they also show how an interpretation of the 'we' tends to govern—or be governed by—one's view of the PhG as a whole. The following discussion will thus enable us not only to survey the field of Hegel scholarship through the prism of this vital issue; it will also afford an occasion for systematically developing the argument of this study.

The first point of critical importance which, consciously or unconsciously, divides these scholars is the degree of significance they attach to the inverted commas which they (Hegel himself uses no inverted commas) place around the 'we' or 'for us.' Of the ten, only Marcuse and Lukács draw explicit attention to the fact that "we" are the *readers* of the PhG. Thus the problem of the intelligibility of the dramatic activity to the 'audience' is elevated to a position of prominence. When "we" are understood to be readers such as 'you or I,' then the *Verfremdungseffekt* serves to remind us (a) *that* we are the audience and (b) *what* we as audience are seeing or have seen;[48] it prevents us from losing our descriptive perspective by, for example, becoming absorbed in the action as a child becomes absorbed in a fairy tale. It does not, on the other hand, estrange us from the standpoint of description, tacitly or explicitly suggesting that the 'we' stands for some extraordinary intelligence which we readers see through a glass but darkly.

Marcuse's observation that the intelligibility of the PhG is only open to those readers who "already dwell in the 'element of philosophy'" is clearly incontestable, but it is not clear from his remarks just what this 'element' is. In a subsequent passage (p. 94) he suggests that this 'element' is the philosophy of transcendental idealism; but this is also problematical since, as Hartmann points out (p. 338), transcendental idealism is not accepted in the PhG as a thesis but is rather treated as an historical phenomenon, one of the stages of consciousness described. Although Hyppolite mentions the peculiar difficulties faced by "the modern reader" in following the transitions in the PhG (a remark that is transformed into an interpretative thesis by Findlay), as well as the problematical relationship of the PhG and history, his extensive study has little to say about the specific preconditions for intelligible reading, whether in 1946 or 1807.[49]

The only writer who directly deals with this problem is Lukács. He suggests that the appearance *of* the various "shapes of consciousness" is intelligible for the philosophical reader because he (i.e., "we") observes the developmental process of the human genus from a "higher plane." This higher plane is said to be that of "Objective Spirit" or the perspective of history.[50] This historical approach to the problem of the 'we' is very suggestive, but in Lukács' discussion it has two distinct shortcomings as a general hypothesis: (a) the specific nature of the historical preconditions for the 'we' is not developed (e.g., in connection with Hegel's references in the Preface (PhG 15ff.) to "our age," ca. 1806, as a "new world") and (b) Lukács expressly limits this interpretation of the 'we' to what

he calls the "first part" (cf. Lukács, p. 602) of the PhG, i.e., "Subjective Spirit." For the second and third parts of his triadically divided PhG he offers no explanation for the 'philosophical we'—which nevertheless continues to appear.

In Niel's discussion of the PhG, which is rarely more than a paraphrase focussing on the issue of 'mediation,' the term "*pour nous*" is almost inevitably followed by the apposition, "qui réfléchissons après coup sur. . . ."[51] This phrase, which is literally a *Leitmotif* in Niel's extensive analysis, clearly indicates that he is at one with Hyppolite, Findlay, and Lukács on the retrospective standpoint of the 'we' vis-à-vis what we have called 'appearance *in* experience,' but he seems to be untroubled by the systematic problem of what we have called the 'appearance *of* experience.'

Baillie, by contrast, regards the philosophical 'we' as anticipatory with respect to "actual consciousness." But Baillie's explanation of the nature of this "anticipation" is, to this reader, far from clear. Perhaps the 'we' is able to anticipate because its viewpoint is essentially retrospective; or perhaps, as Baillie seems to suggest in his introduction,[52] the 'we' is like the aforementioned 'omniscient narrator.' Certainly something like the latter would be necessary if the "strictly alternative" relationship of the terms 'for us' and 'in itself' is to be understood as Baillie proposes.

Van der Meulen's brief remarks on the problem contain an interesting reference to Hegel's Jena lectures, but whether this passage is specifically an expression of the difference between the 'we' and developing consciousness in the PhG or rather of the more generic difference between self-consciousness and consciousness is not unequivocally clear. In any case, van der Meulen's assertion that the 'we' observes and comprehends the development of consciousness from "the standpoint of pure science" is no more enlightening than Baillie's strict "alternative."

The citation from Hartmann adds to this discussion a recognition of the problem of 'our' grasping the "necessity" in the sequence of consciousness' experiences, thus enabling "us" to raise this sequence to a scientific series, "a science of the experience of consciousness." But it is only Kroner and Hyppolite who develop the problem of the *structure* of "necessity" in the PhG. Both recognize that what Baillie mystifyingly refers to as "strictly alternative" is a twofold or parallel process of necessity. Or, in the terminology of this study, both scholars recognize that there is (a) a process of necessity *within* experience, the process in which consciousness judges its knowledge by its own criterion and consequently tests its criterion and alters its object, as well as (b) the necessity *of* experience as a noncontingent series observed by us. As the foregoing discussion has shown, it is this second kind of necessity which is particularly problematical and crucial for an understanding of the philosophical 'we.'

It is noteworthy that, of the two, only Hyppolite speaks of this second necessity in terms of *appearance*. But it is an appearance of a peculiarly "retrospective" nature. The 'we' or the philosopher is said to be already (and not merely implicitly) at the level of "speculative philosophy" and, on Hyppolite's reading, the appearance *of* experience seems to provide the philosopher something like an *occasion* to rethink the phenomenological development, which he has presumably already, in some sense, experienced. In view of the historical preconditions for "our" phenomenological comprehension suggested by Hegel in the Preface, this is at least a partially plausible assumption. One

is, however, led to ask Hyppolite whether the standpoint of "speculative philosophy" is itself attainable without having *first* rethought the phenomenological development presented in the PhG. This surely would seem to follow from Hegel's description of the PhG as an *introduction*, and a necessary introduction, to speculative philosophy or, since for Hegel they are equivalent, Logic (PhG 33).[53] Hegel observes that the "System der Erfahrung des Geistes" only embraces the *appearance* of this experience (PhG 33) and he clearly does not set down systematic philosophy as a precondition for grasping the systematic character of this experience. It is manifest that the reverse of this is proposed (cf. also, PhG 25ff.).

If then our critique of Hyppolite has hit its mark, Kroner's interpretation of the philosophical observer, or 'we,' is even less viable. Not mentioning the problem of the *appearance of* experience, he proceeds to assert that the 'we' grasps the necessity in the sequence of natural consciousness' experiences from the standpoint of the goal towards which it is striving, from the *end* of its pathway, which the '*we*' recognizes as the "self-realization of the Absolute." Kroner's version of the 'we' has already arrived at the level of Absolute Knowledge. But if this interpretation were accepted, one could give no plausible answer to Hegel's 'rhetorical' question: "… man könnte mit dem Negativen [i.e., in the appearance *of* experience] als dem *Falschen* verschont bleiben wollen und verlangen ohne weiteres zur Wahrheit geführt zu werden; wozu sich mit dem Falschen abgeben?"* (PhG 33).

Findlay's *aperçu* on the philosophical observer, apart from his parenthetical and undeveloped suggestion that it is somehow comparable to a semantic meta-language, is a partial restatement of Hyppolite's interpretation.

The most extensive and least lucid of all interpretations gathered here is that of Heidegger. He most clearly recognizes that the 'we' is problematical and that it involves the question of the appearance *of* experience, or, as he characteristically puts it, the "Erscheinen des Erscheinenden." A full appreciation of Heidegger's remarks would, however, require an extensive preliminary analysis of both *Sein und Zeit* as well as his later writings on 'Sein.' Such a task is clearly beyond the scope of this study. We may nevertheless observe that, for Heidegger, the 'we' is at least the 'fundamental ontologist' of *Sein und Zeit*, who grasps the difference between the 'ontic' and the 'ontological' and thus is able to comprehend "die Seiendheit des Seienden." But this 'we' also has an insight into "die Absolutheit des Absoluten" or into the depths of Being plumbed by Heidegger in his more recent essays. And, as he observes on p. 171, "Alles liegt daran, die hier [i.e., in the PhG] genannte Erfahrung als das Sein des Bewußtseins zu denken."

This latter remark reveals the basic error of Heidegger's Hegel interpretation.[54] As we saw above, it is of utmost importance to distinguish actual phenomenal experience from immediate reflection. Moreover, a careful reading of the PhG reveals that Hegel treats "Being" as a determination of "immediacy" and "reflection," and therefore as the contrary of experience, which always involves mediation and action. For example "… diese Unmittelbarkeit des Geistes, … die Reflexion, die selbst

* "one might simply dispense with the negative as something *false* and thus demand to be led to the truth without further ado; why bother oneself about that which is false?"

einfach, die Unmittelbarkeit als solche für sich ist, das *Sein*, das die Reflexion in sich selbst ist"* (PhG 25).[55]

The safest generalization about Heidegger's essay is that it uses the PhG Introduction as a touchstone for elucidating some important elements of his own fundamental ontology. As such it is a valuable document for the student who seeks to grasp the relationship between *Sein und Zeit* and the 'late' Heidegger.[56] And while it is in many respects a stimulating exercise for the Hegel student, it can be singularly misleading if taken literally as a commentary on the PhG. For the PhG is *not* an ontology (Hegel's *Logik* may be properly spoken of as his ontology[57]); it is a *phenomenology* and can only be understood as such.[58]

D-3. *Some Working Hypotheses for the Role of the "We" in Hegel's Phenomenological Method.*

The most remarkable feature of Heidegger's interpretation of the philosophical 'we' is that it limits itself to an application of the dark passage in the next last page of the Introduction (PhG 74) dealing with "unsere Zutat." But perhaps this is not so remarkable after all, for when we look closely at the studies of Kroner, Hartmann, van der Meulen, Hyppolite and Findlay, we find that their definitive utterances on the 'we' also take the form of analyses of PhG 74. It seems to this writer a matter of no mean consequence that six out of the ten scholars cited tend to so limit their attention in defining a term on whose comprehension intelligibility in *reading* the PhG hinges. And if, in addition, one recalls Hegel's frequent critical comments on prefaces and introductions to philosophical works, it is reasonable to assume that he too would be highly sceptical of a general definition which is based on a passage where, in the language of contemporary semantical theory, the term is, from the viewpoint of the work as a whole, metalinguistically 'mentioned' rather than dramatically 'used.'

In point of fact, the term 'we' and its variants are *used* more than 150 times in the PhG. Rather than adding any further speculations on the 'real' meaning of "unsere Zutat," perhaps it might be more fruitful to arrive at a comprehension of who "we" are through the process of "working the matter out." In the following paragraphs certain working hypotheses will be stated, but these can only be provisional; their only verification can be an enhanced comprehension on the part of a reader who works his way through the PhG itself.

First, let us gather together the helpful suggestions which have emerged from our review of Hegel scholarship.[59]

(1) Following Marcuse, our attention will be fixed on the problem of *intelligibility* in the PhG and (2) with Lukács this intelligibility will be sought, in so far as possible, in connection with the specific prerequisites for comprehension by "us" as intelligent (but also human) *readers*. (3) As Hyppolite has pointed out, certain of these prerequisites are *historical*, thus providing at least one clue to what (4) Niel repeatedly calls the "*retrospective*" standpoint of the philosophical 'we.' (5) With Baillie,

* "… this immediacy of spirit, … reflection which is itself simple, which for itself is immediacy as such—this reflection into its self is *being*."

however, we must also carefully examine Hegel's use of 'we' to determine whether his method does not sometimes assume a certain *anticipatory* insight on the part of his readers at specific stages of the phenomenological drama.

(6) From our examination of van der Meulen, we must also bear in mind the parallel between the problem of the 'we' and that of *self-consciousness* in general. In this connection it would seem at the very least prudent to observe whether or not "we" *qua* readers actually learn anything of such significance that it would be appropriate to speak of a development of the phenomenological method itself in the course of the PhG, and especially in the passage through "Sense Certainty," "Perception," and "Understanding" to "Self-Consciousness."

(7) All the while, we must not forget that, as Hartmann observes, "we" must grasp the *necessity* in the development of the described consciousness' experiences. It will be of singular importance to comprehend just what this necessity consists in. (8) But our comprehension of this necessity will be clouded if we neglect to distinguish between the *two* parallel processes of necessity at work in the PhG, as Kroner indicates. Perhaps one of these processes will show itself to be what Niel calls retrospective while the other will have a certain anticipatory character. In any event, the precise nature of this twofold process must become more clear in the course of "our" reading if intelligibility is to be sustained.

(9) One possible way of clarifying the task of the reader—assuming him to be a knowledgeable member of the mid-20th century English-speaking philosophical community—might be to rethink the twofold process of development in the PhG in terms of the distinction between an 'object language' and the 'meta-language' mentioned in Findlay's parenthetical remark. This sort of enterprise must, however, be undertaken with great caution, not merely because the prerequisites for intelligent readership have to be in some intimate way associated with the peculiar historical and philosophical circumstances of 1807, but also because comparisons of this sort easily lead to facile and philosophically worthless comments about 'astonishing resemblances,' 'remarkable anticipations of 'modern' developments,' etc., etc.

Nevertheless, in one specific respect the precision of contemporary linguistic analysis may prove to be an aid in making more intelligible what Hegel calls the exclusively *formal* manner in which "we" grasp the *appearance of* consciousness' experience of the 'new object.' "… der *Inhalt* aber dessen, was uns entsteht, ist *für es* [i.e., consciousness], und wir begreifen nur das Formelle desselben oder sein reines Entstehen; …"* (PhG 74). In so far as "our" standpoint may be considered metalinguistic, our comprehension of the appearance *of* the new object may be accordingly regarded as purely formal and hence susceptible of precising through linguistic techniques. On this assumption, our activity is purely theoretical, contemplative and descriptive; "we" are dwelling exclusively in the sphere of *language*, and a language of a very limited nature as well.

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* "… but the *content* of what we see arising is *for consciousness*, and we only grasp its formal aspect or its pure origination; . . . ."

We have already had occasion to notice the central role assigned to language in general—together with labor and work—in Hegel's PhG. In connection with the metalinguistic hypothesis, we will have to pay particular attention to the way language is described and used especially in the section dealing with "Consciousness," the most conspicuously 'philosophical,' in the usual sense, section of the PhG. But here, as in all the other 'acts' of this phenomenological drama, we must avoid the practice of absolutizing on the basis of a particular 'scene.'[60] We must rather attempt to grasp in Hegel's 'metalinguistic' presentation of other scientific and observational meta-languages a better understanding of that peculiar 'meta-language' in which the reader of the PhG gradually accrues a comprehension of the whole phenomenological drama.

Or, perhaps it will also be necessary to ask ourselves whether the 'metalinguistic' standpoint developed for the reader in the PhG is, *qua* metalinguistically formal, adequate to the synthetic vision proposed to the reader by Hegel in the last chapter, where he asserts that there corresponds to "jedem abstrakten Momente der Wissenschaft eine Gestalt des erscheinenden Geistes überhaupt. Wie der daseiende Geist nicht reicher ist als sie, so ist er in seinem Inhalte auch nicht ärmer. Die reinen Begriffe der Wissenschaft in dieser Form von Gestalten des Bewußtseins zu erkennen, macht die Seite ihrer Realität aus, nach welcher ihr Wesen, der Begriff, der in ihr in seiner *einfachen* Vermittlung als *Denken* gesetzt ist, die Momente dieser Vermittlung auseinanderschlägt und nach dem innern Gegensatze sich darstellt"* (PhG 562).

An understanding of this passage will clearly have direct bearing on Hegel's remark in the Preface that "Das Wahre ist das Ganze"† (PhG 21). Since, however, this latter task can only be undertaken in connection with an analysis of Hegel's presentation of historical (daseiender) spirit, it must be reserved for the fourth chapter of this study. In the following chapter we can only deal with the description (and the language of description) of consciousness' experience taken in abstraction from its communal and historical context. It is here, if anywhere, that the PhG must enable its readers to dwell in what Marcuse has called the 'element of philosophy.' "Das *reine Selbsterkennen* im absoluten Anderssein, dieser Äther *als solcher*, ist der Grund und Boden der Wissenschaft oder das *Wissen im allgemeinen*. Der Anfang der Philosophie macht die Voraussetzung oder Forderung, daß das Bewußtsein sich in diesem *Elemente* befinde. Aber dieses Element erhält seine Vollendung und Durchsichtigkeit selbst nur durch die Bewegung seines Werdens"‡ (PhG 24).

Our hypothesis will be that the reader, or the 'we,' *first* comes to an adequate awareness of his own necessary standpoint for comprehending the entire subsequent development *after* he has

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* "every abstract moment of science a shape in which spirit as a whole makes its appearance. As existing, historical spirit is not richer (i.e., more concrete) than science, it is also, with respect to its content, not poorer. To know the pure *Begriffe* of science in this form, as shapes of consciousness—this way of knowing constitutes the aspect of reality on the part of scientific *Begriffe*. The essence of this reality is the *Begriff* which is posited in its *simple* mediation as *thought* and which breaks up and separates the moments of this mediation and presents these moments in accordance with their internal opposition."

† "The truth is the whole."

‡ "*Pure self-knowledge* in absolute otherness, this aether *as such*, is the very foundation of science or *universal knowledge*. The beginning of philosophy makes the presupposition or the demand that consciousness find itself in this *element*. But this element only attains its realization and transparency through the process of its becoming."

experienced the section called "Consciousness." We shall test this hypothesis by seeing exactly how the term 'we' is *used* in this section. If the hypothesis is verified, we shall then be able to grasp the significance of Hegel's anthropology (in the sections called "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason") as it is presented, in demystified, intelligible form.

Hegel, contrary to many a legend, demonstrates in the PhG a great respect for his readers. This, rather than his reputedly esoteric and didactic style, is a more probable source of 'unintelligibility' to readers of the PhG. He recognized that the individual reader has "das Recht zu fordern, daß die Wissenschaft ihm die Leiter wenigstens zu diesem Standpunkte [i.e., the element of philosophy] reiche, ihm in ihm selbst denselben aufzeige"* (PhG 25). As we shall see, the ladder which Hegel extends in the opening section of the PhG is a 'ladder language' quite unlike that of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: it *does* enable "our" theoretical orientation to rise above the level of solipsism, mystical or otherwise, because it destroys the 'myth of meaning' underlying the 'paradox of learning' which has plagued philosophical thought since Socrates.

Hegel recognized, perhaps as no other, his readers' right to absolute independence, free from mystical appeals to a peculiar depth of inward feeling (characteristic, at his time, of the romantics) as well as from tautological propositions masquerading as profound metaphysical truths. But he also realized that this independence must be made manifest. Thus, if our hypothesis is correct, the first section of the PhG is constituted by prolegomena, not to a future metaphysics, but to a self-conscious awareness of independence on the part of its readers.

So much for the intellectual or specifically philosophical preconditions for the reader, or for the 'we,' in the PhG. As we have seen, these cannot be set down like a recipe, all at once; the reader must grasp them as they unfold in the course of "working the matter out." Hegel's phenomenological method is therefore not only a method for describing a developing content; it is also a developing method.[61]

If these 'methodological' remarks are appropriate to the technical problem of intelligibility of what is meant by the reader's dwelling in the 'element of philosophy,' they apply *a fortiori* to the question of historical preconditions, of the reader's sociohistorical milieu. This problem can only be taken up in connection, not merely with Hegel's remarks in the Preface concerning the "new epoch" which "our age" (i.e., ca. 1806) is said to mark, or the equally important observations about the "universal" and the "particular" individual—these issues can only be comprehended in the light of what the PhG actually presents as a sequential account of human history up to 1806. Following Hegel's own clue (PhG 476) on this matter (which is confirmed on careful reading), we will look for this properly historical development in the section called "Spirit," and especially in the last chapter of that section: "Morality." It is here, if anywhere, that we will discover the precise nature of the historical preconditions thought to be sufficient for a *Phenomenology of Spirit* by its *author* and, accordingly, already implicitly at hand for *any* of its possible (1807ff.) *readers*.

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* "the right to demand that science should hold the ladder to help him get himself at least to the standpoint (element) of philosophy by pointing out that he (already) carries this standpoint in himself."

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

[1] And, one is tempted to add, without a successor.

[2] The student of Hegel will, of course, recognize this schema as a barefaced caricature of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*. But that such a caricature could pass for Hegel's philosophy is an important factor in a good deal of recent western intellectual history and especially in the English-speaking world, a factor of contemporary significance.

[3] An opposite tendency, that of drawing an equally uncritical dichotomy between the encyclopedic writings and the *Phenomenology*, has also been expressed in recent years among existential-humanistic writers on the European continent. It is of course true that Hegel did not continue to regard the *Phenomenology* as both an introduction to and the first part of his system of philosophy and that his subsequent restatements of the "Phenomenology" (in the *Propaedeutic* and in the *Encyclopedia*) become less and less like the 1807 version in method and content. But it must also be remembered that Hegel, at the time of his death, had just begun preparations for a new edition of the *Phenomenology*, an edition which was not to involve any major alterations.

[4] Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Vol. II: *Von der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie des Geistes*, Tübingen: Verlag J.C.B. Mohr, 1924.
Nicolai Hartmann, *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Part II: *Hegel* (1929), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960.
Jean Hyppolite, *Genèse et structure de la phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel*, Vols. I and II, Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1946.
Alexandre Kojève, *Hegel: Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, trans. I. Fetscher and G. Lehmbruch, ed. I. Fetscher, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958.
Jan van der Meulen, *Hegel: Die gebrochene Mitte*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958.

[5] Cf. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931, pp. 27ff.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 9.

[7] Ed. by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1948. References will be given in connection with the abbreviation "PhG."

[8] Ivan Iljin, *Die Philosophie Hegels als kontemplative Gotteslehre*, Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1946, p. 126.

[9] Heidegger's subsequent essay, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung," published in *Holzwege*, Frankfurt/M.: V. Klostermann, 1957, pp. 105–192, which is expressly devoted to the Introduction to the PhG, is far less helpful.

[10] Cf. Kojève, *op. cit*., viz., pp. 112ff.

[11] Cf. N. Hartmann, *op. cit*.

[12] The term "science" is, of course, not to be taken merely in the restrictive sense of the natural sciences or any other formally organized discipline—although these too will come into view. What Hegel means by *Wissenschaft* here is a specific shape or *Gestalt* of consciousness or spirit which is *itself* constituted by a systematic mode of relating form and content, certainty and truth, subject and substance. Thus "die *Sittlichkeit*" is just as much a science as "Psychology."

[13] For a discussion of the problematical "we" of the PhG, see section D below.

[14] In view of the radical novelty of Hegel's use of the term '*Begriff*,' the present exposition will not employ any of the traditional English renderings, such as "concept," "notion," etc. Wallace and Baillie have presented cogent arguments for the term notion. It has the advantage of suggesting a kinship with the Greek term νοῦς and it has a systematic precedent in Berkeley's *Siris*. But the term seems to this writer more appropriate to the more Aristotelian encyclopedic writings of Hegel. For the PhG, the happiest choice would probably be 'comprehension.'

[15] For a discussion of the *Begriff qua* known by the philosophical 'we,' see section D.

[16] Cf. also PhG 38: "Was die *Zeit* betrifft, … so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst." Both these passages are given an extensive and illuminating interpretation in Kojève, *op. cit*., pp. 69ff.

[17] Hegel has in this analysis developed an important insight into the problematical relationship between the positive and negative senses of the Kantian Thing-in-itself: i.e., of the Thing-in-itself *qua* object (that which, according to the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first *Critique*, is said to be known) and the Thing-in-itself

qua noumenon. From the perspective of the *Critique of Pure Reason* there is no unambiguous answer to Jacobi's well known charge that Kant tried, against his own strictures, to have it both ways.

[18] In view of the endless polemics among Marxists and critics of Marx on the question of the "Hegelian method" it is interesting to note that this "method" is quite indifferent to the rival claims of idealism on the one hand and realism on the other.

[19] This aspect of human experience is not grasped by the reader of the PhG before he has followed the argument *through* the chapter on *Verstand*. N.B., PhG 128. As we shall see, an understanding of this characteristic feature of the PhG is essential for a demystification of the philosophical 'we'; or, which is another way of expressing the same problem, it is essential to the intelligibility of the PhG as a philosophical work.

[20] Baillie, *op. cit*., p. 138.

[21] R. Kroner suggests that '*Erleben*' would be a more adequate term for what Hegel describes as experience. Cf. Kroner, *op. cit*., p. 374.

[22] This argument is forcefully developed by George Schrader in "Hegel's Contribution to Phenomenology," *The Monist*, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 18ff.

[23] Cf. footnote 31 below.

[24] Cf. J.N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination*, New York: Collier Books, 1962 (1st impr. 1958), p. 113.

[25] Published in *Verhandlungen des dritten Hegelkongresses*, Tübingen/Haarlem, 1934, p. 129.

[26] Hoffmeister, reediting the text in 1937, nevertheless maintains Goebhardt's table of contents. For his—to this reader unsatisfactory—justification, see his "Zur Feststellung des Textes," PhG 576.

[27] Cf. e.g., Ernst Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterungen zu Hegel*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1962, p. 70, and Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, Zürich and Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1948, pp. 599ff.

[28] George Kline, "Some Recent Reinterpretations of Hegel's Philosophy," *The Monist*, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 50.

[29] Van der Meulen, *op. cit*., p. 293.

[30] *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (hereafter MEGA), Erste Abteilung, Band 3, ed. V. Adoratsky, Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932, p. 153.

[31] The structure of the PhG is so complex that nothing short of a detailed commentary could possibly do it justice. The problem has been brought to attention in this chapter only to note the inadequacy and incoherence of the arguments supporting two popular views which, if accepted as authoritative, would inhibit a comprehension of the argument in this study. It is interesting to note that the only existing complete commentary on the PhG divides the work into the two parts indicated above, cf. Jean Hyppolite, *op. cit*., p. 40 *et passim*. But Hyppolite's contention (p. 55) that "the *Phenomenology* was for Hegel, consciously or unconsciously, the means to deliver to the public, not a complete system, but the history of his own philosophical development," seems to commit that *intentional* fallacy which Hegel (PhG 227–301) subjected to such devastating criticism. The most elaborate structural interpretation of the PhG is given in the French edition of Kojève's lectures, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, ed. R. Queneau, Paris: Gallimard, 1947, pp. 574–595.

[32] This quest for concreteness is, of course, a presupposition. Despite Hegel's claim that his method is purely descriptive, it will be seen that the need for concreteness is a pivotal presupposition in his description of the experience of natural consciousness as well as a criterion of the philosophical "we" throughout most of the book. The central role of concreteness in Hegel's philosophy has been demonstrated conclusively by Ivan Iljin, *op. cit*., viz., pp. 148–78.

[33] Among existing works of drama, the one which immediately suggests itself for comparison is Goethe's *Faust*. An elaboration of this comparison between the PhG and *Faust* may be found in Georg Lukács, *Goethe und seine Zeit*, Bern: A. Francke, 1947; and Ernst Bloch, "Das Faustmotiv der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," *Hegel-Studien*, Vol. 1, No. 1.

[34] I.e., through the observation of "Consciousness."

[35] Cf. Bertolt Brecht, *Schriften zum Theater*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1957.

[36] Compare Heraclitus's remark: "And whatever path you walk, your goal will not be found."

[37] The problem of the 'we' has, however, received scant attention in Marxist oriented studies dealing with the PhG. It is, for example, not even mentioned by Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt*, and Adorno, *Drei Studien zu Hegel*,

Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963. Kojève's quasi-Marxist lectures also include no systematic discussion of the 'we.'

[38] Cf. H. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941, p. 94.

[39] Cf. G. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, pp. 602–3, cf. p. 627.
"The characteristic mode of exposition consists in always clarifying for the reader that connection of the objective and subjective categories which remains hidden to the individual 'shape of consciousness' then under consideration. . . . The dualism exists only for the 'shapes of consciousness,' not for the philosopher and consequently not for the reader. When Hegel … says that the decisive connections between objectivity and subjectivity are opaque for the 'shapes of consciousness' but transparent *for us*, he means for the philosophical reader, who observes this process of evolution of the human genus from a higher plane."

[40] Henri Niel, *De la médiation dans la philosophie de Hegel*, Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1945, p. 113.
"Consciousness engaged in experience is painfully surprised by this transformation [of its 'inner' into its 'outer' and vice versa], but we who reflect afterwards upon this process recognize in it the expression of the movement of mediation with itself."

[41] Footnote to pp. 162–63 of Baillie's translation of the PhG, 1931. Cf. also "Translator's Introduction," p. 50.

[42] Jan van der Meulen, *op. cit*., p. 272 and p. 284.
(Quoting from the *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 201.) "'However this conscious being and that of which it is conscious, is not this unity of consciousness for itself but only for a third.' Here already we find an expression of the basic difference between 'for it' and 'in itself' or 'for us' which is so important for the presentation of the PhG. . . . We, for whom alone this movement of becoming exists, are the observers who from the level of pure science, comprehend consciousness in its development."

[43] N. Hartmann, *op. cit*., p. 317.
"With the term 'we' Hegel means the accompanying philosophical comprehension. And therein lies the possibility for philosophy, in tracing the origination [of a new shape of consciousness], to grasp its necessity as well. For it is in virtue of this possibility that 'this road to science is already itself a science,' a science of the experience of consciousness."

[44] Jean Hyppolite, *op. cit*., pp. 29–30, cf. also pp. 81 and 104.
"That is why the necessity of the experience which consciousness undergoes presents itself under a double light, or rather that there are two necessities, that of the negation of the object, brought about by consciousness itself in its experience, in the examination of its knowledge, and that of the appearance of the new object which is formed through the earlier experience. (This necessity could be called *retrospective*). This second necessity only belongs to the philosopher who re-thinks the phenomenological development; there is in it a moment of the in-itself or 'for us' which is not to be found in consciousness … (The PhG is *theory of knowledge* and at the same time *speculative philosophy*; but it is speculative philosophy only for us. . . . Which means that Hegel's PhG is at the same time *description* of phenomenal consciousness and *comprehension* of this description by the philosopher) … (The succession of the 'experiences' of consciousness is thus contingent only for phenomenal consciousness. As for us who are gathering these experiences, we discover at the same time the necessity of the progression, which goes from the one to the other. The PhG demonstrates the immanence of all experience in consciousness. Moreover, it must be recognized that this (synthetic) necessity is not always easy to grasp and the transition sometimes appears arbitrary to the modern reader. This transition also poses the problem of the connection between history and the PhG.)"

[45] R. Kroner, *op. cit*., pp. 369–70.
"In the PhG there are thus two moving series running parallel to each other: that of the observed object, the wandering 'soul' which passes from experience to experience, and that of the observer who surveys this progress from the end of the road and comprehends it as the self-actualization of the Absolute. Each step which 'natural' consciousness advances thus becomes a doubly necessary one; or *the necessity of each step appears under a double light*. On the one hand consciousness is urged forward on the basis of its own experience, … on the other hand, however, the necessity of the first self-movement is placed into the light of Absolute Knowledge and is comprehended as a necessity by the observer who has already reached that aim towards which consciousness directs itself and which in truth attracts the wandering ego to itself."

[46] J. Findlay, *op. cit*., p. 87.

[47] M. Heidegger, *Holzwege*, p. 173 and 175.
"Who are the 'we'? They are those who in the inversion of natural consciousness let it persist in its meaning but at the same time and expressly look at the appearance of the appearing. This looking-at, which expressly watches the appearance, is the watching in which the skepsis fulfills itself, the skepsis which has looked ahead to the absoluteness of the absolute and has in advance provided itself with it. That which comes to light in self-fulfilling skepticism shows itself 'for us,' i.e., for those who, thinking upon the beingness of being are already provided with Being. . . . The addition is itself intended by the Absoluteness of the Absolute. . . . The addition gives prominence to the fact that and the manner in which we, in watching, are akin to the Absoluteness of the Absolute."

[48] The most frequent contexts for the appearance of "we" in the main body of the PhG are: "jetzt sehen wir" or "wir sehen."

[49] Hyppolite does, however, offer a clue to answering this problem in a subsequent remark which does not directly deal with the problem of the philosophical 'we': "… but it is only the *universal individuality*, that which has been able to lift itself to absolute knowledge, which must find again in it and develop in itself the moments implied in its becoming. It is the same consciousness which, having reached philosophical knowledge, turns back upon itself and which, as empirical consciousness, goes upon the phenomenological itinerary. In order to indicate to others the road of absolute knowledge, it must find it back in itself. . . . That which for it is reminiscence and interiorisation, must be for the others the road of their ascension. But this individuality itself, as far as it is individuality, carries necessarily elements of particularity; it is bound to time and for it the French Revolution or the period of enlightenment have more importance than other historical events. Isn't there an irreducible contingency in this?" Jean Hyppolite, *op. cit*., p. 50. Cf. p. 80.

[50] It will be recalled, cf. *supra*, that Lukács divides the PhG according to the triad of the *Encyclopedia*.

[51] Cf. Niel, *op. cit*., e.g., pp. 116, 117, 121, 123, 131, 143, 145, 176.

[52] Baillie, *op. cit*., p. 50.

[53] Hyppolite takes up the question of the relationship of the PhG to the *Logik* in the last chapter of his commentary. His discussion includes a, for this reader, novel argument showing how the *Logik* may be regarded as the standpoint '*für uns*' in the PhG and the PhG, reciprocally, as the standpoint '*für uns*' in the *Logik*. Cf. Hyppolite, *op. cit*., pp. 560ff. But this discussion also leaves unanswered the problem of the philosophical 'we' *qua reader* in the PhG.

[54] One is tempted to call it a 'Holzweg' in Hegel scholarship.

[55] Among many other passages in the PhG, see for example: 31, 82, 90, 110, 138, and 177. Also *Encyclopedia*, § 84, *et passim*.

[56] The materials were first worked up for a small seminar in 1942–43.

[57] Cf. Heidegger's discussion of the *Logik* in his *Identität und Differenz*.

[58] Cf. T.W. Adorno's critique of Heidegger's Hegel interpretation in Adorno, *op. cit*., p. 69.

[59] Owing to this writer's linguistic limitations, it was impossible to consider Leo Lugarini's essay dealing with the 'we,' "L'idea hegeliana del sapere assoluto," *Il Pensiero*, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 and 2 (double number), Milan, Jan.–Aug., 1962. If, however, H.S. Harris' report (in *The Monist*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1964, p. 130) is a faithful summary, then Lugarini's contention "that the standpoint of 'absolute knowledge' is the standpoint *für uns* throughout" is not, as we have seen, novel.

[60] This has been an unfortunate interpretative tendency, not only in Hegel scholarship, but even more markedly in studies of Marx. Indeed, it is legitimate to doubt whether there were *any* truly philosophical studies of Marx before the appearance of Alfred Schmidt's most illuminating and demystifying philological study, *Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx*, Frankfurt/M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1962.

[61] For a penetrating study of this problem in connection with Hegel's later writings, see Chapter IV of John McTaggart's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1922.

CHAPTER THREE

HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGY

In the first half of the PhG Hegel presents a phenomenological description of man *qua* individual. The present study has accordingly referred to it as his anthropology. It might be thought that the term 'psychology' would be more appropriate. But this would be a mistake—and it has been a very prevalent mistake among Hegel scholars. Indeed, the radical departure from a psychological orientation is one of the most characteristic features of the PhG as a whole. It *is* a phenomenology precisely to the extent that it *describes* the *appearances* of human experience, individual or collective, and abstains from abstracting, inductively generalizing, transcendentally deducing, or formulating in any way hypotheses after the manner of a psychologist or a traditional (i.e., non-phenomenological) epistemologist.

As we have observed, the PhG involves *two* processes of *immanently* necessary development: that of the reader or the philosophical 'we' following the description, and that of the consciousness or shapes of consciousness described. Both processes involve a development from immediacy and abstractness through mediation to concreteness. But the *emphasis* on one or the other is not always the same. As we shall see, the emphasis in the opening section, "Consciousness," and the closing section, "Absolute Knowledge," is on the orientation of the reader or the 'we.' In all the other sections attention is focussed on the process of the consciousness described. Moreover, this pattern of emphasis not only makes good sense on the assumption that the PhG, as a book, was written to be *read*;[1] it is demonstrably confirmed by the way the words 'we,' 'for us,' 'our,' etc. actually *appear* in the work itself.

The confirmation consists simply in reading the PhG without forgetting that "we" are not to confuse our role in following the description with the process described. In other words, the term 'we' and its variants must never lose their *Verfremdungseffekt*. When we thus read through the first half of the PhG,[2] we discover that "we" play a role in "Consciousness" which is radically and consistently different from that assigned us in "Self-Consciousness" and "Reason."

Once we have made this discovery, and have read through the first half of the PhG accordingly, our reading not only becomes more intelligible, we also come to understand that this way of organizing the PhG was necessary. In reading through the Preface and the Introduction we do learn a great deal about Hegel's phenomenological method, but what we learn is still abstract. As Hegel observes, reading a preface is in no sense equivalent to "working the matter out," and, at this stage of our reading, we simply have not worked the matter out. We do not as yet dwell in what, for Hegel, is the 'element of philosophy.'

A. Beyond the Paradox of Learning or How We Learn to Read.

Although phenomenological philosophy is not yet 'our element,' we are presumably well schooled in what is usually taken to be epistemology or a philosophy of knowledge. Perhaps we are even aware of the underlying paradox which has been more or less consistently acknowledged by philosophers since the birth of philosophical *language*, or more generally the referential theory of

meaning, in Parmenides' poem: *The Two Ways*. Whether we call this paradox, with Socrates, "that old trick question," or by some more sophisticated terminology, such as "the problem of the determinate and the determinable," "Sense and Reference," or simply "the paradox of learning," makes little difference at this juncture.

What is clear is that we have not as yet developed *for ourselves* that totally unfamiliar but necessary sense of *restraint* which we have been more or less abstractly and didactically informed of through Hegel's *mentioning* the term 'we' in the Preface and the Introduction. Thus we are aware that phenomenological description, or the "Studium der Wissenschaft," requires an unprecedented "Anstrengung des Begriffs" (PhG 48), that "we" must pay extremely close attention to such simple determinations as "*Ansichsein*," "*Fürsichsein*," "*Sichselbstgleichheit*," etc. But "we"[3] have at this point neither a *Begriff* of what *Begriff* actually involves nor any thorough comprehension of what these latter terms might 'mean' as Hegel uses them.

The first and absolutely essential stage in the actualization of the reader's already implicitly philosophical (in Hegel's sense) comprehension (i.e., the first of the PhG's two developmental processes mentioned above) is found in working through the section called "Consciousness."[4] It is here that Hegel will show "us" a way out of the epistemological labyrinth, beyond the psychological standpoint with its attendant "paradox of learning," and into the daylight of described phenomena.[5] But the 'way' cannot simply be 'pointed out'; it must be worked through.

In the following discussion of "Consciousness" we shall call this traditional philosophic, or psychological, standpoint 'Solipsism.' It may, of course, be called "The Egocentric Predicament," the "Gnosological Circle," or by any number of other phrases which have been coined, for the most part in polemics against idealism. That the standpoint itself is equally susceptible of a realist or an idealist interpretation is eloquently demonstrated by the history of philosophy. And Hegel's presentation of 'solipsism' draws freely from this history—from Parmenides to Kant.

This study does not propose to give a step by step analysis of the 'ladder language' Hegel extends to help his readers get themselves beyond solipsism. Such a task must be reserved for an extensive commentary on the PhG. It will nevertheless be possible to show that a trail has been marked, that Hegel, like Ariadne, has left us a thread.[6] But the thread tends to remain invisible as long as the reader assumes for example, that "Sense Certainty" presents a naive[7] consciousness, a mere foil for Professor Hegel's argument and thus akin to the so-called 'naive realist,' who never existed outside a university classroom. Hegel does not bid us to join in a chorus of enlightened pity vis-à-vis a poor soul whose language isn't sophisticated enough to get him beyond the immediacy of 'here' and 'now.' "Sense Certainty" must be seen as a highly sophisticated and distinctly 'philosophical' form of consciousness, a consciousness with whom the reader must *relate* himself (not merely 'observe,' cf. PhG 79) more intimately than with any other.

It is only in "Consciousness" that "we" actually assume the standpoint of the consciousness presented, and there *speak* for it and *write* for it (cf. PhG 81), attempt to immediately and passively observe for it (PhG 85), as well as *perceive* for it (cf. PhG 95) and actively participate in its *Begriff* (cf. PhG 103). Moreover, "we" are able so to relate ourselves, not because it is some primordial experience

and the 'we' is "the Absoluteness of the Absolute" (with Heidegger), or because the 'we' is a speculative Hegelian philosopher (with Hyppolite), or because the 'we' enjoys the privileged access of Absolute Knowledge (with Kroner); both the consciousness in question and "we" ourselves are already in the element of *pre*-Hegelian philosophy.[8] Indeed, the section called "Consciousness" is the most directly philosophical (in the traditional sense of the term) of the entire work. And it is so because it must enable its readers to get beyond 'philosophy,' beyond the 'love of knowledge,' and thus to begin to know (PhG 12). "Our" knowing must not be plagued by scepticism implicit in the traditional quest for certainty; we must overcome the paradox of learning and thus begin to learn. Hegel enables us to do this by presenting a philosophical drama with audience participation: "we" learn to despair of our paradoxical presuppositions by playing the 'solipsistic game.'

B. How "We" Play the Solipsistic Game.

Solipsism presents itself in three forms, which may be called (a) 'realistic,' (b) 'idealistic' and (c) 'purified.' All three are very scientific and are characterized by a zealous concern for scientific methodology and the avoidance of error. Indeed, the methodology of knowledge is so much the center of attention that actual knowledge is literally forgot.

As any science which actually appears, it divides itself into a subjective and objective aspect, subject and substance, e.g., meaning and reference. It also has a mode of appearing, viz., *language*. But this science is so preoccupied with the maintenance of subjective certainty and objective truth that it *says* no more about a 'fact' than that *it is* (ἔστιν). Thus it presents itself as in principle the richest and truest of sciences: it leaves nothing out; at the same time it seems to be the purest and most certain: it only presupposes its own indubitable cogito.

It will suffice here to limit our attention to 'realistic' and 'purified' solipsism. In its 'realistic' form, the *language* of sense certainty is constituted by one key term: 'this.' "Das Bewußtsein seinerseits ist in dieser Gewißheit nur als reines *Ich*; oder *Ich* bin darin nur als reiner *Dieser* und der Gegenstand ebenso nur als reines *Dieses*"* (PhG 79). In the terminology of Arthur Pap,[9] 'realistic' sense certainty employs a language of 'ostensive definitions.' But the language is not to be *used* for actually formulating definitions;[10] the 'thises' are merely *mentioned* as examples (Beispiele) of possible definitions. Thus certainty is preserved by restricting the reference of language to a two-valued logic of assertions, ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ("either a thing is or it is not"[11]), untarnished by what Parmenides called δόξα.

The knower is a singular ego and what is known is likewise a singular this. Wary of losing its certainty in what recent British philosophers (following the terminology of Bradley) have called "the paradox of relation," the realistic solipsist asserts no determinate relation either between the objective 'thises' or between the objective 'this' and the subjective 'this' or ego. "An dem *reinen Sein* aber, welches das Wesen dieser Gewißheit ausmacht und welches sie als ihre Wahrheit aussagt, spielt, wenn wir zusehen, noch vieles andere beiher"† (PhG 80). The by-playing (beiherspielen[12]) shows itself to be

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* "Consciousness for its part is in this certainty only as a pure *ego*; or *I* am involved in it [the science of certainty] only as a pure *this* and the object is likewise [involved in sense certainty] only as a pure *this*."

† "But when we examine [this apparent science] we see in the *pure being*, constituting the essence of this certainty and expressed by it as its truth, something quite different playing along with it."

none other than the science of sense certainty itself, which in addition to being a science based on immediacy is also, in actual practice, an example (Beispiel) of this immediacy as well. As such, however, it is caught up in a relation in spite of (or better, because of) itself. "Ich habe die Gewißheit *durch* ein anderes, nämlich die Sache; und diese ist ebenso in der Gewißheit *durch* ein anderes, nämlich durch Ich"* (PhG 80).

Like a highly reflective logical atomism of proper names, this science will *assert* no more about its proper object. Thus it systematically excludes the possibility of bringing to light the mediation implicit within its very nature. "We" are accordingly left with the option of either reflecting about its grammar of minimal assertion (and perhaps submitting an article about it to *Mind*) or actually putting it to the test by *playing* the role of a realistic solipsist ourselves. Since it is unwilling to give a straight answer to the questions "*What* is the 'this'?" or "*What* is the 'now'?," "we" will therefore, "to play along" (zum Beispiel, PhG 81), answer for it (carefully observing all the grammatical rules): "the now is the night."

The truth of this immediately certain assertion is susceptible of a simple test: "we" will *write* it down. Surely a truth cannot lose anything by being expressed in a written form. Indeed, the logically autonomous 'truths' of sense certainty are kept syntactically simple precisely in order for them to sustain their synonymity in *any* linguistic form. Moreover, their indifference to the specific language in which they are expressed holds *a fortiori* with respect to the specific cogito using that language, whether it be "we" or the immediate solipsist himself. As Parmenides was first to observe, "That which thinks is the same thing … in each and all men" (Frag. 16). Nevertheless, when "we" look at our linguistically preserved truth at a later but equally immediate now, e.g., mid-day, "our" *error* comes to light and "we" are compelled to *say* that our 'truth' has gone stale, that our 'meaning' has been perverted.

Unless the reader is willing to perform this simple experiment, facing up to the consequences without explaining them away, he will be quite unable to comprehend Hegel's anthropology, which is based on the observation that man *qua* man is an *erring animal* and that human errors expressed in some *determinate* and *durative* form *reveal* themselves *as errors* and can be recognized as such.[13] This is the *first* step beyond the Cartesian *cogito* and its attendant solipsism and it must be thoroughly worked out if the reader's grasp of Hegel's anthropology is to get beyond the half-way house of, for example, Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

Anthropology as such is not, however, "our" proper object in Hegel's description of "Consciousness." Here 'man,' so far as he can be spoken of as such, is a tenuated 'philosophical' entity whose only self-revealing form of expression is a 'philosophical' language so emasculated and abstract that it requires what Russell called "a long training in absurdity" to make any sense of it at all. What "we" (who *are* so trained) now learn in our partially estranged (verfremdet) 'playing along' with philosophical solipsism is an important fact about human consciousness in its more reflective forms: the intransitive nature of 'meaning' and the transitive character of 'asserting.' By actually subjecting

* "I have the certainty *through* the other, namely the fact, and this is likewise in the certainty *through* an other, namely through the I."

our 'meaning' to the test of time within experience, we learn that our inner 'meaning' cannot be preserved in an external form without jeopardy.

Hegel's presentation of the 'paradox of meaning' could be illustrated by numerous articles which, especially since the translation of Frege, have contributed to the bulk of philosophical journals in the English-speaking world. But the clearest formulation of the problem known to this writer is to be found in the discussion of 'sub-nexion' among such combinatory logicians as H.B. Curry. All scrupulous linguistic formulations of 'meaning' must employ at least a tacit appeal to a metalinguistic standpoint more or less systematically employing such logical forms as: "I meant *that*. . . ," or "I mean '…'."[14] The 'that' or the inverted commas 'sub-nect' and they must so sub-nect if the linguistic expression is to indicate clearly that the consciousness in question is attempting not merely to express itself but to make clear that it is expressing 'its meaning.'

For Hegel, as we shall see, all such attempts are systematically misleading. As he shows again and again throughout the PhG,[15] a presumed 'meaning' is quite 'meaningless' unless it is expressed, and, as expressed, it requires no special assurances that some 'meaning' is actually being expressed. The redundancy inherent in these assurances is itself an expression of a solipsistic, Cartesian quest for clarity and distinctness—an endless quest which merely regenerates the 'myth of meaning.'

"Die Sprache aber ist, wie wir sehen, das Wahrhaftere; in ihr widerlegen wir selbst unmittelbar unsere *Meinung*"* (PhG 82). However we hone our 'Ockham's razor,' however much we may attempt to 'mean' the particular, or with Nelson Goodman, 'individuals,' language inevitably entangles us in 'Plato's beard': what we thereby assert are universals or abstract entities.

What the reader therefore learns in 'playing the solipsistic game' is that the truth of sense certainty is actually constituted, not by the particulars 'meant' or the universals expressed, but by the series of its own appearing acts. Solipsistic consciousness oscillates back and forth between its 'realist' and its 'idealist' standpoints, now discovering that the asserted 'fact' is a universal, now that the asserting 'I' is a universal, all the while remaining within the orbit of the Cartesian cogito. Or, as a final ruse, it may adopt the standpoint of 'purified' solipsism, declaring itself to be a "pure intuition" (PhG 84) completely indifferent to the comparison of propositions such as "now is night," "now is day" and the like. Rather than allowing itself to be thrown into an unwonted relation, it takes a firm stand on *one* immediate relation: "the 'now' is day" (PhG 85).

As Hegel rightly observes, this form of sense certainty cannot be refuted by however ingenious formulations of counter-examples; it cannot be drawn into any dialogue because it wholeheartedly accepts the sage and thoroughly consistent solipsistic principle: "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen." Moreover, solipsism is not merely one of many possible philosophical positions out of which we may pick and choose according to our fancy; as philosophers, it is directly *our* problem. And if "we" are to get beyond solipsism we must take solipsism in complete seriousness; as responsible philosophers, we cannot cast it aside with an appeal to 'ordinary language'; we must ourselves *become consistent* solipsists. Merely 'playing along' will no longer do; we must directly play the

* "But as we see, language is the more truthful; in it we ourselves directly refute our own *meaning*."

solipsistic game as a solipsist: we must *be* no more than a passive ego, a mere receptacle in space and time—we simply let 'this now' be indicated to us. "Wir müssen daher in denselben Punkt der Zeit oder des Raums eintreten, sie uns zeigen, d.h. uns zu demselben diesen Ich, welches das gewiß Wissende ist, machen lassen"* (PhG 85).[16]

'This now' is therefore our truth. But we also observe that 'now,' if it is to be a 'this' as well, must be *held fast* as a *definite* 'this now.' As definite, however, it is no longer 'now.' It no longer has 'being'; it 'has been.' And this is its truth. But that is not all; it is also "our" truth—and as *consistent* solipsists we hold fast to our truth. Yet it cannot be denied that what 'has been' *is not* now. Thus we are forced by our solipsistic convictions to negate the 'truth' to which we have so consistently held fast; we recognize it to be an *un*truth, a negation of the truth, and consequently we must negate the *error* which has *resulted* from our *holding fast*—we must negate our own negation and acknowledge, again consistently with our own solipsistic principles, that our 'immediate' knowledge is shot through and through with mediation, that passively letting a point in time or space be shown to us *eo ipso* entails that we hold fast to that point as a definite this, that 'being given' entails 'our taking,' and finally that our taking cannot be immediate but must be recognized as a *process*.[17]

We are able to follow this movement, this *history* of the experiences within sense certainty (cf. PhG 86), because we have not skirted the central issue by dancing above and beyond the 'object language' according to the rules of the great metalinguistically oriented debate; we have directly played the solipsistic game (more consistently than the solipsists themselves) and in so doing have begun to comprehend the possibilities and limits of phenomenological *observation*-language.

The natural consciousness described has not been so estranged from the immediacy of its quest for certainty. Thus, although the *content* of its experience is the same as "ours," it continually forgets what its own experience has mediated and it proceeds to devise theoretical ways of 'saving the appearances' within its solipsistic perspective. Thus "we" proceed to observe and participate in 'solipsistic revisionism.'

C. Varieties of Solipsistic Revisionism.

With "perceptual consciousness" as our object, we have moved out of the world of ostensive definitions, logical atomism, and a language of proper names and into the world of concept empiricism. Here universals and relations are no longer regarded as embarrassing and there is no anxiety over 'ontological commitment.' In this sphere of consciousness a language referring to objects is actually used and not merely mentioned in a metalanguage above and seemingly secure from the chaotic world of time and facts. And here the objects to which reference is made are recognized as having properties and not simply disposed of with such expressions as "it is" or "John is."

But it is not only the consciousness observed which has changed; "we" too have learned a great deal from our playing the solipsistic game. We have already come to grasp the *principle* of universality which perceptual consciousness now assumes as its own general principle in its effort to

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* "We must therefore enter the same point of time or space and let them be shown to us, i.e., we must let ourselves be transformed into the very same 'this I' which is the subject knowing with certainty."

'save the appearances' and therewith the basic standpoint of philosophical solipsism as well. "Perception" therefore marks the first stage in the PhG when *our process* of apprehending the appearance *of* consciousness becomes a *logically necessary* process.[18] It must be noted, however, that *our process* is *not yet* phenomenological description; it is observational apprehension.[19] We have learned, through "Sense Certainty," to apprehend the experiences of consciousness *as* a *movement* rather than as a sequence of isolated propositions ostensibly involving 'meanings' as well as assertions.

The reader must make *his own* experience of Sense Certainty absolutely transparent to himself if his reading of Hegel's subsequent presentation is to have for him anything more than a "queer sense of aesthetic appropriateness." He must see that *holding fast* to a truth *within* the 'language games' of solipsistic certainty or solipsistic revisionism involves by its very nature a concurrent *process* of preserving *and* negating. The twofold character of this process, unfortunately blurred in Baillie's translation (p. 156), must be seen and comprehended by the reader if he is to understand Hegel's dramatization of human experience,[20] his *use* of the term *'Begriff'* as a twofold function within experience, and the controversial term '*Aufheben*.' This last expression is not simply an untranslatable peculiarity of the German tongue which has been surreptitiously appropriated by German metaphysicians. In the PhG it is no more and no less than an apt one-word description of a universal characteristic of human experience, viz., the negating which is unavoidably entailed by the process of referring to any definite object over any period of time. The term '*Aufheben*' will become *completely* demystified if, but only if, the reader takes Hegel (PhG 85) literally and takes the place of, plays the role of, a 'purified' solipsist whose sense of certainty is directly rooted in the immediate present.

Since the basic principle of traditional epistemology, the analysis of experience in terms of universal concepts (whether they be explicitly called 'universals' or 'particulars'), has already *appeared for us* in our *Auseinandersetzung* with "Sense Certainty," Hegel says that the 'perceptual' form of this epistemological stance is but "kurz zu entwickeln"* (PhG 90). The chapter called "Perception" is therefore not a detailed recapitulation of the innumerable attempts to 'save the appearances' from a basically solipsistic theoretical standpoint, employing methodological or 'paper' doubt, distinctions of formal and objective truths, or theories of occasionalism or recollection. It is a presentation of the logically possible ways of using universal concepts *within* this frame of reference (which for the sake of systematic, not chronological, explanation may be called 'pre-Kantian'). The following interpretation of Hegel's discussion will accordingly be less detailed than the explication of "Sense Certainty" in the previous section.

Whereas for Sense Certainty the wealth of phenomenal content was merely something "… an der er nur das Beiherspielende war"† (PhG 90), the perceptual solipsist (die Wahrnehmung) seeks to save the phenomena by *taking* them as they *truly* are.[21] The *means* for truly taking the appearances within experience are concepts, and these universal concepts are employed by perceptual consciousness in basically three ways: (1) as the empirical generalizations or abstractions naming the objective properties or qualities of a thing or 'substance' (e.g., as in Locke), (2) as impressions lingering as ideas or concepts

* "briefly to be developed."

† "… at the side of which it only 'played along.'"

associated in a subjective medium (itself a congery of impressions) in accordance with some associative standard or criterion for *degrees* (in-so-far) of objectivity such as 'vivacity' (e.g., as in Hume) or (3) as hypothetical functions which are designed to dodge the problem of time within the essentially spatial orientation of solipsism, e.g., by 'if-then' statements such as "If water and fire at t_1, then boiling water at t_2." To facilitate our explication (hopefully without evoking cries of protest for misrepresenting 'well known' and respectable philosophical positions), these may be called (1) 'Representational Realism,' (2) 'Phenomenalism' and (3) A scientific observational language of 'counterfactuals' and 'subjunctive conditionals.'

It must be noted from the outset that perceptual consciousness is not directly concerned with the actual *explanation* of things perceived; it is more theoretically or 'philosophically' epistemological. Its direct problem is to work out the principle or the theoretical foundations of perceiving things. To this end it uses universal concepts to account for how a thing, which is regarded as a substantial, persisting and determinable 'I know not what' (i.e., a *determinate* nothing as opposed to the atomistic 'this' nothing of sense certainty), is *related* to atomistically conceived or particular properties. Both the thing and the properties are conceived by perceptual consciousness (explicitly or implicitly) as universals. But if the relation to be theoretically accounted for is to hold, then the properties as well as the thing to which they are to be somehow related must be conceived as durative, persisting, and determinable. In other words, each property and every knowable thing must be "eine *unterschiedene*, *bestimmte* Eigenschaft"* (PhG 90).

The problem of perceptual consciousness throughout its revisionist efforts to save solipsism concerns the *determinate* character of the thing and of the properties. It does not directly concern itself with the actual *use* of concepts as determinables, as *functions* of unity in the active subjective apprehension of things. Thus, although the universal *qua* principle is the central issue for perceptual consciousness, universals are talked about in connection with the presumably constant, *objective* aspects of perception, the *subjective* process of perceiv*ing* being regarded as an unessential variable. In other words, the essence for Perception (Wahrnehmen) is *the given* truth (*das Wahre*), not *the taking* (*nehmen*).[22]

Within all three varieties of perception, the modes of relating the properties to the thing are of three basic logical forms, which may be symbolized as follows:

(a) (p v q v r v …)
(b) (p & q & r & …)
(c) (p) (q) (r) …

In the first case (a), the thing is regarded as a simple 'here' and the properties are recognized as so specific and determinate that they are absolutely indifferent to each other. Their association at one 'here' is thus that of a simple 'also' (symbolized above by the wedge (v) of Russell and Whitehead's propositional calculus, a *non-exclusive* 'or'). E.g., an apple is red, and *also* spherical, and *also* acedic, and *also* etc. In this case the universals *qua* properties are related merely externally and are thus susceptible of being 'pealed off' their locus, the thing, much in the way Philonous pealed them off for Hylas in

* "a *differentiated*, *determinate* property."

Berkeley's dialogue. But if the properties are so easily pealed off, then clearly neither they nor 'their' thing-medium is determinate. *Any* properties will do.

In the second case (b), the thing is regarded as the essential universal, essentially *constituted* by *its* properties, which it holds in a relationship (symbolized by a concatenation of p, q, etc., connected by the ampersand, &) which *excludes* all contrary properties. Briefly put, the difficulty here is that the excluding function assigned to the thing must also be regarded as a property, which, since it is clearly a property of the thing, must be held in a relationship with the thing's other properties, thus requiring a *new* excluding property, which, etc., etc.[23]

Although the third case (c) obviously avoids the difficulties attending the first two, it is equally obvious that in setting up the *properties* as singular it involves a recourse to the problem of particular 'thises' discussed in the preceding section and that it does not enable perceptual consciousness to formulate a theory of how *things* are known.[24]

Hegel then presents these three logical forms of 'relating' the thing and its properties within the frameworks of a 'representation realist' (PhG 93–94), a 'phenomenalist' (PhG 95–97) and a hypothetical combination of both (PhG 97–100). We will not, in this study, trace out this development. With each successive refinement of perceptual theory the reader of the PhG comes to see ever more clearly that the formally logical and ego-centrically certain criterion of self-sameness (Sichselbstgleichheit) evinces a paradox within every theory attempting to show how the relationship between the phenomenal things and properties may be construed. The things *qua* phenomena cannot be 'saved'; their phenomenal form simply proves to be a curtain behind which the things deceptively elude every theoretical device designed to take them as they truly are.

In the face of an obdurant phenomenal world, epistemologically oriented consciousness thus gives up the task of conceptually relating the unity of phenomenal things and the diversity of phenomenal properties. The ultimate object of knowledge or the 'thing' will be conceived as lying beyond the realm of appearances and the presumed source of deception, the 'curtain,' will be treated as the boundary of the phenomenal world. The philosophical consciousness to which we now turn will theoretically acknowledge a noumenal world of unities as well as a phenomenal world of differences as necessary presuppositions for the possibility of discovering the true 'meaning' of things.

D. Noumenology and Explanation: "We" go behind the "curtain."

For the philosophical "we," the chapter called "Understanding" marks the most crucial turning point within the PhG. The first two chapters have already enabled the reader to sense that the epistemological and the ego-centric standpoints are coterminous; his comprehension of epistemology as it is now presented in its most sophisticated and self-critical forms will uniquely determine whether his grasp of the subsequent description of human nature will be in the Hegelian phenomenological mode or whether he will try to reconstruct Hegel's phenomenological anthropology in terms of 'more intelligible' traditional epistemological categories. Although this second way of reading the PhG has tended to predominate in most of the existing discussions of the book, an effort will be made in the present section to show that this traditional way of reading Hegel's phenomenological descriptions is

not only a mistake, but a mistake which Hegel himself enables his readers—with an adequate *Anstrengung*—to overcome.

In his presentation of "Understanding" Hegel shows more clearly than anywhere else his intense appreciation for and penetration into the brilliant and revolutionary argument of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. By no means a mere recapitulation of Kant's work, the chapter follows a course of consciousness' development exhibiting the implicitly dialectical character of the first *Critique*. Very roughly, the three stages in this development, (1) "Force" (PhG 105–14), (2) "Law" (PhG 114–19), and (3) "Explanation" (PhG 114–29), may be seen to deal with issues comparable to those taken up by Kant in his discussion of (1) the role assigned to the 'thing-in-itself' in the "Transcendental Aesthetic,"[25] (2) the problematical relationship of empirical concepts and formal categories in the "Transcendental Analytic," and (3) the problem of the "Transcendental Deduction" concerning the unity of the "Transcendental Unity of Apprehension": is it analytical or synthetical? (It is only in (3) that the philosophy as well as the issues described are peculiarly Kantian.)

Throughout this presentation the reader may observe Hegel's keen sensitivity to Kant's central insight, namely, that all human cognition *eo ipso* involves objectification. Thus when Understanding employs universal concepts which perceptual consciousness attempted to assert about the *relations* between a thing and its properties to characterize that which the thing itself asserts, e.g., the concept of force, "we" can see that the concept retains an objectivity in spite of its stipulated independence from specific, empirically perceived relations to things. It may be conceived as un-thinged (unbe*dingt*) or unconditioned; nevertheless, *qua* thought, it is objective: "Dies unbedingte Allgemeine, das nunmehr der wahre Gegenstand des Bewußtseins ist, ist noch als *Gegenstand* desselben"* (PhG 103).

The philosophical consciousness observed, however, does not at first take account of the fact (acknowledged by Kant) that its knowledge is constituted by its own self-objectification and consequently, although it does now deal with an unconditioned or un-thinged universal, it does not yet recognize the impossibility of directly relating the thing as a unity in itself and 'its' properties. Thus the 'thing' is conceived as a non-thing, as a unity in itself (and thus akin to the individual properties of case 'c,' p. 39 above) whose only characteristic or property is said to be the *self-assertion* of that thing itself. This self-assertion is called 'force.'[26]

Hence the 'thing-in-itself' is no longer conceived so as to entail a paradox in the relationship between the thing and its properties; the thing has *one* property and the epistemology of Understanding now limits itself to the claim that this one property is '*identical*' with the totality of *knowable* characteristics of the thing *qua* 'thing-in-itself.'

Understanding therefore refers to the 'thing-in-itself' as *per se* unknowable; the *ultimate* object of knowledge can only be directly spoken of in a negative mode, as a noumenon, or literally as a being-of-nous. But "we" also observe that this negatively conceived 'thing-in-itself' is nevertheless said to be positively known or empirically experienced. It is, however, said to be experienced only indirectly,

* "This un-thinged or unconditioned universal, which is now consciousness' true object, is still a universal *qua object* of consciousness."

not as it is in itself but as it asserts or expresses itself. Thus the postulation of the 'thing-in-itself' *qua* 'force' entails a bi-*modal* distinction between (a) 'force proper' or in itself (cf. PhG 105) and (b) the phenomenal '*expression* of force.' But since Understanding does not at this stage of its development recognize the above distinction as a mere distinction in thought, "we" must "beide Momente in ihrer unmittelbaren Einheit erhalten …"* (PhG 105).

Thus we come to see that the first stage of critical Understanding, a theoretical consciousness of the 'thing-in-itself' *qua* 'force,' is actually a more reflective and critical version of perceptual consciousness. The alternating emphasis on 'force in itself' and 'force expressed' is the direct counterpart of the already observed oscillation of perception, "worin die beiden Seiten, das Wahrnehmende und das Wahrgenommene zugleich, einmal als das *Auffassen* des Wahren eins und ununterschieden, dabei aber ebensowohl jede Seite in sich *reflektiert* oder für sich ist"† (PhG 106). But whereas perceptual consciousness did not draw an explicit distinction between the percipient and the perceived in the perceiving process (focussing only on the object perceived) and was accordingly uncritical of the subjective side of its knowing process, we see that both sides now assume an *objective* form for Understanding. Here they are the two modes of objective force, and though the distinction is not immediately recognized as such by Understanding in its first stage of development, "we" can see that the distinction is in principle recognizable within the framework of Understanding and consequently that it will be recognized in the course of Understanding's "working the matter out."[27]

In other words, "we" can see that the 'thing-in-itself' *qua* force functions in this epistemological theory as a "middle term" (Mitte, PhG 106) holding together the two *extremes*, 'force in itself' or the negative noumenon and 'force as expressed' or the phenomena. The problem is that the presumably knowable and objectively unifying middle term is said to be known in such a way that it is more akin to the second extreme, 'force as expressed,' than to what is ostensibly the ultimate 'object' of Understanding's inquiry, namely the unconditioned universal as something non-objective or as the *inner* aspect of the 'thing-in-itself.'

If "our" standpoint may be considered metalinguistically formal, then it is evident that a formal argument or syllogism (Schluss) of this sort is by the very nature of the case, or in a strictly logical sense, doomed to failure in so far as it remains a revised form of perceptual theory. The 'middle term' is at once both broken (thus involving a *quaternio terminorum*) as well as a reduplication of the 'extremes.' For Understanding, the unity of the extremes is essential if it is to avoid the paradoxes of relation inherent in Perception. But in the course of critically reflecting on this unity, it will discover that its middle term is broken and that the concept of force as a principle of experience entails an untenable four-term distinction.[28]

We will now sketch this process of discovery briefly. In the first place, force, as the principle of unity, the self-assertive characteristic of the ostensibly substantial but unknowable 'thing-in-itself,'

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* "maintain or hold both moments in their immediate unity."

† "In which both sides, the 'truly *taking*' [i.e., the percipient] and the 'truly *taken*' [i.e., the perceived], are at once united and undistinguished in the *grasping* of 'the true,' and yet, by that very fact, each side is just as much *reflected* into itself or something existing for itself."

is presented as something reflected into itself, as the self-identity of the unknown 'thing' and its single 'property' force. The differentiated characteristics of the 'thing' *qua* known are thus said to fall outside of the 'thing-in-itself.' They are, nevertheless, regarded as *expressions* of the 'thing' *qua* unified force. And since force is posited as that which is by its very nature self-expressive, its self-expressions, the differentiated characteristics, must of necessity be expressions of *its self*. These, however, were first set up as *other* than the 'thing-in-itself' (which was in turn posited as *identical* with 'force'). The middle term, force, must now be considered as a universal medium for the subsistence of the differentiated characteristics. The crucial question thus becomes: how can the middle term be at once both the unity of one extreme, 'force itself,' and the diversity of the other, 'force as expressed'?

Understanding's answer (like that of the perceptual theory of "subjunctive conditionals") involves an appeal to a temporal distinction: the diverse characteristics are regarded as something which 'force in itself' *has expressed*. Whereas 'force' was first set up by Understanding as a device to account for substantial unity from the side of the phenomena, "we" now see that Understanding has tacitly shifted its theoretical orientation to the side of 'force in itself,' i.e., to the side of the presumably unknowable noumenon. From this point of view, the hitherto positive and objectively known phenomena are regarded as negative, as vanishing moments. Just as "we" in "Sense Certainty" attempted to take the place of the immediate solipsist and found the immediate posited "this now" to be a negatively vanishing moment, so too we see that consciousness itself here tries to adopt the standpoint of the 'thing-in-itself' and finds that its expressive moments likewise vanish, that they can only be conceived as *having been* expressed.

With this discovery of a dichotomy within force itself, Understanding attempts to preserve unity in its concept of force by assuming a 'complementary theory'[29]—it acknowledges that there are two forces, one inciting, the other incited, but adds that these are *really* two complementary aspects of the *same* force. The unity is thus conceived as a reciprocal interchange or a "play of forces."

With the assumption of a 'play of forces,' however, consciousness becomes increasingly aware that, in spite of its theoretical efforts to avoid the paradoxes of perception, its cognition of force as a twofold interchange entails an objectification of *force* itself *as a relation*. As objectifying consciousness, then, it distinguishes its own process of reflective objectification from the mutual reflection or 'play' of objective forces, and regards this 'play' as a 'middle term' encompassing the two extremes of conscious Understanding itself, on the one hand, and the *inner* aspect of the 'thing-in-itself,' on the other. Since this middle term or 'play' is *for* Understanding the being of force as a vanishing moment, it is called *appearance* (PhG 110).

This consciousness does not acknowledge the perceptible realm of appearance as the true world, however. Like all forms of solipsism, its basic criterion is self-sameness or self-identity. Critical consciousness now finds that there is no correspondence between its criterion and its object in so far as its object is a phenomenon. Confronted by a world of flux in which no thing seems to remain the same, Understanding thus purifies its concept of the inner truth of things by changing its object to fit its criterion; it posits a supersensible world of essences beyond the existing world of sense and appearance.[30]

We have already had occasion to notice[31] the important role played by the contrast between eternally identical essences or ideas, on the one hand, and existing and temporal *Begiffe*, on the other, within experience as it is described according to Hegel's phenomenological method. We must now observe more closely how this difference is developed within the experience of Understanding. To this end, *our* object, whose *content* is the appearance *of* Understanding's experience, takes the *form* of a logically inferential process whose *extremes* are (a) the inner aspect of 'things-in-themselves' now posited by consciousness as a realm of essence and (b) experiencing consciousness *qua* observed Understanding, whose *middle term* is the appearance of the interaction between (a) and (b), or the above mentioned appearance *of* experience.

This form of observation is only possible because our object, the observed consciousness, now *expresses* its conviction that appearance is the *appearance of* the supersensible 'beyond' or world of essences. Or, in other words, "Das Übersinnliche ist also die *Erscheinung*, als *Erscheinung*"* (PhG 113). From the standpoint of Sense Certainty or Perception, this attitude toward appearance would seem the very inversion of the true state of affairs, for it would seem to identify the supersensible with the sensible world. But Understanding has transcended the identification of the actual world with the world of autonomous intuitions and percepts or independent things, which this protest of immediately certain and perceptual consciousness presupposes. For Understanding, the appearing play of forces is recognized as something negative, and the essences are regarded as the *per se* supersensible form of that which *has been* expressed by the supersensible 'things-in-themselves.' It also recognizes, however, that the imperceptible 'thing-in-itself' would be for it a mere undifferentiated formal locus were it not for the content manifested through the mediating agency of the play of forces.

For the observed Understanding, therefore, both the 'thing-in-itself' and the appearing play of forces have complementary positive and negative aspects. Positively, the 'thing-in-itself' or the noumenon is the inciting activity and formally the locus of ultimate truth for this consciousness. But the noumenon is also negative because, as such, it is not constituted by any experienced content; it is only a thought entity. The appearing play of forces or the phenomenon, on the other hand, has the positive significance of being a content for Understanding, it is the incited appearance. But the phenomenon is also a negative factor because it is, *qua* phenomenon, formally indeterminate; it is merely a medium through which the 'thing-in-itself' is said to express itself.

Understanding's complementary theory is thus seen to involve a four term distinction constituted by two contraries: (a) form-content and (b) noumenon-phenomenon (cf. PhG 114). (1) With respect to its form, the noumenon is the inciting activity of force, whose positive role in empirical knowledge is recognized by Understanding as a necessary presupposition. (2) With respect to its content, however, the noumenon is the *inciting* force itself, which critical Understanding must recognize as unknowable and thus as a negative factor in empirical knowledge. (3) The phenomenon *as such*, on the other hand, is in principle formally determinate; but all Understanding can *say* concerning its form, is that it is passive and negative, that it is *incited by* the active and positive

* "The supersensible is thus the *appearance qua appearance*."

noumenon. (4) The phenomenon is nevertheless said to be the real content of empirical experience, and in this sense it is positive.

With this formulation of the problem of empirical knowledge, Understanding at first seems to have simply realized the four term fallacy which we earlier saw to be inherent in its standpoint as a more critical version of a perceptual epistemology. But it also has the positive significance of reducing the arbitrariness of particular forces in the 'play of forces' to an absolute fluidity and therewith the complex multiplicity of formal distinctions to a simple *universal difference*: the active-passive distinction between 'inciting' and 'incited by.' "Dieser *Unterschied als allgemeiner* ist daher *das Einfache an dem Spiele der Kraft selbst*, und das Wahre desselben; er ist das *Gesetz der Kraft*"* (PhG 114).

Understanding now grasps *law* as the universal and simple difference because the element of form in the contrary (a) form-content is seen to embrace specific aspects of both elements of the contrary (b) noumenon-phenomenon. It is seen that the thought of form, as brought to light by the simple active-passive distinction between 'inciting to' and 'incited by,' essentially involves negation and that this negation discloses the universal difference between noumenon and phenomenon as a persisting or enduring mediation. The otherwise intractable multiplicity of difference in the unstable world of phenomena is thus *expressed* in law as an image of the unchangeable in the realm of time and change. "Die *übersinnliche* Welt ist hiemit ein *ruhiges Reich von Gesetzen* …"† (PhG 115).

The noumenon also comes explicitly to be understood in two senses at this point. On the one hand, the noumenon *qua* thing-in-itself or direct content continues to be regarded as unknowable. In its formal aspect, on the other hand, the noumenon is not only knowable, as a being-of-reason it is by definition known. One of the central tasks of self-critical Understanding thus becomes the avoidance of an uncritical identification of the knowable, formal, and supersensible noumenon *qua* formal law, with the content of the noumenon *qua* thing-in-itself. In other words, the inner as subject must be differentiated from the inner as object.

With the systematic observation of this difference, Understanding has arrived at the principle or idea of law in general. Consciousness' criterion for the truth of its knowledge accordingly becomes internally necessary lawlikeness or *Gesetzmäßigkeit*. But this criterion, although it marks a significant advance over the more or less arbitrary postulation of properties, relations, and forces, is nevertheless found to be so demanding that the lawlikeness of various determinately known laws can only be ascertained through their reduction to a single law. Thus, for example, the law expressing the constant rate of acceleration of freely falling bodies (informally expressed as 32 feet per second per second), while it is a formal constant independent of the content or the particular properties of the body in question, does nevertheless presuppose a limitation to a kind of motion whose specific presuppositions are not expressed in the law itself, e.g., the 'attractive force' of a specific body, viz.,

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* "This *difference*, *as universal difference*, is therefore *the simple* [difference] *in the play of force itself* and the truth of that process; it is the *law of force*."

† "The *supersensible* world is accordingly a *calm kingdom of laws*."

the earth. Hence this law of motion does not express an 'inner' necessity. And it is as such merely arbitrarily related to the laws of motion expressed, e.g., in celestial mechanics.

The criterion of inner lawlikeness therefore requires the unification of all laws of motion into the law of universal attraction. But this law, which says no more than that any thing has a *constant difference* with respect to any other thing (cf. PhG 115), preserves none of the determinateness of the laws it unites; the only 'content' it expresses is the mere principle or criterion of lawlikeness itself. Thus we see that the basic epistemological criterion of self-sameness or identity has been preserved once again, but that what epistemological consciousness *meant* to express—namely, something concerning actuality as such—has been lost in the abstracting process of self-critical formulation; Understanding's "*Begriff* des Gesetzes ist gegen *das Gesetz* selbst gekehrt"* (PhG 116).

At this turn we must consider briefly two important theoretical devices for retaining the necessity expressed in the criterion of lawlikeness without having to reduce the determinateness of specific laws to the empty and formal self-identity of the criterion itself. In the first of these the determinate aspect is to be preserved by regarding lawlikeness as necessarily involving *correlative* moments or terms. It is observed, for example, that the very thought of positive electricity *ipso facto* entails the thought of its *correlative*, negative electricity. Hence specific differences seem to be susceptible of a lawlike formulation. And we must agree that such correlations do obtain—but we must also notice that the differentiated correlative pairs are only established when one member is already posited, not, to pursue the same example, when electricity as such is alone in question. If, then, we are assured that electricity *by definition* divides itself into such correlatives, we are compelled to observe that what is now at issue is no longer a logic of necessary correlations but rather the mere assurance of a stipulative definition.

Understanding's second way of theoretically accounting for a necessary difference is more self-critical; it is based upon an examination of its own structure of apprehension. With respect to the laws of motion, for example, involving distance and velocity or space and time, Understanding distinguishes between space and time as modes of being (Wesen des Seins, PhG 118), on the one hand, and as ways of consciousness' own sensible representation (Vorstellen), on the other. And while it is careful not to confuse the idea of the space and time of things-in-themselves with its own spatial and temporal modes of sensibility, "we" must be equally careful not to forget that Understanding itself is now actually conscious of this difference. Self-critical Understanding is thus aware that the ground of the necessity in the laws about which it speaks is to be found only in itself. "Es ist also nur die *eigne* Notwendigkeit, was der Verstand ausspricht; einen Unterschied, den er also nur so macht, daß er es zugleich ausdrückt, daß der Unterschied kein *Unterschied der Sache selbst* sei"† (PhG 119). Moreover, the inner necessity of any law expressed by this Understanding is not *grounded* on the difference between the space and time of things in themselves and the spatial and temporal modes of its own apprehension (for here, as consciousness has discovered, no necessity is to be found); necessity is seen to be grounded solely on the *difference* between *its* spatially and temporally organized objective apprehensions

* "*Begriff* of law is turned against *the law* itself."

† "It is only *its own* necessity that Understanding expresses; a difference which it only makes in such a way that it at the same time expresses the difference to be no *difference in the fact itself*."

and its own cognitive awareness of these apprehensions, which is observed to accompany necessarily all of its apprehensions.

The process through which Understanding becomes aware of the objectification necessarily involved in its cognition is called *Explanation*. When a law is both self-critically formulated and actually expressed in an explanation, it is seen that the phenomenal content so explained is in fact *constituted* by the law in question. If, for example, the explanation concerns force, Understanding says that "*die Kraft ist gerade so beschaffen wie das Gesetz*; es wird gesagt, daß beide gar nicht unterschieden seien"* (PhG 119).

In this way, the epistemological principle of self-identity (Sichselbstgleichheit) is employed in its most critical and consistent form. And on closer observation we see that Understanding's self-critical consistency is attained by regarding the principle of identity under two aspects, one analytical and the other synthetical. The ultimate ground of necessary identity is said to be the analytical *self*-identity of (a) consciousness *qua* object awareness or the 'I think' and (b) consciousness *qua* objectified or the 'me' which is being thought in the process of apprehension. The synthetical identity, on the other hand, is said to hold between (a) the laws or functions of unity which must be employed in objectively thinking phenomenal content and (b) the knowable or formal characteristics of the phenomena which are objectively unified or constituted through the process of being so thought or apprehended.

Still another way of formulating the twofold identity brought to light in the description of *Explanation* in the PhG may be found in Kant's discussion of the reproductive and productive imagination in the difficult section of the first *Critique* concerning the "Schematism" of concepts. The importance of this theory in the development of Hegel's critique of epistemology is already to be seen in his pre-PhG work, *Glauben und Wissen*, where he writes: "Diese Einbildungskraft als die ursprüngliche zweiseitige Identität, die nach einer Seite Subjekt überhaupt wird, nach der andern aber Objekt, und ursprünglich beides ist, ist nichts anders als die Vernunft selbst . . . , nur Vernunft als erscheinend in der Sphäre des empirischen Bewußtseins."†[32]

For the reader of the PhG, however, it is of utmost importance to notice that Hegel's description of the tautological foundation of necessity in Understanding's process of explanation in terms of laws does *not* constitute the basis from which Hegel develops his own 'dialectical' epistemology. Although this has been a popular way of conceiving the transition 'from Kant to Hegel,' there is not a shred of evidence to support this interpretation in the text of the PhG. The epistemological development continues to be that of the described consciousness itself. "We," the readers, do of course continue to learn. Indeed, what we learn in our observation of Understanding in its (phenomenologically observable) self-critical explanations is absolutely crucial for our comprehension of the limits of epistemology and therewith our grasp of Hegel's subsequent phenomenological descriptions.

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* "*the force is constituted in exactly the same way as the law*; Understanding declares that the two are not differentiated."

† "This power of imagination, as the original twofold identity which becomes on the one hand subject in general but on the other object, and which is originally both—this power is nothing other than reason itself . . . , but only reason as it appears in the sphere of empirical consciousness."

The observed Understanding, in its critical self-clarification of the foundations of necessity in its empirical judgments and explanations, comes to see that its synthetical judgments are based upon its own tautological or analytical self-identity, that the necessary connections in its objective knowledge can only be demonstrated as necessary in virtue of the fact that the process of cognition *eo ipso* involves *self*-objectification, and not because of any original identity in the object itself. Through this clarification, therefore, it becomes clear to Understanding that, whatever it might 'mean' or 'intend,' scientific explanation not only explains nothing which is in itself objective, it is systematically impossible for any rigorously logical process of explanation to say anything new, to get beyond a stuttering repetition and reshuffling of the data which have already been somehow 'fed into' it.

The fact of scientific discovery must, of course, be acknowledged. What Hegel's discussion makes clear is that the scientific explanation of Understanding is *per se* neither adequate to bring about discoveries nor—and this is no doubt of significance for the philosophy of science—capable of adequately explaining scientific discoveries *post festum*. As we shall see, whatever any individual scientist may profess as his 'theory of knowledge,' scientific discovery can only be accounted for through a phenomenological description of self-consciousness in praxis, i.e., as making and experiencing actual *errors*.

Nevertheless, in "our" present observation of Understanding's explanations "erkennen wir nun eben dasjenige, was an dem Gesetze vermißt wurde, nämlich den absoluten Wechsel selbst, denn diese *Bewegung*, wenn wir sie näher betrachten, ist unmittelbar das Gegenteil ihrer selbst. Sie setzt nämlich *einen Unterschied*, welcher nicht nur für uns *kein Unterschied* ist, sondern welchen sie selbst als Unterschied aufhebt. . . . Es ist nicht nur die bloße Einheit vorhanden, so daß *kein Unterschied* gesetzt wäre [as in the case of the general criterion of lawlikeness], sondern es ist diese ***Bewegung***, daß *allerdings ein Unterschied gemacht*, *aber*, weil er keiner ist, *wieder aufgehoben wird*'"* (PhG 120).

Unlike the Understanding which employed supersensible and immutable laws to account for the regularity underlying the differences in its empirical experience, regarding all errors as a misapplication of its infallible noumenal standards to the phenomena, self-critical Explanation finds the ground of all necessity—even the basis for the law of contradiction—within the structure of conscious awareness itself. Once again, an appeal is made to an inner, noumenal realm, but it is only with Explanation that the realm of legitimately knowable and necessarily true noumena is discovered to be not merely a peaceful kingdom of eternal objects, but also a bacchanalian revel of absolute alteration. The realm of truth is seen to be governed by a dual monarchy of calm tautological inwardness and turbulent objective differentiations, a regime in which theoretical instability is not veiled behind scientific or technological fecundity but systematic errors are relentlessly disclosed.[33]

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* "we now recognize precisely that which was missed in [observing Understanding's use of] law, namely, absolute alternation itself; for this *process*, when we observe it more closely, is directly the opposite of its self. For in this process Understanding posits *a difference* which is not only for us *no difference*, but one which it itself abolishes as a difference. . . . What is now at hand is not merely unity alone, as if *no difference* had really been posited in the first place [as in the case of the general criterion of lawlikeness]; it is rather the following ***process***: *a differentiation is indeed made*, *but*, because it is no difference, *it is then abolished*."

In our observation of Explanation, we cannot but agree with Kant's teaching in the first *Critique* that the direct importation of subjectively inner beings of reason (noumena) into the phenomenal realm is a source of error. But we must add: (1) human errors *are discovered* by human consciousness and their discovery has been most instructive in the development of man, and (2) the process of actually externalizing noumena and the process of discovering errors in their use *can be described*. Moreover, this description becomes accessible to us when "unser Bewußtsein ist aber aus dem Innern als Gegenstande auf die andere Seite in den *Verstand* herübergegangen und hat in ihm den Wechsel"* (PhG 120).

It is only for the human Understanding which we now observe that the subjectively inner noumenal laws are regarded as constitutive in the experience of phenomena. As attentive readers of the PhG, *we* are no longer directly concerned with the avoidance of error within the strictures of epistemological theory; we are coming more and more to see that consciousness' quest for certainty on the basis of the law of contradiction or the criterion of self-identity discloses itself as less and less tenable with every additional increment of self-criticism in its self-disclosing (and thus phenomenologically observable) *acts* of explanation.

The total fluidity or absolute alternation in the 'play of forces,' which marked the transition to the Understanding of law, is now manifested in Understanding's own acts of explanation. But whereas the supersensible realm of laws was brought about by simply promoting, as it were, the constants perceived in the play of forces to a more lofty rank, dispensing thereby with the principle of phenomenal alteration that perception had employed to account for errors, Understanding's process of explaining in terms of laws as functions of unity still has to account for the alteration appearing in its objects of knowledge. And in consistently regarding its world of experience as constituted by self-legislated laws grounded on its own self-identity, which we have observed as a subjectively *inner* process of absolute alteration, it comes to experience objective alteration in the form of an inverted world (verkehrte Welt, cf. PhG 121).

The inverted world is a world of antinomies; it is a second supersensible world of laws which are seen to be the truth of the laws in the first supersensible world. Indeed, what were called 'laws' in that first supersensible world are now seen to have been no more than empirical concepts.[34] And while these empirical concepts did express differences, their necessity was not intrinsic but rather based on the appeal to a 'necessity for the possibility of differentiated empirical experience.' With the clarification of their actually synthetic function and their logically analytical foundation in Explanation, however, Understanding is confronted with an endless series of antinomies. What was sweet by the laws of the first world is discovered to be fundamentally sour in this second or inverted world; what was black is seen to be essentially white, etc., etc.

For an intelligible reading of the PhG, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the antinomies described by Hegel at this juncture do not arise out of a transcendent or mistaken employment of concepts like that discussed by Kant in his "Transcendental Dialectic." The antinomies

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* "our consciousness no longer has the Inner as its object and has passed over to the other side, into *Understanding*, and now finds the alternating process in it."

of Understanding's 'inverted world' are more accurately grasped as developing out of a consistent and critical attempt to use the theoretical framework of the "Transcendental Analytic." This development may be summarized as follows: (1) Synthetical judgments establish or constitute a knowable difference in empirical experience; (2) the difference is knowable because it is said to be *recognized* as constituted by Understanding's own laws or functions of unity. (3) As known, the thus constituted difference is recognized by Understanding as an objectification of its self. (4) Since Understanding is said to recognize itself as identical with itself, it also acknowledges the formal character of the difference established through its self-objectification as *identical* with itself and, in this sense, lawlike. (5) Understanding's synthetical judgments are therefore also regarded as necessary because they are said to be formed in accordance with its analytically necessary laws. (6) The difference established through judgment is accordingly seen to be at root an identity. (7) But since the identity in question is only an identity as a unity of differences, it is only established through self-objectification or the establishment of a differentiation (Entzweiung, cf. PhG 124–26) of its own self by the positing of its opposite. (8) The knowable differences established through synthetical judgments are thus shown to be analytically or tautologically identical and hence necessary laws. (9) But *as* tautologies they embrace no difference and thus Understanding is once again compelled to differentiate itself and establish the opposite of these laws which have been found to be identical with itself. (10) The thus established opposites are then the inversion of the laws employed in the first synthetical judgment and the world constituted and known through these laws is accordingly the inversion of the first known world.

The process of Explanation thus described clearly contains no internal principle of limit; we therefore see that consistently self-critical Understanding is *not* based on *a static tautology* but rather an *infinite process* of thinking contradictions. "Durch die Unendlichkeit sehen wir das Gesetz zur Notwendigkeit an ihm selbst vollendet und alle Momente der Erscheinung in das Innre aufgenommen"* (PhG 124). But what we grasp in observing the infinite cycle of self-identity and self-differentiation realized in this most critical form of epistemology is not itself an epistemological insight. It is rather a comprehension of the ultimate limits of all philosophical theories implicitly or explicitly grounded on the solipsistic criterion of self-identity, a comprehension of what is entailed in a systematic justification of the law of non-contradiction. We come to see that it is indeed impossible to give an adequate and coherent account of how we actually *learn* anything new or *different* from the solipsistic orientation of the traditional epistemological quest for certainty.

It is no exaggeration to say that Hegel's description of Explanation enables *us* to see for the first time just why the 'paradox of learning' is paradoxical. "Die *Einheit*, von welcher gesagt zu werden pflegt, daß der Unterschied nicht aus ihr herauskommen könne, ist in der Tat selbst nur das Eine Moment der Entzweiung; sie ist die Abstraktion der Einfachheit, welche dem Unterschiede gegenüber ist. Aber indem sie die Abstraktion, nur das Eine der Entgegengesetzten ist, so ist es schon gesagt, daß sie das Entzweien ist; denn ist die Einheit ein *Negatives*, ein *Entgegengesetztes*, so ist sie eben gesetzt

* "Through the infinity we see law realizing necessity within law itself and we see all the moments of appearance taken up into the Inner."

als das, welches die Entgegensetzung an ihm hat. Die Unterschiede von *Entzweiung* und *Sichselbstgleichwerden* sind darum ebenso nur *diese Bewegung des sich Aufhebens*; …"* (PhG 126).

In all the previous forms of the theory of knowledge—from Sense Certainty, in which difference is first discovered to be an essential albeit problematical factor in knowing, through the relational paradoxes of Perceptual theory, and Understanding's theories of the unified, self-related and self-expressive, but elusive 'thing-in-itself,' to the various theories of Law and of Necessity as grounded in the tautological unity of self-identity—an adequate *justification* for how man learns anything new or different was thought to be the responsibility of philosophy, and with the discovery of incoherence in each of philosophy's successive answers, the indubitable fact of learning perennially came to be regarded as paradoxical.

The less obvious fact that all empirical or phenomenal knowing involves an endless process of self-objectification and self-unification first comes into view in *our* observation of Understanding's explanation that phenomenal content *qua* known is formally constituted by the 'inner' laws of the knowing subject. But this Understanding merely makes use of this principle in justifying its knowledge; the actually *infinite* process of establishing difference through self-objectification and necessity through self-identity is, as a process, "*nicht sein Gegenstand*"† (PhG 127). In other words, it is not aware that its principle, as indeed that of all the previous theories of objective knowledge (cf. PhG 128), is that of *self-consciousness*. It shares with all forms of epistemological theory the presupposition that appearance is somehow the expression of something deeper, a 'meaning' or an 'inner' reality.

But, from *our* standpoint of phenomenological observation, "Wir sehen, daß im Innern der Erscheinung der Verstand in Wahrheit nicht etwas anders als die Erscheinung selbst, … und in der Tat nur *sich selbst* erfährt"‡ (PhG 128). Whereas critical Understanding regards appearance as a middle term between two noumenal realms—that of the 'thing-in-itself' and that of the knowing self—we have come to see that the phenomenon or appearance, when it is conceived within such a theoretical framework, can only be treated as a veil, as an ultimately impenetrable curtain (Vorhang) which systematically outrules anything but a paradoxical account of human learning.

What *we* have learned in observing consciousness is that the two ostensibly unknowable noumenal realms do—in spite of all epistemological strictures—in point of fact ceaselessly interact. And with the observation of this interaction between the two noumenal 'extremes,' we see that they "sind nun zusammengefallen, und wie sie als Extreme, so ist auch die Mitte, als etwas anders als sie,

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* "The *unity* or the One, out of which, as it is conventionally said, no difference can be derived, is, in actuality, itself no more than one moment of self-differentiation; it is the abstraction of the simplicity to which difference is opposed. But since it is the abstraction, only the one of that which is posited as its opposite, the One has already been expressed as self-differentiating; for if the One is a *negative*, a *posited opposition*, then it is posited as precisely that which the posited opposition contains. The differences of *self-differentiation* and *self-identification* are therefore no more and no less than *this concomitant process of self-cancellation and self-preservation*."

† "*not its object*."

‡ "We see that, in truth, Understanding experiences in the Inner of appearance nothing other than appearance itself; and in the act [of knowing] Understanding only experiences *its self*."

verschwunden"* (PhG 128). What remains, what still appears for us when the 'epistemological curtain' is withdrawn from our eyes, is the activity of a consciousness engaged in a ceaseless struggle to arrive at truth, an infinite process of positing differences in the undifferentiated and then proving the differences to be essentially identities. This process is seen to propel itself on the basis of its own hypostatized ideas, the metaphysical conception of an inner truth. Having observed the vacuous *ideology* of epistemological theories, however, our attention will now turn to the appearance of a more concrete form of human experience.

The positive significance of our experience of "Consciousness" may be summarized with respect to its significance for the two processes of necessity which we have seen to be involved in Hegel's phenomenological method: that of the philosophical "we" and that of the observed consciousness. (1) *We* have come to grasp the intrinsic limitations of traditional reflections on the nature of knowledge and we will accordingly strive to avoid the adoption of a solipsistic interpretation of appearance (as a 'curtain') and of necessity (as a reduction to tautological self-identity). Through *our* effort (or Anstrengung) to comprehend the necessity within empirical experience under the various formulations of the traditional epistemological presupposition that 'inner reality' is at once disclosed to and concealed from the experiencing subject by means of a phenomenal curtain, "we," who have literally adopted the standpoint of this subject in its forms of Sense Certainty, Perception and Understanding, have come to see "daß hinter dem sogenannten Vorhange, welcher das Innre verdecken soll, nichts zu sehen ist, wenn *wir* nicht selbst dahintergehen, ebensosehr damit gesehen werde, als daß etwas dahinter sei, das gesehen werden kann"† (PhG 129). In accordance with this hard won insight, our standpoint in the sequel will be the very inversion of what we have discovered as that of traditional epistemology. We will no longer attempt to certify the validity of subjective knowledge by means of methodological doubt and ideological criteria. Our attention will rather be focussed on the description of that process in which living men are seen to penetrate, or, better, abolish, the so-called curtain in their acts. And instead of engaging in an endless and literally academic debate on the metaphysics of inner meanings and intentions, we shall struggle to comprehend more concretely Hegel's insight that "*die Wahrheit der Absicht ist nur die Tat selbst*"‡ (PhG 123, emphasis added). Moreover, the acts which rent the otherwise impenetrable curtain are themselves the subject matter which we come to see. The real act does not itself remain hidden; it actually appears in the forms of speech or work and as such it is susceptible of phenomenological description.

(2) The observation that human acts are in principle describable, although it marks a significant advance over the quest for meanings and intentions, is by no means an adequate basis for either the practice or the comprehension of phenomenological description. Of the two, the practice of actually describing is of course the more difficult. As readers, however, this is not required of us. What is required is some principle in terms of which we can organize our comprehension of what Hegel has

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* "are now merged together; and just as they have vanished as extremes, so too the middle term [appearance], as *something other than the extremes*, has also disappeared" (emphasis added).

† "that behind the so-called curtain, which is supposed to conceal the Inner, there is nothing to be seen unless *we* go behind it ourselves, just as much in order to see as that there may be something behind it which can be seen."

‡ "*the truth of intention is only the act itself*."

described. And, as we shall come to see more clearly, "Consciousness" has revealed such a principle: viz., *the infinite process of alteration* which constitutes the *form* of self-consciousness.

Our review of human experience in its most rarified 'scientific' form has brought to light one all important, though as yet abstract, fact about human **life**, namely that all human awareness is *eo ipso* self-consciousness, that all conscious activity involves an infinite process of interaction between the self *qua* knower and the self *qua* known. But the object of consciousness cannot be truly recognized as such within the frictionless world of theoretical, merely thought, entities. If we are to comprehend how human consciousness becomes for itself self-consciousness, we must observe its interaction with objects (a) which are for it a matter of vital concern and (b) which by their very nature offer a resistance within human consciousness' effort to interact with them. However thoroughly we may have gone beyond the idea of a phenomenal curtain, we are compelled to acknowledge "daß das Erkennen dessen, *was das Bewußtsein weiß*, *indem es sich selbst weiß*, noch weiterer Umstände bedarf, …"* (PhG 129). The first stage in this phenomenological development will thus be a description of how living consciousness arises out of an endless interactive process (e.g., metabolism) in which it simply abolishes the differences in things by, e.g., eating them, and comes to negate things in such a way that the negation itself endures and resists, that the negation is truly determinate.

* "that the recognition of *what consciousness knows*, *through its knowledge of its self*, requires [us to view it under] much more extensive circumstances."

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1 The disadvantage of this argument is that, however much it may appeal to common sense, it depends on a presumption of Hegel's 'intention' in writing the PhG. Following Hegel, we will try to avoid all such hypotheses and rely on what the PhG itself presents for *us* as experience.

2 The reading must, however, be of one of the German editions; Baillie's liberal additions and occasional deletions of 'we,' 'us' etc. make this important experiment very difficult in his version of the text.

3 This, of course, applies especially to those of "us" who have not been philosophically nurtured on the soil of German Idealism. But I shall maintain in this essay that such a preparatory study (apart from a knowledge of Kant) is not particularly (or uniquely) necessary for a reading of the PhG. There are indeed numerous oblique references to Fichte and Schelling scattered throughout the text, but those who take the "From Kant to Hegel" approach to the PhG tend to obscure more than they actually attain by way of intelligibility. Hegel's argument in the PhG is so truly revolutionary that one may, without exaggeration, say that a firm grasp of such classics as Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant is far more important than a detailed knowledge of Reinhold, Beck, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Schlegel, Schleiermacher, etc. To the extent that the reader assumes he has gleaned from the latter an adequate basis for comprehending the PhG, he has proportionally enhanced the difficulty of actually reading the PhG with comprehension. I do not, of course, wish to deny the importance of studying any of these German Idealists for their own sake or for enhancing one's appreciation for the nuances of Hegel's argument in the PhG; I merely wish to point out one possible source of illusion and hence unintelligibility in *reading* the PhG.

4 Although a painstaking struggle with "Consciousness" is a necessary condition for comprehending the PhG, it is in no way a 'sufficient' condition. "We" continue to learn throughout.

5 The reader may draw some additional insight concerning the relationship of "light" and "phenomenon" from Heidegger's etymologically oriented discussion in *Sein und Zeit*. Cf. especially section 7, "Die phänomenologische Methode der Untersuchung," pp. 27–39.

6 In view of the novelty of the PhG interpretation presented in this study, it may be protested that the interpretation itself, if correct, is simply another demonstration of Hegel's 'well known' obscurity; that is to say, if the role of the 'we' is as important as it is claimed to be in this study, and if generations of Hegel scholars have missed its true significance, then doesn't this prove that Hegel didn't make himself adequately clear in the first place? The only possible response to this objection is to ask the reader rework the PhG in light of this interpretation. If he then asks himself whether any other philosopher has more clearly faced up to the paradox of learning and its attendant problems, he will, I am sure, develop a new respect for Hegel and phenomenology.

7 'Naive' is not an adequate rendering of "natürliches" in Hegel's use of the term 'natural consciousness.'

8 The term 'pre-Hegelian' is to be understood in a systematic rather than an historical sense.

9 Who was, as he himself indicated in a private conversation with this writer shortly before his death, a thoroughgoing Hegelian in his earlier years.

10 This more active form of defining and sorting natural objects into categories will come into view as "Observational Reason."

11 Translation suggested by Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957, p. 269.

12 Already, on the second page of "Sense Certainty," the reader is confronted by one of Hegel's many puns (Wort*spiele*) in the PhG. Nearly all of them are apt and important for the presentation and none are quite so baffling as the well known "zu Grunde gehen" of the larger *Logik*.

13 It will be observed that what is here called an "error" is analogous to what in the previous chapter was called "death." The former term is, however, more appropriate to the discussion of "Consciousness" because of the rarified, highly 'philosophical' character of this section. Questions of "life and death" do not emerge until the next section, "Self-Consciousness," when the reader has, presumably, learned how to *read* phenomenological descriptions through his participation in the 'game' of philosophical solipsism.

[14] This form of 'subnexion' may be illustrated in the language of Tarski and Carnap's writings on 'the semantical theory of truth'; e.g., "The proposition 'it is snowing' is true if and only if it is snowing." This device for preserving the truth of sense certainty tends, as Max Black has wittily shown, to proliferate a whole 'telephone directory' of definitions which, if ever completed, would once again confront our solipsistic philosophers with the dialectic of sense certainty.

[15] Cf. e.g., PhG 221–222, 234ff.

[16] This passage illustrates once again the importance of taking Hegel at his word when he uses the word 'we.' Other commentators tend to either pass over such remarks (e.g., Findlay, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–89, Hartmann, *op. cit.*, p. 325, Kroner, *op. cit.*, p. 397, Niel, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–17) or 'translate' them into a less shocking language (e.g., Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 106) or simply paraphrase Hegel's text without indicating any awareness that the 'we' is as much in question here as it is at PhG 74 (Hyppolite, *op. cit.*, p. 97).

[17] Note that the passive-active duality of this process is lost in Baillie's translation of "sie uns zeigen … lassen" (cf. Baillie, *op. cit.*, p. 156).

[18] "… unser Aufnehmen der Wahrnehmung daher nicht mehr ein erscheinendes Aufnehmen, wie der sinnlichen Gewißheit, sondern ein notwendiges" (PhG 89).

[19] Description, in Hegel's sense of the term, *begins* only with "Self-Consciousness."

[20] E.g., as something less outré than "die Präsentation der absoluten Repräsentation die Parusie des Absoluten.": Heidegger, *Holzwege*, p. 171.

[21] "… ich nehme so es auf, wie es in Wahrheit ist, und statt ein Unmittelbares zu wissen, *nehme ich wahr*" (PhG 89).

[22] On this important distinction, see Wilfrid Sellars' lectures, "The Myth of the Given," reprinted in Sellars, *Science, Perception and Reality*, New York: Humanities Press, 1963, pp. 127ff.

[23] The similarity of the above to the logical problems of self-reference discussed by Frege, and paradoxes associated with the "theory of types" in *Principia Mathematica*, as well as the 'revisionist' attempt to formulate a "ramified theory of types," will be evident to the reader.

[24] The most ingenious effort to formulate a language in which "the logical terms do not relate" is to be found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Although the debate on the relationship between the 'early' and 'late' Wittgenstein is currently as hot as that on the 'early' and 'late' Heidegger, this writer accepts Wittgenstein's own verdict on the inadequacy of the language developed in the *Tractatus*.

[25] But this problem was left scrupulously undeveloped by Kant himself (except for obscure examples such as 'cinnabar,' A100), thus leaving the door open for various Kantian 'schools' of interpreting the 'thing-in-itself.'

[26] It is also fruitful to consider Whitehead's theory of "causal efficacy" in terms of the following discussion of 'force.' There are, of course, numerous other parallel discussions, the most obvious of which is probably that of Plato in *The Sophist*.

[27] In contrast to the framework of perception, where the distinction was *systematically ambiguous*.

[28] Note that the "we" is here anticipatory, but not in virtue of any absolute omniscience; the anticipation stems simply from "our" observational standpoint. Cf. PhG 93.

[29] Somewhat analogous to the 'Copenhagen theory' of the electron.

[30] With this observation of consciousness' distinction between essence and existence and its postulation of the supersensible world as the realm of essence, the reader is confronted with the first explicit but as yet undeveloped manifestation of both reason (PhG 111) and Religion (cf. PhG 473).

[31] Cf. Chapter Two of this essay.

[32] Quoted in Otto Pöggeler, "Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes," *Hegel-Studien*, Vol. I, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1961, p. 293.

[33] It is interesting to note that this 'veiling' effect is employed in Kant's *Prolegomena*, which takes as given mathematics and Newtonian physics and proceeds 'analytically' from these, in contrast with the more 'synthetical' *Critique of Pure Reason*, which attempts to justify the use of concepts in mathematics and physics.

[34] On the problem of empirical concepts in Kant's epistemology, see George Schrader's article, "Kant's Theory of Concepts" in *Kant-Studien*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1958, pp. 264ff.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSTITUTIVE MOMENTS OF EXISTING SPIRIT: HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

In our discussion of Hegel's phenomenological method we drew special attention to the problem of intelligibility in reading the PhG. In the most general sense, the PhG will only be intelligible for the reader who comes to realize (a) that Spirit can only be grasped phenomenologically and (b) that the only subject matter susceptible of a phenomenological description is Spirit. Although neither of these interpretative propositions are likely to make much sense in their immediate and abstract form, the reader who has worked his way through Hegel's critique of epistemology has attained some of the preconditions for the possibility of comprehending Spirit phenomenologically.

In the preceding chapter we have shown how the standpoint of epistemology systematically negates its own premises for the reader who participates in the drama of "Consciousness." We have seen that the effort to interpret experience on the basis of such conceptual criteria as "Here," "Now," "Particularity," "Universality," "Force" and "Law" *eo ipso* outrules the possibility of describing experience as it interprets itself. Now, as the second chapter of this study demonstrated, a description of self-interpreting and self-transforming experience is precisely what constitutes the phenomenological method in Hegel's sense of the term. This self-interpreting characteristic must therefore be one of the basic features of the object described by the PhG, in so far as Hegel is true to his method.

A. Immediate Self-Consciousness as Desire in General.

As the reader turns from "Consciousness" to "Self-Consciousness" he is confronted with a problem. Although "we" have overcome the epistemological assumption that appearance is a curtain, Spirit has in no obvious sense emerged upon the scene. We seem rather to have as our object a form of knowing which knows only itself. It is indeed self-interpreting, and its knowledge is even true, since its object corresponds with its *Begriff*. It has thus arrived at the truth of its quest for self-certainty; but this truth at first seems merely to be the motionless tautology: "I am I" (PhG 134).

If, however, we were to accept this truth as it is immediately presented from within the experience of self-consciousness, we would betray our failure to grasp the central point of Hegel's presentation of "Consciousness." We would demonstrate our persistence in holding to an epistemological orientation vis-à-vis experience. But if we now regard self-consciousness as itself an appearance, we see that it is by no means a static tautology; it is a *result*. The tautology is only attained *through* a reduction to unity. And as a reduction, it is therefore a temporal process.

As a result of our observation of "Consciousness," "we" know that this reductive process is constituted by two necessary moments. On the one hand, self-consciousness as consciousness has for itself the whole range of sensible appearances, or what we have (in Chapter Two) called appearance *within* experience. On the other hand, however, consciousness as self-consciousness truly *has* these sensible appearances within experience only in a *second* moment: in the unity of self-consciousness with

itself. It is this unity alone which persists; but even this unity persists for self-consciousness only as appearance, as that which *is* for self-consciousness only as it is negated.

If we relinquish the epistemological standpoint of *interpreting* appearances within the orientation of a particular consciousness (and therewith all the transcendentalist arguments for uniting a particular consciousness with "Bewußtsein überhaupt") and merely follow the *appearance of* this experience, we then see that the process of reducing all phenomenal objects to the negating unity of self-consciousness reveals the fundamental nature of self-consciousness. "Dieser Gegensatz seiner Erscheinung und seiner Wahrheit hat aber nur die Wahrheit, nämlich die Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins mit sich selbst, zu seinem Wesen; diese muß ihm wesentlich werden, d.h. es ist *Begierde* überhaupt"* (PhG 135).

Self-consciousness, revealed as *desire in general*, is therefore that nothingness to which all of its objects are perpetually reduced.

It will be recalled from our discussion of Hegel's phenomenological method that negativity was found to play a necessary and important role in phenomenal experience as described according to that method. At that point our attention was drawn to Hegel's characterization of *Verstand* as "die ungeheure Macht des Negativen" (PhG 29). Now that we have worked through the development of *Verstand* in Chapter III of the PhG, we have watched this all-consuming power wrest itself loose from its conceptual fetters. As self-consciousness, it is directly our object and it is tempting to regard this "encounter with nothingness" as perhaps supplying the "existentialist" key to a new understanding of Hegel. And this indeed has been a marked tendency in recent interpretations of the PhG.

But we must remind ourselves that negativity, for Hegel, is a factor *within* phenomenal experience. For us, who are participating in the description of the appearance *of* experience, it is clear that desiring self-consciousness is not adequately described merely with reference to that aspect of objectivity which has been negatively reduced. Whereas objects are true for this self-consciousness only as reduced to an indeterminate unity with itself, for us, who follow this experience as a process (cf. PhG 74, 127), it is manifest that the movement of self-consciousness actually involves a double object (PhG 135). We see that the process of reduction to unity itself requires the existence of that which is reduced.

A pure form of the existentialist interpretation presupposes the adequacy of regarding self-consciousness as a modified Cartesian cogito; but the negative world of pure desire reveals itself to us as subsisting within and indeed as the perpetual product of an encompassing milieu. In its process of returning to itself, the objective aspect of its milieu is for self-consciousness merely negative. But for us, the objective aspect is also revealed as returning to itself. And this, the milieu with which self-consciousness interacts, appears to us as its life-world. Accordingly, we now see that "der Gegenstand

* "This opposition of its appearance and its truth nevertheless has for its essence only the truth, i.e., the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential for self-consciousness, which is to say that self-consciousness is *desire* in general."

der unmittelbaren Begierde ist ein *Lebendiges*[*] (PhG 135). With this observation, our object is no longer the existentially isolated immediate self-consciousness but rather the process of *life*.

B. Life and Animal Desire.

At the conclusion of Hegel's presentation of *Verstand* (PhG 129) he observed that our description of what consciousness knows in knowing itself would require us to view it under much more extensive circumstances. Ultimately, the only adequate context within which self-consciousness can be described is that of Spirit. But Spirit as such is not yet our object. As the reader comes to see *in retrospect*, the whole first half of the PhG consists in descriptions of elements or, better, moments taken in abstraction from Spirit. On the other hand, it is equally true that a systematic elaboration of the constitutive moments of existing spirit is absolutely essential for that *anticipatory* insight which alone makes possible an intelligible reading of Hegel's description of Spirit as a dynamic totality (PhG, Chapters VI and VII).

The first context within which we must view self-consciousness is life.[1] As we first enlarge our descriptive horizon, we find that life is already in some measure determined as the counterpart of self-consciousness. Whereas immediate self-consciousness is the process of reducing its world of objects to a unity *for itself*, life is the simply being-in-itself of the life-world of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is indeed the *truth* of life because life is only a whole or a unity for it. But, as Hyppolite notes, "life is the *condition* of self-consciousness; it is that unity which does not yet know itself as a unity. That is why consciousness will make the experience of the independence of its object, life."[2]

We must now briefly outline the course of this development of an independent object for self-consciousness. It is presented by Hegel in one of the most terse and difficult passages of the whole PhG (pp. 135–140).

As a mere context, life at first seems to be wholly indeterminate and unintelligible. But as the milieu of that self-determining and object-negating activity which we have discovered self-consciousness to be, the essence of life is "die Unendlichkeit als das *Aufgehobensein* aller Unterschiede, die reine achsendrehende Bewegung, die Ruhe ihrer selbst als absolut unruhiger Unendlichkeit …"[†] (PhG 136). As perpetually suppressed, life is infinite restlessness; but as the medium of these negative differentiations, it is itself differentiated. "Die *Unterschiede* sind aber an diesem *einfachen allgemeinen* Medium ebensosehr, als *Unterschiede*, denn diese allgemeine Flüssigkeit hat ihre negative Natur, nur indem sie ein *Aufheben derselben* ist; aber sie kann die Unterschiede nicht aufheben, wenn sie nicht ein Bestehen haben"[‡] (PhG 136). As the universal fluid medium of negative differentiation, life is therefore the subsistence of the resulting differences; in life they have a substantial reality as distinct

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[*] "the object of immediate desire is *something living*."

[†] "infinity as the *being-suppressed* of all differences, the pure rotation on its own axis, itself at rest as absolutely restless infinity."

[‡] "In this *simple and universal* milieu, however, the *differences* do also exist as *differences*, for this universal fluidity possesses its negative nature only by being a *suppression of these same differences*; but it cannot suppress the differences if these do not have a subsistence."

members (Glieder). Their being is no longer merely that of being abstractions; it is the fluid substance of life itself.

The difference between the individual members does not depend upon any distinguishing force external to the pure movement of life itself. They are simply self-determinations of life as moments of its infinite rotation upon its own axis. In so far as these members are *for* themselves, they are independent. But they are for themselves only in their unmediated reflection into the fluid whole of life, just as this fluid whole, as a negative or infinite unity, is in turn a division into independent figures (Gestalten, PhG 136). And since the independent figure is the result of a division, it manifests itself as something determined, as something *for another* and thus as something to be suppressed by another. Now this *other* is, at this stage of the development, life as the infinite fluid unity, and a suppression by this other is simply a resolution into the infinite whole.[3] "But this activity of suppressing the division is also present at the interior of each figure; for it is exactly this fluidity which is the substance of the independent figures. But this substance is infinite; consequently, in its own subsistence the figure is itself the act of the division or the suppression of its own being-for-itself."[4]

In suppressing its being-for-itself, we see that the subsisting figure stands in opposition to the universal substance (life), divides itself from the continuity of the fluid milieu by consuming it and thereby maintaining itself. Thus life is transformed from a calm unfolding (Auseinanderlegung) of distinct figures into the movement of these figures themselves. And in this process life is now consumed in the form of living things. The individual figures thereby attain a *feeling* of unity with themselves rather than being merely moments of life as a universal fluid unity.[5] Since the essence of the individual figure is life in its universality, we see that "dies Entzweien der unterschiedslosen Flüssigkeit ist eben das Setzen der Individualität"* (PhG 137).

At this turn of the argument, Hegel's incredibly compressed exposition of life opens itself to the possibility of an intelligible interpretation.[6] The key is to be found—here as in so many cases of seeming obscurity in the PhG—in taking seriously Hegel's use of crucial terms. In this instance, the terms are "Glied" and "Gestalt" ("member" and "figure"). It will be recalled that we entered the dialectic of life with the radically solipsistic issue of *Verstand*, namely, *immediate* self-consciousness. Having systematically extricated ourselves from the reductive standpoint of solipsism, we came to see that the negating unity of self-consciousness could only be described within a context. But since the phenomenological method (in Hegel's sense) permits no postulation of conditions for the appearance of our object, we allowed this context to be developed directly from the context-demanding character of our object (the *Begriff* of self-consciousness). The negativity without limit of immediate self-consciousness was then seen to develop as a member (Glied) of an infinite substance, life.

This, in turn, determined the context itself as a universal fluidity within which the being-for-itself (i.e., the mode of being which had been the exclusive characteristic of immediate self-consciousness) of each *member* was immediately reflected into the unity of life, just as life, *qua* infinite movement, immediately divided *itself* into *figures*.

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* "this division of the undifferentiated fluidity is exactly the positing of individuality."

Now, having followed the development of life from an infinite movement into a *process* of its configurations, the simple substance of life has manifested itself as "die Entzweiung ihrer selbst in Gestalten und zugleich die Auflösung dieser bestehenden Unterschiede; und die Auflösung der Entzweiung ist ebensosehr Entzweien oder ein *Gliedern*"* (PhG 137–38, emphasis added). But the resultant *members* are no longer for themselves merely as reflected into the infinite unity of life. Through the moments of (a) the configuration (Gestalten) of life and (b) the process of configurated life consuming universal life, life once again appears as a unity, but no longer as an immediate unity. The simple substance of life now appears as a *reflected unity*, whose members no longer have as their object the undifferentiated infinity of life. This reflected unity is the simple genus (Gattung), which, as a result of the life process, refers life as such to another life.

Now this other life, for which the substance of life appears as a reflected unity or genus, is consciousness. And in finding this reflected unity in another, consciousness is no longer the indiscriminately negative power which we observed as immediate self-consciousness; "we" now have as "our" object the unity of self-consciousness and life or *a living self-consciousness*. This self-consciousness also has merely its own I as object, but, as living self-consciousness, the objects which it negates must present themselves to it as independent living things. The desire of living self-consciousness is a desire for something definite.

It seems plausible to conjecture at this point that the new form of desire which has come into view is best understood as *animal desire*. This form of desire is also shared by man, but it is a characteristic of man's biological life rather than his properly human condition. The self-certitude achieved through the negation, or better, consumption of the object of animal desire is an objectively oriented certitude, as opposed to the subjective form of certitude attained through satisfying the desire of immediate self-consciousness. Animal desire is therefore satisfied only through an experience in which a definite object is transformed into something non-existent for it. And therein the object is experienced as *independent*, for the satisfaction of animal desire is conditioned (bedingt, PhG 139) by the necessity of transforming its object. The suppression of such an object is accordingly a reproduction of the animal desire itself, because this form of desire *is* only in reference to an object. Since this animal subject only exists through its metabolic negation of living objects, the momentary satisfaction of any particular desire occasions the positing of a new object and therewith a new desire. The subject of this form of desire therefore attains no durative satisfaction.

The subject of animal desire is thus a function of the objects upon which its desires 'feed' and through which they find momentary satisfaction. If these objects are merely living, then it will simply take its place in the cycle of life. Its process of negating objects will manifest itself as its metabolism with nature. Thus the subject of animal desire is a merely natural subject, and animal desire may properly be regarded as simple appetite, just as its peculiar form of "self-consciousness" is best described as "self-feeling." The objects of this form of desire are as perpetually created as those of

* "the division of itself into figures, and at the same time the dissolution of these subsisting differences; and the resolution of the division is also a process of division or an *articulation of members*."

immediate self-consciousness were perpetually abolished. In neither case do we seem to find that form of negative activity which is characteristic of the human spirit.

But there is in the two taken together the basis for a comprehension of the emergence of the human spirit. Whereas the merely biological genus maintains itself through a consumptive process which sustains the individuals by reproducing desires and through a reproductive process which sustains the genus by producing the individuals with the same objective desire orientation, the genus does in principle contain the seeds for the transcendence of its merely natural life. This transcendence, or *anthropogeny*, will depend upon certain very definite conditions, which will be elaborated in the next section. At this point we must note that the various members of this object-negating and self-feeling genus have within their range of possible objects not merely those living things which are only susceptible of being negated absolutely. They also have one another. And though they do immediately appear to one another merely as objects for the satisfaction of animal desire (in eating, sexual relations, etc.), they are, as objects of desire which themselves desire, in principle capable of bringing about a negation of themselves vis-à-vis a desiring subject by negating their own desire.

Only thus will a negation within experience appear for "us," the readers of the PhG, which does not merely occasion a reproduction of desire and its correlative object and thus circle back into the metabolism of nature. Only thus will a mode of *time* emerge upon the scene which is not merely the perpetually recurring *temporality* of life, "das einfache Wesen der Zeit, das in dieser Sichselbstgleichheit die gediegene Gestalt des Raumes hat"* (PhG 136).

This, I take it, is what is implied in the following description of a form of satisfaction which is not merely swallowed up in the cycle of temporality: "Um der Selbständigkeit des Gegenstandes willen kann es [Selbstbewußtsein] daher zur Befriedigung nur gelangen, indem dieser selbst die Negation an ihm vollzieht; und er muß diese Negation seiner selbst an sich vollziehen, denn er ist *an sich* das Negative, und muß für das Andre sein, was er ist"† (PhG 139).

We began this section with a problem: we observed that the only object which will allow of a phenomenological description is Spirit. But after having worked our way out of the epistemological labyrinth, we were confronted not with Spirit but with a dynamic *Begriff*, self-consciousness, whose self-certainty was indeed truth but a truth which was merely negative, a perpetual reduction to unity with itself. It may very well be objected that the subsequent development of the context of immediate self-consciousness was not phenomenological *in stricto sensu*. Indeed Hegel himself suggests (PhG 135–36) that the determination of life may be sufficiently spelled out on the basis of the *Begriff* with which *we* enter this sphere. In this case, the foregoing discussion of life was perhaps more properly based on an analysis of a *Begriff* than on a description of phenomena. But if it will be granted that Hegel's analysis of life as the contextual correlative of immediate self-consciousness does, despite the unusual

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* "the simple essence of time, which in this equality with itself has the solid and compact figure of space."

† "By virtue of the independence of the object, self-consciousness can thus reach its satisfaction only when this object itself accomplishes in it the negation; and it must accomplish in itself this negation of itself because it is *in itself* the negative and must be for the Other that which it is."

obscurity of the text, allow the general conclusion we have drawn, then his subsequent exposition may be characterized as phenomenological in the sense outlined in Chapter Two of this essay.

The *Begriff* of self-consciousness has been traced through three object-orientations: from the immediate and undifferentiated object of *desire in general*, and the independent and living object of *animal desire*, to desire itself as the object of that desire to which we shall now turn: the *desire for recognition*. With this last form of desire, a desire for a desire,[7] we have finally encountered the *Begriff* of Spirit.

C. Recognition.

C-1. *Recognition and Death in the* Jenenser Realphilosophie.

The *Begriff* of Spirit is revealed in the struggle for recognition, and in developing a comprehension of recognition the reader of the PhG acquires the basic insight into the nature and destiny of the human spirit. Hegel himself first arrived at this insight after years of struggle with the solipsistic implications of modern epistemological theory revealed by the Kantian critical philosophy and epitomized in 1787 by Jacobi: "daß man nämlich in die *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* nicht eintreten könne ohne das Ding an sich, daß man aber mit ihm nicht in ihr verharren könne."[8] His first attempts to formulate an answer to this problem involved a shift from the critical epistemological orientation of consciousness to an ontology in which life was treated as the absolute.[9]

But as we have seen in the preceding section, an ontology of life as such will permit only an account of self-consciousness in the form of self-feeling or animal awareness. Hegel's central problem was therefore to work out a way of describing human experience such that the experience itself would articulate the difference between man's spiritual and his merely animal or natural life. In contrast to Schelling, Hegel wanted to say "ich betrachte den Menschen in seinem *Begriffe*, d.h. nicht im Naturzustande."[10] But what sort of *Begriffe* are susceptible of being described without explicitly or tacitly identifying the standpoint of description with that of an individual and thus solipsistic consciousness? His answer was first worked out in his Jena lectures of 1803–1804 and 1805–1806, which Hoffmeister has published in two volumes under the title *Jenenser Realphilosophie*. The following passage from the second volume gives the central point of Hegel's answer and provides the modern reader with a vital key to a coherent interpretation of the PhG.

> In dem Anerkennen hört das Selbst auf, dies Einzelne zu sein. . . . Das Anerkannte ist anerkannt als *unmittelbar* geltend, durch *sein Sein*, aber eben *dies Sein ist erzeugt aus dem Begriffe*; es ist anerkanntes Sein. Der Mensch wird notwendig anerkannt und ist notwendig anerkennend. Diese Notwendigkeit ist seine eigne, nicht die unsres Denkens im Gegensatze gegen den Inhalt. Als Anerkennen ist er selbst die Bewegung und diese Bewegung hebt eben seinen Naturzustand auf: das Natürliche *ist* nur, es ist nicht *Geistiges*.*[11]

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* "In recognition the Self ceases to be this particular being. . . . The Recognized is recognized as *immediately* valid, through its *Being*, but even *this Being is created out of the Begriff*; it is recognized Being. Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily recognizing. This necessity is his own, and not that of our thought in opposition to the content. As recognition he is himself the movement, and this movement is exactly what suppresses his natural condition: the natural *is* only, it is not something *spiritual*."

Man *is* man only when he is recognized. From this it follows that a self in isolation is not a human self and that any philosophical description of the self in isolation is *eo ipso* not a description of man. What then do we describe when we describe the human spirit? We describe the *movement* or process of recognition through which man *qua* man is created and in which his development is a human (rather than merely a natural) development. But before we can describe the development of man (or human history) the nature of man must reveal itself in the movement whereby man is created. If we are to be descriptive, it clearly will not do to postulate some definition of man and then attempt to interpret the facts according to our arbitrary criteria. What then is this (anthropogenetic) *movement* which reveals the nature of man? What principle of *limit* is immanent within the merely living being from which man may be seen to emerge and through which his emergence may be described?

This problem could only be taken up in a systematic manner after Hegel had worked out his phenomenological method.[12] But despite inconsistencies in formulation, the Jena lectures already reveal the fundamental anthropogenetic insight of the PhG; that the limiting principle is *death* and that "Die Bewegung ist der Kampf auf Leben und Tod."*[13] Moreover, the struggle through which mere life is overcome must be described as a struggle to death because only "der Tod hat den Widerspruch gegen das Leben in sich."†[14]

The major inconsistency in Hegel's Jena lectures is his paradoxical statement that man (or, more precisely, proto-man) truly becomes human only through the experience of actual death.[15] We shall see how Hegel develops these insights, overcoming their paradoxical character, in the PhG.

C-2. *Three Moments of Recognition and the Three Modes of Desire.*

In the opening pages of his celebrated description of "Lordship and Servitude,"[16] Hegel presents a terse three-paragraph formulation of the moments of the pure *Begriff* of recognition. Since the reader may well be puzzled whether these moments are *ad hoc* formulations or whether they are actually derived from the preceding development of the PhG, and since neither Hegel nor (to my knowledge) any of his commentators provide an explicit answer to this important question,[17] it will be fruitful to consider this point before we proceed to an examination of how recognition first manifests itself for phenomenological description. The question is particularly important for the present interpretation of Hegel's PhG because we shall maintain that the *Begriff* of recognition is the vital cornerstone of the entire work.

Our thesis is that each of the 'moments' of recognition corresponds to the object-orientation of each of the three modes of desire which have already appeared in the PhG and which we have spelled out in sections A and B above: (1) desire in general, (2) animal desire and (3) the desire for a desire. It will be recalled that Hegel virtually identifies self-consciousness with desire. Therefore the following explication should also enable the reader more clearly to distinguish what *mode* of self-consciousness Hegel is describing, when, for example, he refers to *both* the lord and the servant as self-consciousnesses (clearly there is a modal difference here).

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* "The movement is a struggle over life and death."

† "death has in itself the contradiction against life."

Since each of the paragraphs is relatively short, it will be most expedient to present each 'moment' in its entirety, together with a brief commentary. As Hegel later indicates (PhG 142), the three paragraphs in question outline the moments in terms of the action of only one self-consciousness vis-à-vis another, whereas a recognized (i.e., human) self-consciousness is only constituted through an action which is at the same time the action of at least two self-consciousnesses. Since the PhG has, up to this point, only dealt with individual modes of self-consciousness, we will show how these individual modes (the 'a' sections of the following commentary) correspond to the recognized and recognizing modes, i.e., those which are constituted by a plurality of self-consciousnesses (the 'b' sections). Or, since recognized self-consciousness is first constituted through the struggle for recognition, the 'b' sections will describe the form of each mode as it will develop after that struggle. In the case of the last 'b' section, we shall see that it can only be constituted through the entire process of Spirit's development, i.e., human history.

> (1) Es ist für das Selbstbewußtsein ein anderes Selbstbewußtsein; es ist *außer sich* gekommen. Dies hat die gedoppelte Bedeutung; *erstlich*, es hat sich selbst verloren, denn es findet sich als ein *anderes* Wesen; *zweitens*, es hat *damit* [emphasis added] das Andere aufgehoben, denn es sieht auch nicht das Andere als Wesen, sondern *sich selbst* im *Andern*[*] (PhG 141).

(a) This moment in the *Begriff* of recognition is the counterpart of that mode of self-consciousness which we have called "immediate self-consciousness." Its relationship to objects is that of "desire in general" (Begierde überhaupt, PhG 135). For it, there are *no truly independent* objects because objects *are* only as they are reduced to a negative unity with itself. Hence the "*damit*"; the reduction is unmediated. And any *theoretical* efforts to preserve the truth of objectivity for this mode of self-consciousness are doomed to failure. Hegel has shown this in his critique of epistemology, for this mode of self-consciousness is precisely the truth or result of epistemological consciousness, as we have seen. It is the pure tautology of absolutely independent self-consciousness (I=I).

(b) As an actual, as opposed to a merely theoretical, mode of being-in-the-world, we shall see that it is a result; it is created through a confrontation with its own finitude, death, thus marking a break from the infinite process of life. But although its emergence marks the *beginning* of human history, this self-consciousness itself *makes* no history. Rather, as the all-consuming, all-negating warlike power, it is, as actual, the living presence of nothingness, of *death*. Like (1-a), its basic form is (I=I); but in this case the identity is only made possible through the mediation of another mode of self-consciousness (2-b).

> (2) Es muß dies *sein Anderssein* aufheben; dies ist das Aufheben des ersten Doppelsinnes und darum selbst ein zweiter Doppelsinn; *erstlich*, es muß darauf gehen, *das andere selbständige* [emphasis added for the last word] Wesen aufzuheben, um dadurch *seiner* als des Wesens

[*] "There is for self-consciousness another self-consciousness: it has come *outside itself*. This has a doubled significance; *first*, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *Other* essence; *secondly*, it has *therewith* abolished the Other, for it does not see the Other equally as essence, but sees *itself* in the *Other*."

gewiß zu *werden* [emphasis added]; *zweitens* geht es hiemit darauf, *sich selbst* aufzuheben, denn dies andere ist es selbst[*] (PhG 141–142).

(a) In contrast to (1-a) this mode of self-consciousness involves mediation; it relates itself to objects which are for it *independent*. This moment in the *Begriff* of recognition thus corresponds to what Hegel has called the *living* self-consciousness (PhG 140), a mode of self-consciousness which we observe in a milieu, which is a being-in-the-world and which only maintains itself through constant interaction with its biological *life-world*. Since the essential reality for this self-consciousness is life, its relationship to objects is that of "animal desire." The fundamental difference between the two forms of this modality and those of the first consists in the fact that there is a significant distinction for this modality between 'having' an object of desire and 'enjoying' or consuming it. This distinction stems from the independence or *resistance* of the object which must be overcome before it can be negated or transformed. We shall, in a definition to be stipulated in the sequel, call this necessary transformative activity 'labor.'

(b) Whereas all self-consciousnesses existing in a life-world before the struggle to death may be said to experience their worlds according to modality (2-a), preserving themselves through a cyclical process of desire, 'labor,' consumption, desire . . . , the struggle to death transforms both of the (2-a) adversaries into the transitional and unstable pre-recognized modality (3-a), through which one adversary becomes a (1-b) and the other a (2-b). This second form of the living modality differs from the first because its desire for life has been crystallized; it is no longer diffused throughout its whole process of metabolism with nature because it has encountered death as a totality. Thus its life is seen to be preserved, not through 'labor' and consumption but through the grace of death itself. The desire for life and the desire to consume are distinguished and the latter is suspended in 'laboring' upon things. As such, this 'labor' is 'service,' and as service it will become (in a sense yet to be specified) 'work.'[18]

(3) Dies doppelsinnige Aufheben seines doppelsinnigen Andersseins ist ebenso eine doppelsinnige Rückkehr *in sich selbst*; denn *erstlich* erhält es durch das Aufheben sich selbst zurück, denn es wird sich wieder gleich durch das Aufheben *seines* Andersseins; *zweitens* aber gibt es das andere Selbstbewußtsein ihm wieder ebenso zurück, denn es war sich im anderen, es hebt dies *sein* Sein im andern auf, entläßt also das andere wieder frei"[†] (PhG 142).

(a) This mode of self-consciousness is a desire for a desire. Its first form emerges in the struggle to death when the *object* of simple animal desire reveals itself as a desiring *subject* and therefore as an object whose negation need not be brought about through destroying its life. The critical transition occurs when one of the adversaries negates its desire to negate the Other and no longer sees the Other

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[*] "It must suppress this *its being-other*; this is the suppression of the first double sense and therefore itself a second double sense; *first*, it must start suppressing the *other independent* essence in order thereby to *become* certain of *its self* as of the essence; *secondly*, it starts herewith suppressing *itself*, for this Other is itself."

[†] "This suppression in a double sense of its being-other in a double sense is also a return in a double sense *into itself*; for *firstly*, it recovers itself through the suppression of itself because it becomes once again equal to itself through the suppression of *its* being-other; but *secondly*, it restores the other self-consciousness to itself, for it was certain of itself in the Other, it suppresses this *its* being in the Other, and thus makes the Other again free."

as a particular object which it must 'labor' upon or struggle with in order to overcome the objective independence of this Other; the Other is now seen as the very incarnation of death, not as a particular danger but as a *totality*.

(b) The actuality of this mode of self-consciousness is not attainable by an individual, either as lord over or a servant in the life-world. It is only realizable within the life of fully developed Spirit, "ein gegenseitiges Anerkennen, welches der *absolute* Geist ist"* (PhG 471).

C-3. *The Struggle to Death.*

One of the central theses of the PhG is that Spirit as a whole is historical and that only Spirit has a history. "Aber die organische Natur hat keine Geschichte; sie fällt von ihrem Allgemeinen, dem Leben, unmittelbar in die Einzelheit des Daseins herunter …"† (PhG 220). This does not imply, as some have maintained,[19] that Hegel's contrast of nature and Spirit in the PhG systematically outrules the possibility of any development within nature; but it does indicate a problematical dichotomy between spiritual or historical development on the one hand and the process of nature and life on the other. The problem is twofold. In the first place, Hegel must give an account of how Spirit emerges out of the natural life process and secondly he must show how Spirit interacts with nature in the course of its (historical) development.

As we have seen, Hegel's Jena lectures already exhibit a preliminary answer to the first of these two problems—merely living self-feeling was said to transcend the cyclical process of nature through the *fact* of death. In the PhG this first problem is answered in a way that not only overcomes the earlier paradox but also provides the basis for answering the second aspect of the problematical nature-spirit dichotomy.[20] The critical event is no longer the fact of death but the *encounter* with death. Whereas the fact of death is simply the abstract limit of that negativity characteristic of an individual member of biological life, the encounter with death has the double significance of being *the action of both* individuals engaged in the life-and-death struggle. Let us see how this twofold action develops.

Self-consciousness first presents itself as an isolated individual, an immediate self-consciousness whose modality is that we have described under (1-a). But in the phenomenal experience we are about to observe, there are at first *two* such individuals. Since they are, as two, not isolated, each presents itself to the other as an independent figure within the context of the other, i.e., the life-world of the other. They are thus for each other ordinary living things and, each, having an independent living thing as an object, appears for us as living, i.e., as in that mediated modality we have called (2-a). Although each individual is nevertheless certain of itself as independent in the pure modality (1-a), it does not immediately show itself to the other as that which it feels itself to be. This it can only accomplish by presenting itself to the other as the pure nothingness of immediate self-consciousness (1-a) and therewith as the pure negation of its objective mode of being, i.e., life. But clearly such a presentation to the Other can only be accomplished through the Other; it is thus a

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* "a reciprocal recognition which is *Absolute* Spirit."

† "But organic nature does not have a history; it drops from its universal, life, immediately into the individuality of existence. . . ."

twofold action. "Insofern es Tun *des andern* ist, geht also jeder auf den Tod des andern"* (PhG 144). And since the action whereby one brings about the death of the other is *eo ipso* the risk of one's own life, the action of each manifests itself as directed at the death of both. Or, as Hegel put it in his Jena lectures, the struggle for the death of the other is, in effect, *Selbstmord*.[21]

It must be noted at this point that Hegel's description of the struggle over life and death is not based upon any 'insight' into the *will* of either belligerent.[22] The description is based exclusively upon the phenomenal form of desire characteristic of animal life.

The reader must also avoid the unjustifiable inference that a mortal struggle of two animals itself suffices to constitute *recognition*. There have no doubt been countless numbers of such animal scraps in the course of the world. And perhaps many animals have lost their lives in this manner. But the critical anthropogenetic factor has not yet appeared within this context.

C-4. *The Living Death.*

In so far as the life-and-death struggle results in the death or injury of one or both adversaries, the twofold action reveals only an abstract negation. We have not yet observed that kind of self-interpreting action which Hegel's phenomenological method is able, for the first time, to render intelligible: "die Negation des Bewußtseins, welches so *aufhebt*, daß es das Aufgehobene *aufbewahrt* und *erhält*, und hiemit sein Aufgehobenwerden überlebt"† (PhG 145).

But if the struggle to death is not a sufficient, it is nevertheless a necessary condition for recognition. For only thereby does it become manifest *for self-consciousness* that there are *two* independences at stake: not merely that of pure self-consciousness (modality (1-a)), but that of *life* (2-a) as well. Only through this experience is the essentiality of life manifested in such a way that the simple unity of animal desire is bifurcated. In this intensively *social* context, the immediacy of solipsistic self-consciousness is dissolved and the mediating factor of life is objectified for one in the other. *Upon recognizing* this its life in the other, the recognizing self-consciousness becomes, in effect, a living corpse. The result of this *second* experience (3-a) (the first being the struggle toward natural death) is the appearance of *two* modes of self-consciousness: "ein reines Selbstbewußtsein, und ein Bewußtsein … welches nicht rein für sich, sondern für ein anderes, d.h. als *seiendes* [d.h. *nicht* daseiendes] Bewußtsein oder Bewußtsein in der Gestalt der *Dingheit* ist"‡ (PhG 145).[23]

Thus the condition through which man first develops is essentially *social* because it necessarily involves *two* distinct modalities of self-consciousness—Lordship (1-b) and Servitude (2-b), *reines Selbstbewußtsein* and *seiendes Bewußtsein*. But neither of these modalities is that of freedom (3-b) because the lord's 'freedom' is an illusion and the servant's self-suppression has not yet been 'worked out.' Since man *qua* man is literally constituted through his being recognized by another, and since this

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* "In so far as it is the action of *the other*, each tends thus towards the death of the other."

† "the negation of consciousness, which *suppresses* in such a way that it *conserves* and *retains* what has been suppressed, and thereby survives the fact of becoming-suppressed."

‡ "a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness … which is not purely for itself but rather for another, i.e., a consciousness in the *element of being* [i.e., *not* a Da-sein] or in the figure of *thingness*."

recognition *is* only as it is manifested in the world of appearance, two important conclusions follow. First, the being of man is his manifested being-there in recognition, his *Da-sein* as opposed to mere *Sein*, and therefore the true nature of man can be comprehended through a phenomenological description. Secondly, since *we*, the readers of the PhG who follow Hegel's description of the appearance of man as *Da-sein*, come to grasp the *Begriff* of recognition, we also develop an *anticipatory* insight into the necessary direction and goal of human history, namely, freedom or that reciprocal recognition whose intrinsic limit is mankind constituted as a concrete totality, a reciprocal recognition which is universal. In order to deepen our comprehension of this pivotal *Begriff*, let us consider the first and radically non-reciprocal mode of being recognized: Lordship.

C-5. *Lordship and Recognition.*

Through the struggle for recognition the lord has *proved* himself to be what he had, as a merely living self-consciousness, only *felt* himself to be and never actually became, namely a self-consciousness for which all otherness is without independence and resistance. This is the modality of self-consciousness we called (1), within which self-consciousness no sooner finds itself as an other than that other is abolished. But as proved or actualized, the lord now manifests himself for *us* not simply in the pure immediacy of modality (1-a) but as a self-consciousness whose independent being *for itself* is actually mediated by another. In other words, his mode of independence appears as that of (1-b). He has overcome his dependence upon life (2-a) in the first instance by facing up to the total negation of his life in the struggle (3-a). But as the victorious one, who has lived through the life-and-death struggle, he maintains his independence over life only through the mediation of one who is for him no more than a living thing, and as such at one with nature, i.e., the servant (2-b).

To see more clearly how this new relationship between self-consciousness and life manifests itself, it will be helpful to explicate an important distinction which is only implicit in the text (a distinction which we have already suggested in our discussion of the two forms of modality (2), i.e., (2-a) and (2-b)). The text in question is: "was der Begierde nicht gelang, gelingt ihm [d.h. dem Herrn], damit fertig zu werden, und im Genusse sich zu befriedigen. Der Begierde gelang dies nicht wegen der Selbständigkeit des Dinges; der Herr aber, der den Knecht zwischen es und sich eingeschoben, schließt sich dadurch nur mit der Unselbständigkeit des Dinges zusammen, und genießt es rein; die Seite der Selbständigkeit aber überläßt er dem Knechte, der es bearbeitet"* (PhG 146–47).

We propose to call that activity through which a living self-consciousness (2-a) overcomes the independence of a thing 'labor,' as distinguished from the formative activity or 'work,' which we will discuss in C-6. So defined, labor as such is not an activity uniquely characteristic of man; it is rather the general precondition for the satisfaction of animal desire (e.g., as the gathering of nuts is the precondition for eating nuts). As the victorious one, the lord maintains his independence even within the context of life because he no longer engages in this animal activity, labor. Thus his independence

* "what was not brought about by desire, is now attained by the lord, namely, to overcome the thing and to find satisfaction in enjoyment. This was not brought about by desire because of the independence of the thing; but the lord, who has interposed the servant between the thing and himself, thus links himself only to the dependence of the thing, and purely enjoys it. He abandons the independence of the thing to the servant, who labors upon it."

is akin to that independence which we have seen as the immediate truth of epistemological consciousness; like "Explanation," the lord meets with no resistance in his dealings with objects. The activities of both the lord and "Explanation" are so self-satisfying "weil das Bewußtsein dabei, es so auszudrücken, in unmittelbarem Selbstgespräche mit sich, nur sich selbst genießt"* (PhG 127). But whereas "Explanation" was ostensibly dealing with objects but actually dealt only with itself, the lordly life, which first seems to be a pure celebration of interiorized immediacy, is actually shot through and through with mediation. The lord is "ein Fürsichsein, welches nur durch ein Anderes für sich ist …"† (PhG 146). Thus the very nature of the lord's self-consciousness is not, as it seems to the lord himself, an immediate mode of independence (1-a), but is rather an independence constituted through the mediation of another exterior to it (1-b).

This, I take it, is what Hegel means when he writes, "was der Knecht tut, ist eigentlich Tun des Herrn …"‡ (PhG 147). The labor of the servant is an essential moment in the pure negation (i.e., self-satisfying consumption) of the lord, without which the lord would not *remain* a lord. And this moment (1) is rendered possible because (2) the servant as self-consciousness, "sich als Fürsichsein aufhebt, und hiemit selbst das tut, was das erste gegen es tut"§ (PhG 147). In other words, it is not merely the lord who treats the servant as a thing; the action of self-negation which spelled defeat in the life-and-death struggle persists in and actually constitutes the relationship of lordship and servitude. The servant is a servant because he has come to negate his desire for independence (1-a) and treat himself as a thing.

With these two moments we observe the process in which the lord is *recognized*. But it is only the one-sided recognition of modality (1-b) not the reciprocal recognition of (3-b). For this latter, conditions are required which cannot be fulfilled through a life-and-death struggle. These can only be attained through (1) the enormous work of historical development (which Hegel describes in Chapter VI of the PhG) and (2) a communal recognition of man's mortality (whose developmental process Hegel describes in Chapter VII of the PhG). But, according to the interpretation presented in this essay, *we*, the readers, are now in some significant measure able to anticipate the necessity of the subsequent development toward reciprocal recognition (modality (3-b)). We now see the intrinsic defect in that one-sided recognition which marks the beginning of human history: "Aber zum eigentlichen Anerkennen fehlt das Moment, daß, was der Herr gegen den Andern tut, er auch gegen sich selbst, und was der Knecht gegen sich, er auch gegen den Andern tue"** (PhG 147).

We must now turn to a consideration of these factors which will constitute not merely the one-sided state of being-recognized, but rather that process of development which will culminate in recognition proper (3-b). In this process lordship as such will play no direct role. The lord's mode of

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* "because consciousness, in this condition is, so to speak, engaged in an immediate soliloquy with itself and enjoys itself alone."

† "a being-for-itself which is only for itself through another."

‡ "what the servant does is properly the action of the lord."

§ "suppresses itself as being-for-itself and thereby does to itself what the first does to it."

** "But for recognition proper, one moment is still missing—that in which the lord also does to himself what he does to the other and in which the servant also does to the other what he does to himself."

independent being-in-the-world (1-b) systematically outrules the possibility of any history-making activity in the world. He is an independent lord precisely because and to the extent that his interaction with the world is totally mediated by another. Although his fearlessness in the face of death was the essential precondition for historical development, the resulting *state* of lordship is "an existential *cul-de-sac*"; the lord is only "the catalyst of history."[24]

C-6. *Servitude and Nature.*

One of the most popular ways of reconstructing the dialectic of lordship and servitude is to impose on it the model of a simple "mirror" effect[25] such that "the master will become the slave of the slave and the slave master of the master."[26] But whatever ground this sort of interpretation might seem to have in terms of "something like poetic justice," it is difficult to conceive of anything more conducive to an impressionistic reading of the PhG, patently unsupported by the text and wrong-headed.[27] It is indeed central to Hegel's description that "[d]as unwesentliche Bewußtsein ist … für den Herrn der Gegenstand, welcher die *Wahrheit* der Gewißheit seiner selbst ausmacht"* (PhG 147), but it does not follow from this or any other text that the servant will become "the master of the master" because he gets "the best of the bargain" in an inverting mirror-image process. What Hegel says is that servitude will "*in ihrer Vollbringung* zum Gegenteile dessen werden, was sie unmittelbar ist"† (PhG 148, emphasis added). This *Vollbringung* is not the result of any discovery of one self *reflected* in another; it is rather the work of history. "Die Bewegung, die Form seines [d.h. des Geistes] Wissens von sich hervorzutreiben, ist die Arbeit, die er als *wirkliche Geschichte* vollbringt"‡ (PhG 559).

In order to understand how the human spirit comes to its knowledge of itself, namely, recognition proper (3-b), the reader himself must work out a comprehension of three factors: (1) of man *qua* maker of history, (2) of Spirit or the substance of history, and (3) of the revealed structure and historical stages of Spirit's consciousness *of itself*, i.e., what Hegel calls *Religion*. An adequate discussion of the latter two (i.e., Chapters VI and VII of the PhG) would of course require a full commentary on the PhG. But the following discussion of the essential moments of man as history-maker will enable us to draw, in the concluding chapter of this essay, some interpretive guidelines for an intelligible reading of those chapters of the PhG in which these constitutive moments find their place in a description of Spirit's development as a whole.

The critical moments of servitude are three: (1) *Furcht*, (2) *Dienst* and (3) *Bildung*. The first, fear, was initially brought about in the struggle to death, in which one of the belligerents came to see that it was not only an object-negating *immediate* self-consciousness (1-a) but also a *living* self-consciousness (2-a) and thus a living thing or an object susceptible of being negated. It thence came to recognize its own negating activity as the action proper of the Other, who thereby became the lord. The all-negating reductive tautology (I=I) of immediate self-consciousness thus became, for the first time, the object for another self-consciousness. Life, for this latter, was no longer to be maintained in the instinctively guided and infinitely recurring process of (i) a felt nothingness (desire), (ii) objective (or impure)

* "the unessential consciousness is, for the lord, the object which constitutes the truth of his self-certainty."

† "become, *when completed*, the contrary of what it is immediately."

‡ "The movement of bringing forth Spirit's knowledge of itself is that work which Spirit completes as *actual history*."

negation ('labor'), (iii) immediate (or pure) negation (consumption), (i) a felt nothingness, etc., . . . ; this self-consciousness came to know negativity as a totality, and it became a servant precisely through the act of acknowledging the Other as the very incarnation of this negative totality, i.e., as *death*.

The servant's fear was not directed at any particular object in his life-world, not even at the Other, the lord, as a particular individual. The true object of the servant's fear was not *this* lord but the *absolute* lord, death itself. And, in dwelling with this power of absolute dissolution, the servant himself was shaken to his very core, bereft of all determinate existence and subordinated to the fluid process of natural life. The servant accordingly came to treat himself as a mere member (Glied) of nature in the form of living thinghood, as an entity totally dominated by the cyclical process of nature.

It was only as such a natural thing that the servant became a servant for that self-consciousness which had proved its independence of and domination over natural life in the struggle to death. The true object for the lord was not the particular self-consciousness whose natural life he had conserved; the object which he truly came to dominate was nature itself, through which he also dominated that self-consciousness which had subordinated itself to nature.

But, on the other hand, the lord only *maintained* his domination over nature to the extent that natural things were presented to him in a form which he could negate and enjoy without qualification. In this case the lord was a lord over nature only through the servant and the lord of the servant was no longer nature but rather something non-natural, i.e., the recognized lord.

The dialectical process of lordship and servitude is therefore only intelligible as a process constituted by three terms (rather than the two-term interpretation of the 'mirror' hypothesis): the lordly mode of self-consciousness (1-b), the servile mode (2-b), and nature.

We have already seen that the lord's lordly and seemingly immediate (1-a) relation to natural things was the purely negative self-relation of tautological self-consciousness (I=I) only via the mediation of the servant (i.e., it was actually lordly vis-à-vis nature *qua* mediated). We must now examine the act of mediation whereby the lord maintains himself as lord of nature, viz., the servant's mediating activity of *service* (Dienst). Whereas the lord is a lord only because he does not confront natural things as independent, does not have to 'labor' upon his object, and therefore satisfies his desires without reserve, the things of nature are the very fetters of the servant. But as a servant of the desiring lord, his mode of relating himself to natural things is also different from that of the animal. While the animal, as a *part* of nature, 'labors' (according to our previous definition) upon things to overcome their resistant independence (as figures of nature) and satisfy its animal desire, the servant, as mediator between the lord's desires and enjoyments, must *suspend* his own desire in overcoming the independence of natural things. And this relation to nature is exactly what constitutes *service*.

We must now observe the two constitutive sides of servitude. It is not only a necessary moment for the *maintenance* of the lordly mode of self-consciousness; it is also the first moment in the *transcendence* of servitude. The *state* of lordship marks the apex, the complete realization of the lordly mode of being-in-the-world; the lord has, in this relationship, attained a complete triumph over objectivity. He has, in a word, no place to go. But his triumph is just as much a triumph of pure

subjectivity, a retreat from the objective world into a state of simple self-feeling whose only project is to satisfy all its desires by reducing an endless flow of transformed objects to a unity with itself (I=I). The at first servile activity of *transforming* natural objects for the lord is, in contrast to the lord's subjective domination over nature, the process whereby servile consciousness will ultimately become the lord of *objective* nature.

The servile consciousness has this future because its mode of being-in-the-world is essentially projective. Unlike the lord's, its projects are only realized through a struggle with nature as independent and resistant. And through this struggle it not only *deforms* objects for the satisfaction of desire ('labor'), it also comes to *inform* them ('work'). "Diese *negative* Mitte oder das formierende *Tun* ist zugleich *die Einzelheit* oder das reine Fürsichsein des Bewußtseins, welches nun in der Arbeit außer es in das Element des Bleibens tritt; das arbeitende Bewußtsein kommt also hiedurch zur Anschauung des selbständigen Seins *als seiner selbst*"* (PhG 149). The "negative Mitte" to which Hegel refers is servile consciousness as a middle term between the lord's desire and the lord's satisfaction. It is negative because it necessarily involves the suspension of the servant's own desire; but because it is negative, this servile activity is not merely service, it is 'work' as well.

The peculiar characteristic of work is that it transforms the objective world according to a non-instinctive, non-natural or spiritual form and it also transforms the worker into an actually self-conscious or a spiritual being. This process, *Bildung*, therefore presents the reader of the PhG with the paradigm case of that phenomenal experience which is at once self-interpreting and self-transforming. Through it, man not only becomes spiritual, he spiritualizes his world.

* "This *negative* middle term, this formative *activity*, is at the same time *the individuality* or the pure being-for-itself of consciousness which now, in work, appears outside consciousness in the element of permanence; working consciousness thus comes through this activity to the intuition of independent being *as* an intuition *of itself*."

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

[1] The concept of life is one of the recurring themes throughout the Hegelian authorship. It first appears prominently in Hegel's essay of 1797 called "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" and in the so-called *Systemfragment* of 1800 it was an absolute (cf. F. Hegel, *On Christianity*, trans. Knox and Kroner, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961, p. 310). Dilthey has made much of this treatment of life by the early Hegel, both in his *Jugendgeschichte Hegels* and elsewhere. But as Marcuse pointed out in his first book, *Hegels Ontologie*, Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie* does not take into account the important distinction developed in the PhG between life as such and the life of spirit.

[2] Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, trans. Hyppolite, Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1939, Vol. I, p. 148 n. 7.

[3] A finite other will emerge at the next stage of this dialectic of life.

[4] For this rendering of a most difficult passage in the PhG I am indebted to the superb French translation by Hyppolite, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, Vol. I, p. 149.

[5] A preliminary elucidation of this animal-like consumptive process was given in Hegel's discussion of "Sense Certainty." Cf. PhG 87.

[6] In less than five pages Hegel here presents the essence of an exposition of life to which, as we now know, he had devoted hundreds of manuscript pages between 1797 and his Jena lectures of 1805–1806.

[7] The phrase "desire for a desire" does not itself appear in the PhG. So far as I am aware, it was first formulated in Kojève's lectures, cf. *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, p. 13.

[8] Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, Preface to the second edition (1961), p. v.

[9] Cf. Hegel, "Fragment of a System," in *On Christianity*, pp. 309ff.

[10] Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, ed. Hoffmeister, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1931, p. 205 n. 2.

[11] *Ibid*., p. 206.

[12] There are numerous anticipations of Hegel's phenomenological method in both volumes of the *Jenenser Realphilosophie*. See, for example, Vol. I, pp. 214–216.

[13] *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 212.

[14] *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. I, p. 218.

[15] This is pointed out by Kojève, *Hegel: Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, p. 229.

[16] Hyppolite makes a nice 'etymological' observation to justify his translation of *Knechtschaft* as *Servitude* (which is, in any case, preferable to Baillie's "Bondage"). "Hegel, in effect, remembers the etymology of 'servus.' The slave [a less justifiable rendering. If Hegel had wished to say 'slave' he would have used the German term 'Sklave.' This term was indeed employed by Hegel in his first series of Jena lectures. Cf. *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 229.] is he who has been conserved (*servare*), i.e., he who has preferred life to freedom and to whom life has been conserved. . . ." In Hegel, *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, Vol. I, p. 155 n. 1.

[17] The question is important for any reader who wants to know whether Hegel's PhG does develop a phenomenology as "*strenge Wissenschaft*."

[18] For a suggestive development of this distinction between 'labor' and 'work,' see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959, esp. Chapters III and IV. Also note Arendt's etymological observations on p. 322 n.

[19] Cf. van der Meulen, *op. cit*., p. 247.

[20] One of the major weaknesses of the PhG lies in the absence of anything more than a preliminary description of how human history and the development of spiritual values is mediated throughout by man's interaction with nature. The PhG only shows that this interaction is constitutive of the earliest stages of human development. In this respect the Jena lectures may be seen to contain some clues for a more adequate treatment of history.

[21] Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 211.
"Ihm als Bewußtsein erscheint dies, daß es auf den *Tod* eines Andern geht; es geht aber auf seinen eignen; es ist Selbstmord, indem es sich der *Gefahr* aussetzt."

[22] For Hegel's earlier ambivalence on this point, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 210–211 and note that the struggle for recognition is discussed under the heading "Wille." Hartmann also makes a similar point with respect to the dialectic of lord and servant after the struggle. Cf. Hartmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 334–335.

[23] Although there are many (doubtless not coincidental) similarities between this first act of recognition and capitulation as described by Hegel and "the look" and embarrassment as described by Sartre [Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes, New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Cf. 252ff. and 364ff.], the temptation to think of the former in terms of the latter must be avoided. For Hegel, being-with-others is not *per se* problematical; it is the very condition in which the human spirit emerges. Man is constitutively a social being; radical individualism is an animal condition into which man may fall and a philosophical delusion from which it has become difficult to escape.

[24] The expressions are Kojève's. Cf. *Hegel: Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, p. 48.

[25] Cf. e.g., Findlay, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–96.

[26] Note by Hyppolite to his translation of the PhG, *op. cit.*, p. 163 n. 25. This view is also stated somewhat more cautiously by Richard Kroner: "[T]he bondsman, in his turn, attains a certain ascendancy over his master." Introduction to Hegel, *On Christianity*, p. 49.

[27] It is of course true that those who employ the role-inversion device to account for the transformation of servitude also mention other factors as well. I only wish to point out that the beguiling simplicity of this interpretive technique is incompatible with Hegel's own description of servitude and that the resulting interpretations of the PhG are not merely eclectic but also incoherent.

CHAPTER FIVE

PHENOMENOLOGY AND HISTORY

The interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* developed in this essay has been based upon the assumption that the book is potentially intelligible for the modern reader. We have taken as keys to its intelligibility the terms 'phenomenology,' 'reader,' and 'Spirit' and have devoted three chapters to showing (1) what phenomenology is in Hegel's sense of the term, (2) how Hegel prepares his readers to comprehend phenomenological descriptions and (3) the way in which Spirit constitutes itself and manifests itself as the proper subject matter of Hegel's phenomenological description. In the present chapter we will indicate in broad outline the significance of our interpretative thesis for an understanding of Spirit as Hegel describes its appearance in history and thereby for a comprehension of the historical preconditions which made Hegel's phenomenological method possible.

We have seen in the last chapter that Hegel describes self-consciousness in general as desire, as the universal power of negativity which is individuated as animal desire in the life process and first comes to a consciousness of itself as something determinate and actual through the struggle to death. The first context within which we viewed self-consciousness, the unlimited cyclical movement of life, was transformed through the life-and-death struggle into a form of phenomenal experience which itself revealed the constitutive nature of the determinate modes of self-consciousness resulting from this struggle. Since both these modes of self-consciousness, Lordship and Servitude, become determinate modes through their respective ways of transcending the abstract and solipsistic reduction-to-self characteristic of animal desire, their determinate nature or constitution became something apparent within their respective experiences and, accordingly, the process of their phenomenal interaction and mutual constitution became phenomenologically observable for us. This new context, then, was the context of *recognition*.

The process of recognition which manifested the modalities of Lordship and Servitude was seen to involve, in addition to these two originating modalities of determinate self-consciousness, a third term: *nature*. Moreover, after the determination of the lord as the *independent* modality resulting from the struggle, the only form of determinately negative activity which appeared was that of the servant who, having dissolved his solipsistic animal desire through his fearful and servile dwelling with that power which had conserved him (death), came to constitute himself as an *independent* mode of self-consciousness by negating natural things in such a way that they maintained their *independence* for him through the process of their being negated. In other words, the servant's way of negation was determinate because he 'worked' upon natural things, transformed them and—thus engaged in a 'dialogue' with non-natural, 'informed' objects in the element of permanence—he came thereby to transform himself.

While it is clear in a general sense why this transformative activity (Bildung) is history-making, the reader of the PhG might very well ask how this activity concretely manifests itself *as* historical.[1] And if he should follow the obvious clue and investigate the second part of the most clearly historical chapter of the PhG, namely that section of Chapter VI called "Bildung," his perplexity is likely to grow rather than diminish. For in this section the mediating factor of human development (i.e.,

Bildung) and the phenomenal form of human recognition is not nature and work but language (cf. PhG 362ff.).

Although we have already seen (in Chapter Two of this essay) that language is indeed one of the phenomenal forms in which human experience manifests itself for phenomenological description, the only kind of language we have discussed in detail was the phenomenologically inhibiting language of epistemological theory—from which we found it necessary and, in the end, possible to extricate ourselves. It will therefore be important to indicate, if only in a general way, how the PhG interpretation developed in this essay may be seen to illuminate Hegel's description of historical *Bildung*, not merely within a medium of language disconnected from the whole, but in a development continuous with his discussion of *Bildung* as the second moment of anthropogeny in "Lordship and Servitude."

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Hegel's most extensive discussion of the interrelationship between the various chapters of the PhG is to be found in the introduction to Chapter VII, Religion (PhG 473–480). Two points of vital importance for the resolution of our present problem emerge in the course of this discussion. The first concerns Hegel's definition of Religion as "das Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes" (PhG 473). Here once again it is important for the reader not to assume that Hegel is simply giving in his peculiar terminology an equivalent expression for "something well known."[2] What he describes in this chapter is truly the self-consciousness of Spirit in the process of its development. As we shall see, the opening sections of this important chapter are most intelligible when understood as a bridge between Hegel's anthropogeny and his description of the ethical community at the beginning of Chapter VI of the PhG. Since Hegel's anthropogeny traces the emergence of human self-consciousness within a herd rather than a community and, further, since Chapter VI already presupposes a developed community, it will be fruitful to consider whether Hegel presents in Religion a genetical account of the community paralleling his description of man's genesis.

The second point takes on even greater significance in the light of the first. Religion, understood as the self-consciousness of Spirit, at once presupposes the other moments of Spirit and also presents them, for the first time, in their proper historical relationship. "Der ganze Geist[3] nur ist in der Zeit, und die Gestalten, welche Gestalten des ganzen *Geistes* als solchen sind, stellen sich in einer Aufeinanderfolge dar …"* (PhG 476). Hegel therefore invites his readers to seek in this chapter answers to such historical questions as the one we have raised. It is of course true that no adequate interpretation of this or any other chapter of the PhG can be based on a 'pick-and-choose' method. But, in contrast to our previous discussions, which attempted to work out a coherent basis for an interpretation through a close examination of the opening chapters of the PhG, our present concern is to show in a general way how the basic interpretation of this study may be found to make the historical dimension of the PhG more intelligible to the reader of the work as a whole. To understand the book in all of its many dimensions the reader must proceed in a step-by-step manner. Indeed, this

* "Only Spirit as a whole [i.e., Spirit in Religion] is in time, and the shapes, which are shapes of the whole *Spirit* as such, present themselves here in a sequential order."

is even required for a complete grasp of Hegel's phenomenological *method*, since, as we observed in our discussion of that method, it continues to develop throughout the PhG. But this method does reach a nodal point with the emergence of Spirit and that is the justification for drawing our detailed interpretation to a close there.

Hegel's description of the earliest stages of Spirit's development toward a consciousness of itself are so cryptic that they offer what is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to any interpretation seeking to render the PhG intelligible. The following discussion is therefore presented merely as a hypothesis for an interpretation consistent with our previous analysis.

The first step is to banish from our minds the footnotes added to this section by Lasson and reprinted in Baillie's translation. The next step is to notice that the general modality of the Spiritual or proto-communal self-consciousness described in "Das Lichtwesen" is that which we have come to know as (1-b); it is the all-negating night of the "pure I" (PhG 483), which maintains its absolute self-certainty because it dwells in an element which offers it no resistance (PhG 484). It is, in short, "die Form des *Herrn*"* (PhG 483), now appearing as the first stage in the self-consciousness of Spirit. But in this proto-communal or herdlike context the lordly mode of self-consciousness reveals even more clearly the emptiness of its indiscriminately consumptive life. Conscious of itself merely through the evanescent objects it consumes, this Spirit cannot, *qua* lordly, take up an active relation to natural things in their state of independence; the only escape from the ennui of fleeting enjoyments is to be found in a return to a "life of struggle" (PhG 485). The only appropriate opponents for a Spirit which is *already* lordly are, of course, not servile self-consciousnesses, but other lordly herds. We are therefore once again presented with a struggle to death. In this instance, however, the only possible consummations of the struggle are either physical death or the proof that life had been risked.

Despite the seemingly nugatory result, this form of the life-and-death struggle is nevertheless an essential moment in the life of Spirit. Although the lordly peoples display a ferocity characteristic of animals in their combat with one another, as Hegel shows in his discussion of "Die Sittlichkeit," this very animal violence is that which alone maintains the stability of a lordly nation even in the full flower of its maturity (cf. PhG 324). The other important upshot of this hostile activity is not explicitly developed by Hegel in the chapter called "Geist," but it is indicated in "Religion" and it is essential for a comprehension of Spirit as a whole. This lordly warfare creates the context within which servile self-consciousness begins its long process of development (Bildung). "Über die nur zerreißenden Tiergeister behält daher der Arbeitende die Oberhand, dessen Tun nicht nur negativ, sondern beruhigt und positiv ist"† (PhG 485).

As we have seen in the case of the individual servant, however, the activity of the servile community is at first akin to the 'labor' of animals,[4] the only difference being the servant's suppression of immediate animal desire. Hegel describes the transition from the simple 'labor' of the subjugated

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* "the form of the *lord*"

† "The laboring Spirit thus retains the upper hand over [the lordly community in so far as this community is engaged in scraps which transform the belligerents into] mere animal spirits tearing each other to pieces; his activity [i.e., service] is not merely negative but steady and positive."

and servile herd to the community-generating form of 'work,' the activity of *Bildung*, as the third stage in the development of the self-consciousness of Spirit in nature, "Der Werkmeister."

The break from instinctive laboring is seen to take place when the laboring Spirit recognizes that its own being-for-itself has assumed an objective and durative form in its work (PhG 486–87). Although this being-for-itself is at first grasped only as an animal form, the working Spirit which is, through the suspension of animal desire, "sich seiner nicht mehr unmittelbar im Tierleben bewußt"* (PhG 488), gives proof of its independence from animal life by manifesting itself as the force which *constitutes* its objects. But this process of *Bildung* only comes to *constitute* the working Spirit itself when the form objectively impregnated in the work becomes, in the interactive process between working community and nature, a hieroglyph of thought and no longer remains a simple animal hieroglyph. "Daher wird sie auch nicht mehr allein und ganz vom Arbeiter gebraucht, sondern mit der Gestalt des Gedankens, mit der menschlichen, vermischt"† (PhG 488).

Hegel then proceeds to describe how the process of *Bildung* continues through a productive 'dialogue' with objects more and more distinctively human until the second characteristic medium for the phenomenal manifestation of spiritual life is created, namely, *language*. The appearance of language marks the transition from the first form of spiritual self-consciousness, "Die natürliche Religion," to the second, "Die Kunstreligion"; from plastic but objectively resistant nature as the phenomenal medium of one-sided recognition, to the fluid medium of language (PhG 496), which will, in the course of its development, finally bring about a language adequate for the role of mediating that reciprocal recognition (3-b) which we have already seen to be the ultimate goal of historical Spirit.

The first form of actual language Hegel describes—having already shown (PhG 488) how a proto-language results from the 'dialogue' of work—is the hymn (PhG 496), in which "der Geist hat als dieses allgemeine Selbstbewußtsein Aller seine reine Innerlichkeit ebensowohl, als das Sein für Andre und das Fürsichsein der Einzelnen in Einer Einheit"‡ (PhG 496). The hymn is therefore that medium in which the first community, the religious cult (cf. PhG 498ff.), comes into being and manifests itself as a spiritual unity.[5] But the cult as such is not yet the substantial ethical community which appears at the beginning of Hegel's discussion of "*Geist*." This development of the cult into an ethical nation is described in the second section of "Die Kunstreligion," i.e., "Das lebendige Kunstwerk,"and this discussion brings to a conclusion Hegel's genetical account of the community. The section called "Das geistige Kunstwerk" may be read as the dramatic counterpart of Hegel's presentation of "Die sittliche Handlung" (PhG 330–42).

The ethical community becomes a substantial phenomenon, as opposed to the inherent instability of the warring lordly herds, through the mediation of nature. This is brought about by means of the family, which, in the development of religious language, has become an institutionalized death-

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* "no longer immediately aware of itself in animal life."

† "Therefore it [i.e., the animal shape] is now no longer exclusively and completely used by the worker, but becomes mixed with the shape of thought, the human shape."

‡ "Spirit, as this universal self-consciousness of All, has its pure interiority unified with the being for Others and the being-for-themselves of the individuals."

cult. It is important to notice, however, that the servile mode of self-consciousness plays no direct role in the ethical life of this community, despite the fact that its most spiritual work, language, is an essential factor in the institutionalization of the community. Once established, the community assigns the servile group to an extra-institutional status, i.e., slavery.

The family is a necessary counterbalance in the life of an ethical community because the lord as such is only able to give proof of his non-natural or human status through the act of risking his life. But, as we have seen, this act is not a determinate negation. What the lord does in risking his life is indistinguishable from what *every* lord does. This act brings about no determinate and subsisting work; the highest work ("höchste Arbeit," PhG 322) which the lord undertakes for the ethical community is death. And the lord is only recognized as a citizen of the community in so far as he faces death. But he is not recognized as *this particular* lord in his uniquely lordly action; he only reveals himself as at one with all who face the abstract or *universal* negation of death. He is, in Kojève's words, "*one* anonymous warrior, not lord *so-and-so*."[6]

The ethical community is therefore seen to require the family as a factor which stabilizes the whole by recognizing its individual members as individuals. And the lord accordingly manifests himself, not merely as a lord over servants or as a citizen-warrior, but also as the member of a family. The family, in turn, is constituted through the three nature determined relations of (a) man and woman, (b) parents-child and (c) brother-sister (PhG 324ff.). This structure of mutual recognition within the family is not, of course, a distinctively human form of recognition. The individual members are distinguished or individuated on the basis of their merely biological relation to this whole. This recognition is therefore an acknowledgment of the passive *being* of the member, not of his truly human and active *being-there*. The family accordingly manifests itself as a community of the dead rather than the living; it does not undertake any characteristically human act vis-à-vis its members *qua* living and behaves toward each as if it were spiritually dead, i.e., a mere being. There is, nevertheless, one peculiar act through which the family reveals itself as a spiritual community rather than merely a biological nexus for the birth and natural subsistence of its members. This is the act of burial. In this act it elevates itself above simply natural life by consciously refusing to allow its individual member to be negated through the multiplicity of desiring and disintegrating organisms in nature; it takes over this work of nature and weds its no longer living blood relation to the bosom of the earth, "der elementarischen unvergänglichen Individualität"* (PhG 323).[7]

The ethical nation with which Hegel begins his discussion of "Geist" thus appears as constituted through a delicate equilibrium involving two opposed factors, the *universality* of the citizen-lords or the state, on the one hand, and the *singularity* of the ethical family, on the other. The former is preserved by the mature death-defying masculine element; the latter, however, is permeated with the womanly instinct to conserve individual life as such. And since the citizen-lord is only an individual through his family membership, his active life is necessarily tragic. He can attain no lasting satisfaction in either and his action in one sphere is a violation of the other.

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* "the elemental and imperishable individuality."

The beautiful simplicity of ethical life is thus grounded on a dichotomy which will spell its fate. But in so far as the act is only that of an individual lord, the tragic fate is his and the community does not suffer.[8] The ethical world is finally destroyed when a powerful youth, still under the familial principle of singularity, is thrust unripe from the bosom of the family and, under the influence of intriguing women, seizes the helm of the ethical state and becomes *recognized* in his singularity as the power of the whole (PhG 340–41).[9] Through this act the simple universality of the lordly nation is transcended and replaced by a universality which knows no limit, the all-conquering Empire.

The whole of Hegel's subsequent discussion of historical Spirit is a development of the problems issuing from the breakdown of the delicate structure of recognition constituting the ethical community. Men are no longer recognized as citizen-lords but rather as legal persons, no longer as fearless warriors but simply as common soldiers in the service of a powerful emperor. The anthropogenetic and ethically sustaining distinction between Lordship and Servitude is accordingly dissolved into an abstract universality.

The most curious feature of Hegel's description of the historical stage which follows the destruction of the ethical nation is his preoccupation with language as the sole factor mediating the entire development until the French Revolution (PhG 414ff.).[10] This seems to follow from the fact that, since genuine Lordship and Servitude have collapsed without finding any actually human surrogate forms of recognition, Spirit can only express itself in a linguistic form of pseudo-nobility (PhG 358ff.) and pseudo-service (PhG 359ff.). Thus the estrangement from self, which is the central feature of this *second* stage of spiritual *Bildung*, "geschieht allein in der *Sprache*"* (PhG 362). "We," the readers, accordingly follow the course of this development as it manifests itself in a self-interpreting and ultimately self-transforming flow of language.

The critical transition occurs as a result of the ideological battle between the languages of "belief" and "pure insight" in Hegel's brilliant description of the dialectic of Enlightenment (PhG 383–413). This is a struggle in which a self-consciousness which had escaped from the self-estranged and meaningless life of Culture (Bildung) and had come to a belief in an eternal life grounded in a transcendental lord, is dialectically reduced to naught by attempting to defend itself and its religious belief with the content-negating rationalist language of its opponent, enlightened self-consciousness. The truth of this process which destroys all belief in a transcendent foundation for human values is the emergence of utility as the sole object of human consciousness. Spirit therefore seems to have come full circle and returned to the state of seeking satisfaction through a negative activity characteristic of mere animal desire, i.e., consumption. No doubt the range of objects upon which animal desire feeds at this stage has increased many-fold during the two stages of historical *Bildung* which Hegel has described. But the mode of negation is nonetheless parallel.

At the same time, however, the social world resulting from the long process of *Bildung* is also revealed through the truth of Enlightenment to have no foundation. And thus the dialectic of words gives way to an act in which all the isolated personalities unite in a single *work*: a revolution which destroys the distinct cultural spheres in which the restricted isolated spheres of individual life had

* "takes place exclusively in *language*."

become confined. As a purely negative work, the revolution has, of course, no subsistence. But it does give rise to the terror and this is what Hegel takes to be the most significant result: man is once again forced to encounter his absolute lord, *death*.

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For the Hegel of Jena, this second encounter with death was viewed as the major turning point in the course of human history. Spiritual self-consciousness, which had lost its sense of being at home in the world with the collapse of the ethical community, was now seen to face the possibility of returning to itself through the establishment of a new ethical community. He expresses this most directly in his Jena lectures, where he compares the terror of Robespierre to the condition of fear and discipline (Gehorsam) out of which the Greek polis emerged: "so in der französischen Revolution erhielt eine fürchterliche Gewalt den Staat, das Ganze überhaupt. Diese Gewalt ist nicht Despotismus, *sondern Tyrannei*, reine entsetzliche Herrschaft; aber sie ist *notwendig* und *gerecht*, insofern sie den Staat als dieses *wirkliche Individuum konstituiert und erhält*."[*11]

The ethical community Hegel foresaw at this stage of his life was not simply to be a return to a nation of citizens recognized as lords but unable to attain any real satisfaction. As he observes in the important introduction (PhG 255–61) to his description of utopianism in the PhG, the ancient state of one-sided recognition is "no longer" ("nicht mehr"). But he also discusses a form of ethical life, a structure of recognition, which has "not yet" ("noch nicht") appeared. These pages are clearly not descriptive in the sense outlined by Hegel in the Introduction to the PhG. But they are most illuminating for the reader who is attempting to grasp the interrelationship between Hegelian phenomenology and history.

The critical point is the twofold significance of the "not yet." For that practical consciousness which simply finds itself in a ready-made world, the "not yet" is felt as a law imprinted on its individual heart, as vocation to which it alone has been appointed. It thus attempts to transform the world, to bring objective reality into accord with its subjective certainty. Hegel describes the experience of this utopian reformist in "Das Gesetz des Herzens" (PhG 266–74) and its fateful submission to the course of the world (N.B., not history) in "Die Tugend und der Weltlauf" (PhG 274–82).

The other sense of "not yet" is, for the PhG as a whole, more important. But this sense is only grasped by those who have already comprehended the "no longer," those who realize its significance as a moment of *historical* spirit because they know its fundamental *Begriff*. It is only for these that the ethical community which is "not yet" will be more than a nostalgic yearning for a world that once was or a utopian dream for a heaven on earth.

These 'comprehending ones' are none other than the readers of the PhG. "We" realize that in "our" age the beautiful ethical life of pagan Greece has been lost (PhG 261) and "we" also know why the ethical ideal lives on in the hearts of men. "We" know this because we have comprehended the

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[*] "in like manner, the State, the whole as such, fell into the hands of a horrifying power. This power is not despotism *but tyranny*, pure terrifying Lordship; but this tyranny is *necessary* and *just*, in so far as it *constitutes and maintains* the State as this *actual individual*."

development of the human spirit. Finally, "we" have grasped the *goal* ("Ziel") of Spirit's development, we know the *Begriff* of recognition, "nämlich das anerkannte Selbstbewußtsein, das in dem andern *freien* Selbstbewußtsein die Gewißheit seiner selbst, und eben darin seine Wahrheit hat …"* (PhG 256, emphasis added).

How do "we" know this? The first answer to this question is really very easy: because Hegel has described the origin and development of the human spirit and "we," who have learned how to read his phenomenological descriptions, understand him. But since "our" knowledge seems to be made contingent upon Hegel by this answer, it is almost irresistible to ask: How does Hegel know this? Once again, the answer may be simply stated: He knows because he does not judge. And this, it will be recalled, is the very essence of Hegel's phenomenological method.

The contrast between judging forms of self-consciousness and Hegel's is brought out at the very end of the most clearly historical chapter of the PhG, "Geist" (PhG 462–72). Unlike those who find an evil motive in every act the better to display their own good nature, the "Kammerdiener der Moralität" for whom there can be no heroes (PhG 467–68), Hegel has recognized the spiritual significance of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Through this he has grasped the spiritual role of death in the genesis of man and the necessity of terror and warfare in the development of that ethical community which is "not yet." Thus he greeted the coming Spirit with the word of reconciliation: "Das versöhnende *Ja*, worin beide Ich von ihrem entgegengesetzten *Dasein* ablassen … ist der erscheinende Gott mitten unter ihnen, die sich als das reine Wissen wissen"† (PhG 472).

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With these words Hegel concludes his description of historical Spirit.[12] The question of "the appearing God" has been a subject of considerable debate. In view of the context, the assumption that Hegel is here referring to the God of Christian religion seems to be at best moot. A clue for an alternative interpretation may be found in Hegel's Jena lectures of 1805–1806 where he speaks of the "great men" who constitute a state which is the "simple absolute Spirit."[13] He says that such a great man is a God ("er ist ihr Gott"[14]). Moreover, he speaks of the need for a philosophical *reconciliation* with the acts which necessarily accompany the founding of a true state and which otherwise appear as evil. He also observes[15] that Germans tend to shy away from the terror of death, and that they adjudge Machiavellianism as the most evil of doctrines. But Machiavellianism is the philosophical complement of the "Great man"; it is the spirit of reconciliation. "In diesem großen Sinne ist *Macchiavellis* Fürst geschrieben, daß in der Konstituierung des Staats überhaupt das, was Meuchelmord, Hinterlist,

* "namely that recognized self-consciousness which has the certainty of itself in another *free* self-consciousness and finds its truth precisely there."

† "The reconciling *yes*, in which both I's desist from their opposed *being-there* … is the God appearing among those who know themselves as the pure knowledge."

Grausamkeit usf. heißt, keine Bedeutung des Bösen hat, sondern die des mit sich selbst Versöhnten."*[16]

It will be recalled that Hegel, in the Preface to the PhG (p. 29), describes "das Leben des Geistes" as one which does not shy from death, as opposed to the "powerless beauty" which hates "the activity of breaking away" ("die Tätigkeit des Scheidens") and cannot tolerate the terrifying power of the negative. Perhaps it is not an accident that Hegel's "yes of reconciliation" ("versöhnendes Ja," PhG 472) is set in a strikingly parallel contrast with "the Beautiful Soul" in the closing pages of his discussion of history.

Is Hegel's PhG therefore to be regarded as a Machiavellian reconciliation with the Theseus of the modern age? Who, then, is this "great man"?

Assuming the plausibility of the general hypothesis, which the cited texts suggest, one need not search long for an answer to this last question. The man is clearly Napoleon. Moreover, Hegel's admiration for Napoleon and his hopes for Napoleon's creation, the *Rhinebund*, are matters of historical record. Among other places, Hegel expresses this attitude in a letter to his friend Niethammer written a few days after the battle of Jena: "As I did earlier, so now everyone wishes the French army good fortune, which cannot fail them because of the enormous difference between its leaders and those of its enemies."[17]

Hegel's appraisal of the French Imperium underwent a significant change in the course of the next decade. By 1816 he came round to saying, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Heidelberg, that philosophy might at last have a hearing "now that Germany has redeemed itself from the worst of tyrannies." But the change of view which this declaration announces is perhaps no more dramatic than the change in philosophical outlook which differentiates the PhG and the *Enzyklopädie*. Clearly any comprehensive study of the relationship between the PhG and Hegel's later system must take this important fact into account. But this possibility for a wider interpretation of Hegel must be examined on another occasion.[18]

* "This is the general sense in which *Machiavelli* wrote his *Prince*: in the process of constituting the state in general, acts commonly referred to as assassination, intrigue, cruelty, etc. no longer have the significance of evil but rather of acts reconciled with themselves."

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 Marxists have understandably found much of interest to them in this section of the PhG. But they frequently satisfy themselves with the observation that "Lordship and Servitude" simply offers 'another proof' that the true makers of history are the proletarians. This 'revolutionary' conclusion tends to overlook the fact that the section in question does not describe a 'class struggle' and the oppressive condition of the 'proletariat.' The struggle Hegel describes is a struggle to *death* and the conditions under which work is observed to transform man and nature is the condition of fear, namely of *death*. In short, one of the major weaknesses of Marxist theory may be seen to lie in its tendency to neglect the fact of human mortality in developing its systematic anthropology. This is perhaps one of the main reasons why Marxism has left itself open to the indictment of being, at bottom, a secularized version of the Christian eschatology.

2 This sort of assumption perhaps accounts for Baillie's remark that "the analysis of 'Religion' seems fragmentary, and inadequate to the theme. . . ." Baillie, "Translator's Introduction," *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 17.

3 Cf. PhG 477: "Der ganze Geist, der Geist der Religion. . . ."

4 Cf. PhG 486: "… ein instinktartiges Arbeiten, wie die Bienen ihre Zellen bauen."

5 Hegel adds at this point (PhG 496–97) an important observation on another divine language, the oracle, which he contrasts with the language of Socrates.

6 Kojève, *Hegel: Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, p. 59.

7 For a further discussion of the earth as the universal individuality see PhG 219ff.

8 Hegel also shows how the act of an individual woman—his example is clearly Antigone—is tragic in a complementary manner.

9 Kojève makes the plausible suggestion that the powerful youth to which Hegel refers is Alexander the Great.

10 Cf. Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. I, p. 227 n.

11 Hegel, *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 246.

12 As we have seen, the development of historical Spirit is described in Chapters VI and VII of the PhG. According to the hypothesis of this study their chronological order is as follows:

VII, A
VII, B, a & b
VI, A, a
VI, A, b = VII, B, c
VI, A, c
VII, C
VI, B & C

13 *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. II, p. 246.

14 *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 246.

17 Marheineke, Schulze *et al.*, eds., *Briefe von und an Hegel*, Vol. 19 of *Hegels Werke* (Leipzig, 1887), p. 69. Translation by William Knight.

18 Alexandre Koyré has suggested that the completeness of Hegel's system is only possible on the assumption that History is over. Cf. Koyré, *Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique*, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1961, p. 173. Alexandre Kojève has developed Koyré's suggestion into a highly imaginative interpretation of Hegel's philosophy as a whole. Among other things, Kojève also comes to the conclusion that the God of PhG 472 is Napoleon. Cf. Kojève, "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme," in *Critique*, Nos. 3–4, pp. 361ff. But his argument is not based on the Jena lectures we have cited. It seems rather to be developed out of the Koyré hypothesis about the end of history, for, according to Kojève's interpretation, the Napoleonic empire did mark for Hegel the end of history. Indeed, this seems also to be Kojève's view.

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